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Despite heightened international recognition of the importance of corporate governance in 
reinforcing the financial stability and restoring the confidence of investors, minority 
shareholders (especially those from developing countries, including Saudi Arabia) still suffer 
some forms of expropriation at the hands of majority shareholders. There has been grave 
concern because most listed corporations in these countries still operate under the dominance 
of controlling shareholders (state’s representatives and wealthy families’ members) who use 
their influence to misappropriate the funds meant for the company to maximize their own 
interests to the detriment of minority shareholders. 
 
Thus, the primary aim of this thesis was to examine the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia. In order to 
explore this issue, the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance were 
compared between the UK and Saudi Arabia. The choice of the UK as a benchmark for 
comparison was motivated by its global reputation in terms of good corporate governance 
practices. Besides this, the comparison highlighted the differences and similarities between 
the two jurisdictions in corporate governance practices, and thus examined the possibilities of 
transplanting some of the UK corporate governance practices to help improve the situation in 
Saudi Arabia. Based on these comparisons, three key findings were highlighted: (1) corporate 
governance practice in the UK and Saudi Arabia reflects some elements of a global standard 
of good corporate governance; (2) the concentrated share ownership structure in Saudi Arabia 
contributes to the abuse and expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders; and (3) the 
Saudi security market has a legal system that is characterised by weak protection of the rights 
of minority shareholders.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that corporate governance practices would be better 
for minority shareholders if its laws and regulations were modified to ensure adequate 
protection of the minority shareholders’ rights. Importantly, adopting some of the UK 
corporate governance practices would steer significant changes in the way that corporations 
are governed in Saudi Arabia, such as encouraging the use of electronic voting and proxy by 
email, granting minority shareholders easy access to company’s information and the use of 
derivative action against the abuse of board members, and also reinforcing the role and 
independence of the board of directors. 
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The system by which company is directed and controlled.1 The main 
parties in corporate governance are management, stakeholders and 
directors. Corporate governance aims to strengthen transparency and 
accountability requirements within the corporate. 
Shareholder  A person or entity that owns shares in a firm or through mutual funds. 
Minority shareholder  Those who represent a class of shareholders who do not control the 
company and are unable to influence decision-making. 
Shareholder 
activism 
Company performance monitoring by shareholders. 




The responsibility of a board of directors, before shareholders and 
other stakeholders, for corporation performance and actions. 
AGM 
 
The annual general meeting, which is usually held at the end of each 
financial year, as shareholders and management can discuss the 
previous year, place new plans for the future, elect or dismiss 
directors and address other shareholder concerns. 
Annual report 
 
An audited report issued annually by listed corporations to their 
shareholders. It should contain full information regarding financial 
results and company performance of the previous fiscal year. Also, it 
should contain plans on future outlook. 
Audit report Evaluation of the accuracy and validity of corporate financial 
information and conformity with accepted accounting practices. 
Board of 
directors 
The collective group of individuals elected by the shareholders in 
order to monitor the company management and its performance on 
their behalf. 
CEO  The chief executive officer. 
CFO The corporate executive responsible for the financial planning and 
record keeping of a corporation. 
Chairman  Highest-ranking director in a firm's board of directors. 
Code of best 
Practice 
Guiding standards for ensuring good corporate governance to all 
publicly listed corporations.   
Conflict of 
interest 
A situation in which the objectives and aims of two different parties 
are incompatible.   
Disclosure Market-influencing information and the public announcement of 
transactions. 




All market-influencing information and all material information are 
readily available to the public. 
Director  A person elected by shareholders to serve on the board of directors. 
Executive 
director 
A person who is a member of a board of directors, who is also an 
employee of the firm. 
                                                 






A person who is a member of a board of directors, but does not have 
a full-time management position at the company. 




A written report that summarises the financial status of a company for 
a stated period of time, including an income statement and balance 
sheet, describing the financial resources, profits and losses. 
Independent 
director 








The initial sale of shares by a corporation to the public. 
Inside director  
 
A member of a company's board and also an employee of the 
company. 
Insider trading  
 
Buying or selling the company shares by an insider, or upon insider 
information. 








Banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance funds. 
Institutional 
ownership 
Share ownership by institutional investors. 
Proxy 
 
A process that empowers shareholders to submit their votes without 
personally attending the annual general meeting. 
Proxy statement  
 
A document sent by listed companies to shareholders, providing 
material information on issues to be voted on at the annual general 
meeting. 
Quarterly report A report filed quarterly containing unaudited financial statements. 
Right to vote  
 
The right of shareholders to vote on matters of corporate policy at the 
annual general meeting. 
Shareholder’s 
derivative action  
Lawsuit files by a shareholder on behalf of a company, often against 
an executive officer or director. Shareholder derivative action allows 
a shareholder to sue when management has failed to do so. 








Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Research  
In recent times, the issue regarding the protection of the rights of minority shareholders has 
become the central point of many legal, economic and political debates around the world, 
specifically the conflict of interests between the managers and owners, otherwise known as 
‘the agency conflict’, which has created many problems in most publicly held corporations. 
The agency conflict characterises the assumptions of the agency theory and focuses on the 
relationship between two parties: the owners who delegate work and the managers who 
manage the company. The dominant view is that the shareholders usually expect that 
managers will act and make the best decisions in the owners’ interests. In practice however, it 
has been shown that managers tend to express their opportunistic nature and look to 
maximize their own personal goals and selfish interests to the detriment of the shareholders.2 
In other words, there is no assurance that managers will fulfil the best interests of the owners, 
since those look to increase their own different interests and involved in relationships express 
their opportunistic nature.3 
Jensen and Meckling argued in their seminal paper, that managers were squandering 
corporate and societal resources to benefit themselves.4 Therefore, a form of control 
mechanism (corporate governance) is needed to prevent managers from shirking and 
misusing their fiduciary function.5 In fact, corporate governance is seen as a system of checks 
and balances to prevent managers from acting on their selfish interests or making decisions 
that benefit themselves. The interest in the study of corporate governance can be traced to the 
seminal work of Berle and Means, which explored the evolution of big businesses from 
economic and legal perspectives.6 Berle and Means asserted that the modern world is 
characterised by a changing relationship between ownership and control of business. That is, 
with an increase in the number of shareholders of corporations, professional managers are 
                                                 
2E.I. Mostovicz, N.K. Kakabadse and A. Kakabadse, ‘Corporate governance: quo vadis?’  (2011) Corporate Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society, vol 11, no 5, pp 613-626. 
3ibid. p 614.  
4M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling ,’Theory of firm – managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol 3, no 4, pp 305-60. 
5A. Shleifer and R.W.Vishny, ‘A survey of corporate governance’ (1997) The Journal of Finance, vol. 52, pp 737-783. 
6A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1932). For more insight 
see M. S. Mizruvhi, ‘Berle and Means revisited: the governance and power of large U.S. corporations’ (2004) Theory and Society, 
University of Michigan, pp 1-28. 
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gaining an influence over businesses, whereas the capacity of individual shareholders to 
control corporations is being diminished.7 The implication of this, as Berle and Means 
argued, is that shareholders run the risk of managers utilizing the money supplied to the 
company to maximize their own utility rather than maximizing corporate value and the value 
of shares.8 
Following Berle and Means’ study, interest in the subject has continued to grow. Specifically, 
the last two decades have seen a renewed interest amongst scholars, practitioners and the 
media alike, due to the financial crisis and corporate scandals that led to the collapse of 
several large corporations, whose governance systems failed to prevent corruption and 
adequately implement risk management procedures.9 For instance, the fall of financial 
institutions in Asia, Russia, the United States and some European countries during the period 
of 1997 has contributed largely to the establishment of corporate governance as a top concern 
for international financial institutions around the world.10 
 
The 1987 market crash and the subsequent collapse of many corporations resulted in a more 
comprehensive reform of corporate governance mechanisms around the world.11 Similarly, 
the financial crisis in East Asia has affected the economies of countries such as Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. Importantly, the weakness of institutions 
in these economies is attributed to a lack of, or weak, corporate governance mechanisms. 
These corporate scandals revealed not only gaps in corporate governance,12 but also the need 
for more effective corporate governance mechanisms.13 Other countries such as the US have 
also witnessed various forms of corporate scandals. For instance, the massive failures in 
companies such as Enron and MCI Inc. (formerly WorldCom), AOL, Tyco and Arthur 
Andersen have led to political interest in corporate governance and specifically the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 by the US federal government, whose main aim was to 
restore public confidence in corporate governance.14 According to Edwards and Burns, these 
                                                 
7A. Schneider and A. G. Scherer, ‘Corporate Governance in a Risk Society’ (2015), Journal of Business Ethics, vol 126, no 2, pp 309-323. 
8ibid. 
9M. D. Ermann and R. J. Lundman (Eds), Corporate and governmental deviance: Problems of organisational behaviour in contemporary 
society (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
10M. Hossain, ‘The Corporate Governance Reporting Exercise: The Portrait of Developing Country’ (2007) International Journal of 
Business Research, VII (2), p 106. 
11Standards Australia, ‘AS 8000 - 2003 Good Governance Principle’ (2003) Standards Australia International, Sydney, p 4. 
12G. Dallas and N. Bradley, ‘Calibrating corporate governance practices: Corporate governance scores’in C.K. Low (eds), Corporate 
Governance: An Asian-Pacific critique (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, Asia, 2002) pp 75-101. 
13M. Mobius, ‘Corporate governance in Hong Kong’ in C.K. Low (ed.), Corporate governance: An Asia-Pacific critique (Hong Kong: 
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002) pp 201-223. 
14G. Farrell, ‘How Corporate Crooks Fleeced American Shareholders (and How Congress Failed to Stop Them)’America Robbed Blind 
(Wizard Academy Press 2005).  
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scandals have undermined confidence in the US business system and raised questions about 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in the US.15 
 
Importantly, “in the wake of these scandals, many of these companies saw their equity values 
plummet dramatically and experienced a decline in the credit ratings of their debt issues, 
often to junk status”.16 Similar incidences have also been reported in Australia, where failings 
in corporations such as HIH, One.Tel have led to the passage of the CLERP 9 reforms.17 In 
2011, two companies: Sino-Forest Corporation (a Canadian-listed Chinese forestry company) 
and Japanese camera company (Olympus) were the victims of corporate scandals, which was 
attributed to a failure to follow globally recognised best practices when it comes to corporate 
governance.18 According to Lin-Hi and Blumberg,  
 
The regular reappearance of these scandals calls attention to the apparent 
weaknesses in the governance structures of corporations, and ultimately raises 
the question of how good corporate governance can be ensured in the everyday 
business world, in a sustainable fashion.19 
 
The evidence above suggests that corporate fraud is associated with weak corporate 
governance and can undermine the trust and confidence of investors in the security market, 
weaken the value of firms, disrupt regular operations, produce changes in key personnel and 
even threaten the survival of related firms.20 The phenomenon above continues to baffle 
scholars and practitioners across the global. The 1990s were a landmark in the field of 
corporate governance and saw many laws being enacted to address the issues of corporate 
scandals and restore public confidence in the security market. Thus, the Cadbury Report in 
                                                 
15F.R. Edwards and A.F. Burns, U.S. Corporate Governance: What went wrong and can it be fixed?  Paper prepared for B.I.S. and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago conference, ‘Market Discipline: The Evidence across Countries and Industries’ (2003).  
16A. Agrawal and S. Chadha, ‘Corporate governance and accounting scandals’ (2005) Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLVIII, p 371.  
17J. Lee and G. Shailer, ‘The effect of board-related reforms on investors’ confidence’ (2008) Australian Accounting Review, vol 18, no 45, 
pp 123-134. 
18Top Corporate Governance Stories of 2011  http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2011/12/28/top-corporate-governance-
stories-of-2011/.  
19N. Lin-Hi, and I. Blumberg, ‘The relationship between corporate governance, global governance, and sustainable profits: lessons learned 
from BP. Corporate Governance’ (2011) The International Journal of Business in Society, vol 11, no 5, pp 571-584. 
20D.B. Farber, ‘Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?’ (2005) Accounting Review 80, pp 539-561.  M. Nourayi, 
‘Stock price responses to the SEC’s enforcement actions’ (1994) Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 13,  pp 333-347; A. Agrawal and 
S. Chadha, ‘Corporate governance and accounting scandals’ (2005) Journal of Law and Economics, vol XLVIII;  X. Yu, P. Zhang, and Y. 
Zheng, ‘Corporate governance, political connections, and intra-industry effects: Evidence from corporate scandals in China’ (2015) 
Financial Management, Spring , pp 49-80. 
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the UK21, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance22, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
200223 were born. 
Both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
Cadbury reports are public policy instruments intended to assist governments and regulators 
in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for 
corporate governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the ‘Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act’ (in the Senate) and ‘Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability and Responsibility Act’ (in the House), was enacted following the aftermath 
of high profile corporate scandals in the US and it is intended to improve board performance 
by increasing the independence of boards and by requiring them to follow more specific 
processes and procedures, to ensure that they act responsibly and independently.24 These 
regulations reflect the significance of good corporate governance as a safeguarding tool for 
modern corporations to thrive in a competitive global environment. Indeed, financial crises 
and corporate scandals have repeatedly highlighted the need to better understand the 
economic, social, political and legal determinants of corporate governance in individual 
countries.25 According to Charkham: 
The careful study of systems of corporate governance is important at the 
present time because the world of the next century will be even more 
competitive than it is now as the economies of the Far East gather speed… To 
tolerate a poor (corporate governance) system is to impose upon oneself an 
unnecessary competitive handicap.26 
 
Corporate governance therefore, is defined from the narrow and broader perspectives. 
According to the narrow view, corporate governance refers to “the internal means by which 
corporations are operated and controlled”.27 According to the broader perspective, corporate 
governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, board, its 
                                                 
21Cadbury Committee, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London, Gee and Co, Ltd 1992).  
22Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which have endorsed by 
the OECD Ministers and become as a global benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. The 
OECD Meeting May, 1999, Paris, OECD, 1999 and its revised version of 2004. Available at: www.oecd.org. 
23The U.S Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the latest legislative measures enacted to protect investors after the series of collapse of large 
American firms including Enron. 
24F.R. Edwards and A.F. Burns, ‘U.S. corporate governance: What went wrong and can it be fixed?’  Paper prepared for B.I.S. and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago conference, ‘Market Discipline: The Evidence across Countries and Industries’, Chicago, Oct. 30 Nov. 1(2003). 
25A.M. Fleckner and K.J., ‘Comparative corporate governance’ (Cambridge University Press, XXXIII + 1141, 2013) Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298998.  
26J.P. Charkham, Keeping good company: A study of corporate governance in five countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) 1.  
27OECD, ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 1999’. 
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shareholders and other stakeholders.28 Research in corporate governance is largely rooted in 
the foundational arguments of the agency theory (to be described in Chapter 2), which views 
the modern company as a nexus of contracts between principals (risk-bearing shareholders) 
and agents (managers with specialised expertise).29 
 
An important consideration in the study of corporate governance is the variations that 
characterise the system around the world. These variations are seen in terms of the focus on 
the link between the shareholder and the company, board structures and on the social 
responsibility of the firms. Over the years, views on corporate governance have been 
categorised into two contrasting models: the Anglo-American and the Continental 
European.30 The Anglo-American model, also known as the US-UK model, the shareholder-
oriented or the outsider model31, is characterised in terms of financing strategies that involve 
equity, active markets for corporate control, dispersed ownership, and flexible labour 
markets. Whereas, the Continental European model, also known as the insider model or 
stakeholder-oriented model32, is characterised in terms of financing strategies that involve 
long-term debt, ownership by large block-holders, weak markets for corporate control and 
rigid labour markets.33 Following this categorisation, different types of corporate governance 
mechanisms have emerged to include those that are firm-specific (characterised by ownership 
structure, financing strategies, board composition, and corporate control) and those that are 
country-specific (characterised by the legal and cultural environment, standard accounting 
practices, and financial system characteristics).34 
 
An important feature of these two models is that they make separate assumptions regarding 
the protection of minority shareholders. According to the Anglo-Saxon model, companies 
raise equity in the capital markets.35 Thus, in order to protect investors and the functioning of 
effective capital markets, capital market transactions are regulated, for example in the US by 
federal laws that lay down mandatory rules,36 which are complemented by standards issued 
                                                 
28ibid. 
29M. Al-Suhaibani and N. Naifar, Islamic Corporate Governance: Risk-Sharing and Islamic Preferred Shares (2014) Journal of Business 
Ethics 124, pp 623-632. DOI 10.1007/s10551- 013-1897-6. 
30ibid. 
31R.V. Aguilera and G. Jackson, ‘The cross-national diversity of corporate governance dimensions and determinants’ (2003) Academy of 
Management Review,vol 28, no 3, pp 447-465. 
32ibid. 
33M. Al-Suhaibani and N. Naifar, ‘Islamic Corporate Governance: Risk-Sharing and Islamic Preferred Shares’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
124, 201, p624. DOI 10.1007/s10551- 013-1897-6. 
34ibid. 
35P. Mantysaari, Comparative corporate governance: Shareholder as a rule-maker (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer 2005). 
36USC Section 77n (Securities Act of 1933, Section 14); 15 USC Section 78cc (a) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 29(a). 
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by security exchanges.37 According to the Continental European model, companies are 
primarily assumed to raise finance privately.38 Thus, in order to protect minority shareholders 
and creditors, companies are to a large extent regulated by mandatory provisions of company 
law.39 According to Mantysaari: 
The choice of one model instead of the other does not say anything about the 
quality of investor protection. For example, one of the fundamental purposes of 
company law in Europe is to protect creditors. Law, not contract, protects 
creditors according to the European model. In the USA, the reverse is true. 
Creditors who wish to protect themselves from shareholders or managers 
behaving opportunistically must do so by contract.40 
 
As far as the rights of minority shareholders are concerned, the literature in the field of 
corporate governance has shown that there is an ongoing conflict between majority and 
minority shareholders.41 This conflict is more pronounced or observed amongst listed 
companies in developing countries, where dominance of controlling shareholders is still the 
norm. Indeed, an increase in concentrated ownership and control is seen as an advantage to 
controlling shareholders but at the expense of the rights of minority shareholders and 
creditors. Previous research has shown that countries that are characterised by a low level of 
legal protection of minority shareholders’ rights also have a high level of concentration of 
ownership and control.42 By contrast, countries with greater quality of protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights are distinguished by separated or dispersed patterns of ownership.43 
1.2 Minority Shareholders and their Rights 
1.2.1 Minority Shareholders 
Minority shareholder problem occurs due to the influence that managers and majority 
shareholders (or so-called the controlling shareholders) exert in the day-to-day activities of 
the organisation, which allows them to control the decision-making and extract private 
                                                 
37P. Mantysaari, Comparative corporate governance: Shareholder as a rule-maker (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 2005) 
38ibid. 
39K.J. Hopt and W. Gesellschaftsrecht, in H.W. Festschrift für, For the history of investor protection in Germany (2002) pp 1015-1016; 
 B.R. Cheffins, ‘Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at the Tum of the 20th Century’ (2003), 
AJCL 51, pp 499-500. 
40P. Mantysaari, Comparative corporate governance: Shareholder as a rule-maker (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer 2005) 4. 
41R. La Porta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) Journal of Political Economy 106, pp 1151-52. 
42McKinsey & Company Report, ‘Giving New Life to the Corporate Governance Reform Agenda for Emerging Markets’, Survey (2001) pp 
1-6; J. Grant and T. Kirchmaier, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe’, The Centre for Economic Performance 




benefits at the expense of minority shareholders’ rights.44 Shareholders can be major or 
minor, depending on the controlling interests they have in the company. Thus, it is necessary 
to understand the concept of ‘shareholder’ including ‘majority’ and ‘minority shareholders’. 
The term shareholder (or stockholder) refers to people who own shares or stocks in an 
institution or mutual fund.45  
In fact, they are the owner of shares in a company.46 The Articles of Association of a firm 
may authorise classes of shares including ordinary shares, preference shares and other 
specialised types of shares.47 According to Perakis, shareholders are the members of the 
company who technically hold a participation interest in its capital (equity holders), composed 
of relatively small units called shares.48 Bloomsbury Business Library (BBL) defines a 
shareholder as ‘a person who owns shares of a fund or investment trust’.49  
The expression of minority shareholding refers to a shareholder who owns less than 50% per 
cent of voting rights, and thus this percentage does not enable minority shareholders to 
exercise influence over the company’s decision making.50 By contrast, majority shareholders 
are those persons or entities that hold more than 50% per cent of the shares within the firm’s 
capital, which empowers them to control the company's affairs, and more significantly, 
enabling the election and dismissal of the board members, deciding directly or indirectly on 
the wages of the managers and dividends, deciding on incorporation, buying and selling the 
company’s assets, increasing or decreasing the capital of the company.51 
 
Kinkki (2008) suggested that controlling shareholders are able to identify decisions made by 
executives in a corporation.52 Minority shareholders have limited influence on decision 
                                                 
44Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R., ‘Large shareholders and corporate control’, Journal of Political Economy, (1986), vol. 94, pp 461-488., 
Jensen, M., ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers’, American Economic Review, (1986), pp 323-329. Gadhoum, 
Y., Lang, L. and Young, L., ‘Who controls US?’, European Financial Management’, (2005), vol. 11, no. 3, pp 339-363. Lang, L. H. and 
Litzenberger, R., ‘Dividend announcements: cash flow signalling vs. free cash flow hypothesis’, Journal of Financial Economics, (1989), pp 
181-91. Peasnell, L., Pope, P. and Young, S., ‘Managerial equity ownership and the demand for outside directors’, European Managerial 
Management, (2003), vol. 9, no. 2, pp 231-250. 
45Oglesby, D.W. ‘Shareholders' (2007) Concise Encyclopaedia of Investing, pp 65-66. 
46Bob Tricker, Essential Director: The Essential A-Z (The Economist: Economist Books 2003) pp170-171. 
47ibid. 
48E. Perakis, ‘Rights of Minority Shareholders’, XVIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, General and Notional 
Reports (Brisbane, Australia 2002) p16.  
49Bloomsbury Business Library-Business and Management Dictionary (2007) p 6764. 
50Lee, f. 'Four Models of Minority Shareholder Protection. in. Takeover s'. European Business Law Review. 16. 4. (2005) p 803. Institute of 
Directors, ‘Protection for Minority Shareholders’, (2015), p 1. It is available at: http://www.iod.com/guidance/briefings/cgbis-directors-
service-agreement.  
51Szeutkuti. D. ‘Minority shareholder protection rules ill Germany, France and in the UK-A Comparative Overview’. Thesis submitted at 
Central European University, (2007), p 9. Angelika Gorak, 'The Interests of Minority and Majority Shareholders in the EU', Journal of 
International Affairs, (2014) no. 1. It is available at: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/1086/the-interests-of-minority-and-majority-
shareholders-in-the-eu.  




making, but literature suggests that minority shareholders’ rights can be important 
components of the company policy.53 The Bloomsbury Business Library defines a majority 
shareholder as a stockholder with a controlling interest in a company.54  
 
Minority shareholders on the other hand, are defined as shareholders who, irrespective of the 
amount of capital they provide, are unable to exercise a significant form of control within the 
company.55 Importantly, minority shareholders are small parts of shareholders who do not 
dominate the company or have sufficient power to exercise their influence on the company 
decision-making.56 Article (2) of the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (SCGRs) 
defines minority shareholders as ‘those shareholders who represent a class of shareholders 
that do not control the company and hence they are unable to influence the company’.57  
 
Controlling shareholders can be attributed to their controlling rights more than their cash flow 
rights. In reality, the controlling shareholders possibly exist in legal systems that do not have 
strong protection for minority shareholders from majority shareholders' oppression.58 
Majority shareholders are characterized by their motives and engagement in the company’s 
decision making, attainment of personal goals on account of minority shareholders’ rights, 
thereby neglecting justice and fairness.59 
It is important to note that directors and controlling shareholders, who own a controlling 
interest or exercise control over the company, are subject to a fiduciary duty towards minority 
shareholders.60 As is well-known that the fiduciary duty always relies on the trust between 
the trustee and the beneficiary, and therefore it guarantees protection to minority shareholders 
whilst also deterring controlling shareholders from conducting self-dealing transactions or 
abuse of their power.61 To restore the balance in the relationship between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders, the fiduciary duty should expand all responsibilities 
of directors and controlling shareholders to involve such implications resulting from failure 
                                                 
53ibid. 
54Bloomsbury Business Library-Business and Management Dictionary (2007) p 6764. 
55Netherlands Comparative Law Association. ‘Rights of Minority Shareholders in the Netherlands’. Available at: 
http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-12.html. 
56Article (2) Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Regulations issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority Resolution No 1/212/2006 
dated 21/10/1427 AH corresponding to 12/11/2006.  
57Ibid art (2). 
58La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanez, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R., ‘Law and finance’, Journal of Political Economy, (1998), 106, pp 1113-
1155. 
59For more insight about important minority stockholders in companies see: http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/business-
law/important-minority-stockholders-in-companies-business-law-essay.php.  
60Levy, R. E. 'Freeze-out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymmetry between Tender Offers and Negotiated Mergers', 




of the company, merger and acquisition, selling the company’s assets in price below the 
market value. In all cases, directors and controlling shareholders must be responsible for the 
duty of care, good faith, duty of disclosure and also they should fulfil the best interest of the 
corporation.62 
1.2.2 Rights of Minority Shareholders and their Protection Issues 
Before discussing what the rights of minority shareholders are, it is necessary to justify the 
reason why minority shareholders should receive protection and what the ultimate goal of this 
protection should be. Several reasons have been given to justify why minority shareholders 
should receive protection. First, weak protection of minority shareholders increases the average 
cost of capital for a company, putting it at a competitive disadvantage with foreign 
companies.63 Secondly, the confidence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal 
system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated.64 Thirdly, with the 
common aim of improving market credibility, the choice and ultimate design of different 
provisions to protect minority shareholders necessarily depends on the overall regulatory 
framework and the national legal system.65 
Minority shareholders should be confident that their funds will be invested in a safe area and 
protected from the abuse and misconduct of management and controlling shareholders. A 
legal protection of minority shareholders is considered the best tool to encourage investment 
in the stock market. Lazarides suggested that there is a solid relationship between strong law 
and the protection of minority shareholders’ rights: ‘better protection comes from better legal 
protection, stronger structure of the internal control mechanisms and more efficient capital 
markets and market for corporate control’.66 
 
In recent years, a number of studies67 have revealed an inverse relationship between the 
protection of rights of minority shareholders and a higher valuation of corporate assets with 
more developed and valuable capital markets. Following this, scholars in the past decade 
                                                 
62ibid.  
63The Netherlands Comparative Law Association, ‘Rights of Minority Shareholders in the Netherlands’. Available at: 
http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-12.html. 
64OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Draft for Public Comment – November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Principles-CG-2014-Draft.pdf. 
65ibid. 
66Jonida Rustemaj, ‘The New Legal Regime on Minority Shareholder Protection in Albania’ (2012) European Journal of Business and 
Economics, vol 6, p 40. 
67Cooter, R.D., ‘Innovation, Information and the Poverty of Nations’ (2005) FLA. ST. U. L. REV, vol 33. p 373; Glaeser, E. et al. ‘Coase 
versus the Coasians’ (2001) 116:3 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON 853-899. 
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reached a consensus suggesting that minority shareholders deserve legal protection, not only 
for equitable reasons but for efficiency considerations as well.68 
 
The OECD principles of corporate governance set out the rights and equitable treatment of 
shareholders and key ownership functions. The principle states that: 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.69 
 
The OECD principles further outline the basic rights of shareholders to include the right to: 
‘1) secure methods of ownership registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant 
and material information on the corporation at a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and 
vote in general shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share 
in the profits of the corporation’.70 These rights are detailed below: 
 
1. Shareholders should be sufficiently informed about, and have the right to approve or 
participate in, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, such as: i) 
amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar governing 
documents of the company; ii) the authorisation of additional shares; and iii) 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets, that 
in effect result in the sale of the company.  
2. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general 
shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting 
procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings  
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including 
questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general 
meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.  
4. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the 
nomination and election of board members should be facilitated. Shareholders should 
                                                 
68Salama, B.M., and Prado, ‘V.M. Legal protection of minority shareholders of listed corporations in Brazil: brief history, legal structure and 
empirical evidence’ (2011) Journal of Civil Law Studies, vol 4, no 1, pp 147-185. 
69OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Draft for Public Comment – November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Principles-CG-2014-Draft.pdf. 
70OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004. 
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be able to make their views known, including through votes at annual shareholder 
meetings on the remuneration of board members and key executives. The equity 
component of compensation schemes for board members and employees should be 
subject to shareholder approval.  
5. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia and equal effect should be 
given to votes, whether cast in person or in absentia.71 
 
According to the OECD principle, all shareholders of the same series of a class should be 
treated equally. In terms of minority shareholders, the principle states that: ‘minority 
shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, controlling 
shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of redress. 
Abusive self-dealing should be prohibited’72.   
Different countries have their own legislations that provide protections for minority 
shareholders. For example, the Canada Business Corporations Act provides several 
protections for minority shareholders. These include: the right to apply to the court for a 
remedy where a shareholder believes that the affairs of a company have been conducted in an 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial manner; a shareholder can apply to the court for leave to 
bring an action on behalf of a company to remedy a wrong to the company (otherwise known 
as derivative action); a shareholder has the right to require a company to buy its shares for 
fair value where that shareholder dissents from a shareholder vote, approving certain 
fundamental corporate changes.73 In Brazil, the Corporation Law provides a legal framework 
for protecting minority shareholders in listed corporations. It sets out five essential rights of 
minorities to include: (1) the right to receive dividends; (2) the right to participate in the sale 
of the corporation’s assets upon liquidation; (3) the right to supervise the corporation’s 
bodies; (4) the right of first refusal that arises upon the subscription of shares, founders shares 
convertible into shares, debentures convertible into shares and subscription bonuses; and (5) 
the right to withdraw from the corporation in specific instances set forth under the 
Corporations Law.74 
                                                 
71ibid. 
72ibid. 
73Mohtadi, P. and Fox, S., ‘Control and Minority Protection: Canada: International Joint Ventures’ (2010) pp503-4161. Available at: 
www.practicallaw.com/9 . 
74Salama, B.M. and  Prado, V.M., ‘Legal protection of minority shareholders of listed corporations in Brazil: brief history, legal structure 
and empirical evidence’ (2011) Journal of Civil Law Studies, vol 4, no1, pp 147-185. 
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As the above review reveals, different countries seem to have specific legislation in place that 
provides protection for minority shareholders. In terms of analysis of Saudi context, the 
OECD principles of corporate governance will be used. Specifically, the analysis will focus 
on all five out of six OECD principles of corporate governance75, which are specifically 
related to protection of rights of minority shareholders: 
1) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework  
2) Rights of shareholders and key ownership functions  
3) Equitable treatment of shareholders  
4) Disclosure and transparency  
5) Responsibilities of the board 
 
1.3 The Dilemma of Minority Shareholders 
Previous studies have shown that most companies in the world are dominated by controlling 
family members, which tentatively suggests that the conflict of interests between the minority 
and majority shareholders is inevitable.76 The major concern is that controlling shareholders 
may use the company’s profits to benefit themselves instead of returning the revenues to 
minority shareholders or outside shareholders.77 In the celebrated English case of Burland v 
Earle, Lord Davey affirmed that most abuse of power takes place when "...the majority 
shareholders are endeavouring directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves money, 
property or advantages which belong to the company or in which other shareholders are 
entitled to participate".78 
 
According to Dari ‘it is a well settled legal position that the rule of majority will prevail if the 
decision of the majority is in accordance with the provisions of the company law’.79 For 
instance, in a famous case of Foss v Harbottle, the court refused to interfere in the 
management of the company at the instance when the minority shareholders were dissatisfied 
with the conduct of the company’s affairs by its board of directors. The courts further 
                                                 
75OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD), (2004). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.  
76M. Santiago-Castro, ‘Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority shareholders’ rights: Evidence from Latin America’, PhD 
Thesis, University of Texas-Pan American, UTPA (2005). Sarbanes- Oxley Act  2002, U.S. Congress. 
77M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, Theory of firm – managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976) Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol 3, no 4, pp 305-360. 
78Per Lord Davey: Burland v Earle (1902) AC 83. 
79S. S. Dari, ‘Majority rule and minority protection under companies Act 1956 with special reference to Foss vs. Harbottle’ (2014)  IJR, vol 
1, no 9, p 1400.  
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clarified that if the company directors are supported by the majority shareholders in what they 
do, the minority shareholders, in general, can do nothing about it.80 There are different ways 
in which rights of minorities can be violated, and these include investing in inefficient 
projects, awarding failed contracts by board members (as well as directors, who can direct 
cash and loans for their private benefits or to their relatives and friends, instead of returning 
and dividing it among the minority shareholders). Another example is directors or controlling 
shareholders selling the company’s assets, or its production, to another firm they own at a 
price below the market value. In addition, the expropriation of the rights of minority 
shareholders may occur when the controlling shareholders appoint unqualified family 
members to sit on the company’s management or the board of directors. 
The weakness of judicial systems is a crucial factor that reinforces directors and controlling 
shareholders to oppress and abuse the rights of minority shareholders. For instance, the case 
of Atwool v Merryweather revealed that preventing minority shareholders from exercising 
their right against directors and controlling shareholders will always give the latter the 
opportunity to engage in transactions, which will always divert the firm’s profits to their own 
interests. In the above case, the problem emerged when the two directors Merryweather and 
Whitworth conducted a secret deal by selling mines to the corporation. As a result, the court 
affirmed that “…the whole contract is a complete fraud”.81 
The evidence above suggests that issues regarding the protection of rights of minority 
shareholders in the security markets have been a subject of controversy and scholarly 
debate.82 For instance, Bebchuk argued that a major issue facing minority shareholders is that 
they are unable to challenge the company directors.83 He proffered a solution based on giving 
minority shareholders the power to change the company’s charter and challenge the 
directors.84 It has been argued that strengthening of shareholder’s rights is a crucial element 
in reforming and stabilising the financial institutions. Therefore, shareholders should be 
empowered to use their shares to participate in the decision-making processes of the 
company.85 
 
                                                 
80ibid. 
81Atwool v Merryweather (1867) LR 5 EQ 464. 
82
 L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of Shareholder Franchise’ (2007) Harvard Law School: Virginia Law Review, vol 93, pp 1-40;  M. Lipton and 
W. Savitt, ‘The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk’ (2007) Virginia Law Review, vol 93, pp733-743; M.M. Siems, ‘Shareholder protection 
around the world’ (2007) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 359. 
83L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of Shareholder Franchise’ (2007) Harvard Law School: Virginia Law Review, vol 93, pp 1-40. 
84ibid. 
85J. Velasco, ‘Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously’ (2007) University of California, Davis, vol 41, pp 605-681. 
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The failure of Enron Company has increased debate in US literature concerning corporate 
governance and has influenced legislation aimed at providing adequate protection of 
shareholders against the abuse of directors and controlling shareholders.86 In the EU, the 
European Parliament has also endorsed and enacted the so-called A Directive on Shareholder 
Rights, which supported the position of shareholders in listed corporations, for instance, 
giving shareholders the right to use new media at the general meeting.87 
 
Similarly, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance affirmed that ‘…the corporate 
governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights’.88 
These principles, which are used by some countries and international organisations, such as 
the IMF and the World Bank, are seen as a panacea par excellence for good corporate 
governance systems and strengthening the protection of rights of the minority shareholders. 
In Saudi Arabia, applying corporate governance principles in the listed corporations has 
increased dramatically, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis of 2006. Specifically, 
this awful financial crisis hit the Saudi stock market and made the price index plummet by 
approximately 13,000 points within one month (65% of its maximum level).89 This resulted 
in heavy losses to many Saudi people, especially the minority shareholders, who are yet to 
recover their losses or obtain fair compensation following the collapse. 
The collapse of the Saudi stock market in 2006 has been attributed to poor monitoring and 
supervision of the market, the weakness of transparency and disclosure requirements and the 
lack of adequate legal and judicial protection tools. Importantly, the core issue facing 
minority shareholders in the Saudi stock market is that the listed corporations have not 
complied fully with the provisions of the corporate governance rules.90 Indeed, the Saudi 
stock market is suffering from an insufficient legal framework, a weak judicial enforcement 
                                                 
86Enron Corporation was headquartered in Houston, US, and operated one of the biggest natural gas transmission networks in North 
America. It is deemed as the largest marketer of energy in the United States. The company reached the figure (7) on the Fortune 500 list in 
2000 as “Most Innovative” in the United States listing for many years. Its bankruptcy occurred in December 2001 and became the largest 
breakdown in United States history. The name of Enron Corporation became synonymous with corporate greed and corruption over the 
world, and its collapse cost investors and employees more than $70 billion in lost capitalisation and retirement bonuses. Twenty-two Enron 
directors and partners were convicted of criminal charges for their roles in Enron's collapse. Arthur Andersen was found guilty of fraud; 
other Andersen partners were also personally convicted of crimes committed during their work at Enron Company. Whereas several Enron 
directors received probation, others received lengthy imprisonment terms, including CFO Andrew Fastow; accounting Chief Richard 
Causey; CEO of the trading unit, David Delainey; and Treasurer Ben Glisan. In addition, former Chairman Ken Lay and CEO Jeff Skilling 
were found guilty in May 2006. Skilling, guilty of nineteen counts of security and wire fraud, was sentenced over twenty-four years in 
federal prison and began serving his term in December 2006. Ken Lay died suddenly in July 2006 before sentencing, but lately in November 
2006 Lay's conviction was voided. In 2006, the U.S Judiciary Authority declared plans to chase Lay's properties in civil court in an attempt 
to recover some of Enron's losses. For more insight visit: https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/doe08.  
87The European Parliament and the Council on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (2005) /0265 (COD), 
Brussels, 1 June 2007.  
88The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004, Principle No2. 
89A.A. Al-Twaijry, ‘Saudi Stock Market Historical View and Crisis Effect: Graphical and Statistical Analysis’ (2007) Journal of Human 
Sciences, vol 34, pp 1-2. 
90K. I. Falgi, ‘Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A stakeholder Perspective’ (2009) PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, UK,  p 295. 
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and the lack of accountability.91 Previous studies have also shown that trading upon insider 
information is a common factor in the Saudi stock market and this threatens the market 
integrity.92 In addition, the weakness of available information issued by the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) or listed corporations, constitutes a great obstacle amongst shareholders 
and investors and it also reduces cash flow to the Saudi securities market.93 In fact, the 
drawbacks above contributed largely to heightened fears among shareholders, as well as lack 
of confidence in the stock market. 
1.4 Concept of Control and Controlling Shareholders 
One key question facing practitioners and scholars of corporate governance is: Which 
shareholders should be classified as minority shareholders? For instance, in corporations that 
are widely diffused with absence or limited control, it might be that every shareholder is 
considered a minority shareholder. The listing rules of the London Stock Exchange used the 
term ‘controlling shareholder’ to describe one who determines the votes of 30% or more of 
the shares of the company.94 According to Leech, the way of the distribution of the shares 
among different shareholders determines the power of each, particularly the controlling 
shareholder.95 A large minority shareholder has control if the remaining shares are so widely 
distributed among a mass of small shareholders, that it is very likely that they will be able to 
determine the outcome of a vote. 
Previous research has shown that controlling shareholders would be able to take advantage of 
the controlling power to infringe the rights of dispersed minority investors.96 La Porta et al 
argued that the most important problem had been changed from one of agency, to how to 
constrain the majority shareholder from exploiting the interests of the minority 
shareholders.97 In another study that examined the ownership structure of large companies in 
27 countries around the world, La Porta et al concluded that, except in those countries whose 
legal protection of minority shareholders was already developed, such as the UK and the US, 
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in general there was a pyramidal ownership structure.98 La Porta et al defined controlling 
shareholders as those who directly and indirectly hold 20% of voting rights in the firm. 
However, it should be noted that using percentages to conceptualise control has been 
previously challenged by Cubin and Leech.99 
 
Cubin and Leech proposed taxonomy of different types of control: location of control and 
degree of control. In terms of location, they reasoned that control could either be inside or 
outside the management and they went further to divide external control into large individual 
shareholders and institutional shareholders. The degree of control however, is dependent on 
the location of control. They argued that internal controllers are expected to have a higher 
degree of control than other shareholders outside the internal management. Importantly, they 
posit that the degree of control is assessed based on the voting power exercised by a group of 
controlling shareholders. They went ahead to define a controlling shareholder as one who has 
a specified high degree of control and is able to control the direction of the firm.100 
 
It has been shown that firms or companies that are stakeholder-oriented tend to adopt the 
insider model of corporate control as it recognises that the greatest control in a firm is held by 
those who were closest to its actual workings.101  By contrast, those firms whose corporate 
governance is shareholder-oriented tend to adopt the outsider model of corporate control as it 
recognises the distance between the management of a firm and its owners.102 This view is 
consistent with Berle and Means’ assertions: that because of ‘ownership dispersion, 
shareholders as a group are powerless because no individual among them could be said to 
have any appreciable voting power or control’.103 Importantly, they argued that ‘…even a 
relatively large shareholder has little incentive to monitor the performance of the 
management, to take an interest in the direction of the firm or even to vote their shares 
because their ownership stake – small in percentage terms - gives them only a small 
entitlement to the returns accruing to their investment in those activities’.104 
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Fama and Jensen explained the concept of control from the perspective of corporate decision- 
making processes that include four steps: initiation, implementation, ramification and 
monitoring.105 The managers have the power to initiate and implement, which they referred to 
as ‘decision management’, whereas the shareholders have the power to ratify and monitor 
decisions, which they referred to as ‘decision control’.106  They defined the concept of control 
as the power of an individual or group who is/are able to control the entire decision-making 
processes considerably within the corporation (initiation, ratification, implementation and 
monitoring).107 Whereas the board of directors have the power to decide the direction of the 
firm, the control of the firm on the other hand, is the ability to select the board members, or 
influence the decision-making processes within the firm.108 
 
Based on the above review, it appears that there is no general consensus amongst scholars 
regarding the meaning of control. Whereas some argued that control is determined based on 
specified threshold of voting powers, others however, assumed that control is determined by 
a substantial degree of control or influence over the management. In fact, the concept of 
control could be said to be relative, given variations in the dispersion of shareholders in 
different countries. For example, in the UK, where ownership of listed companies is widely 
dispersed, a shareholder with not less than 75% of the voting shares in a company is able to 
control the company.109 
 
However, the reverse might be the case in a country where ownership is concentrated. A 
shareholder may have to hold at least 30% of the voting rights in the company to be able to 
influence the decision-making as is the case with Germany.110 In the US, the Delaware 
Corporation Law interprets the concept of ‘control’ by stating that a shareholder who holds at 
least 20% of the stock can exercise control over the company.111 Furthermore, in the UK, the 
controlling shareholders can be defined as ‘shadow directors’, which means a person who 
owns the power to direct and instruct the directors of the firm.112 (Though, a shadow director 
may not be classified as a controlling shareholder, but in practice, among those who are 
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shadow directors, some evidence suggest that many of them are shareholders holding a 
controlling block in their firms, and that they also own the same kind of influence on the 
board).113 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the data on the ownership structure of listed firms is limited. However, it 
appears that the ownership structure of listed corporations is highly concentrated. According 
to the report of the World Bank, roughly 1/3 of the market's total capital is owned by the 
government and another 1/3 is owned by founding families.114 Through the Corporate 
Governance Regulations, it is obvious that shareholders who hold not less than 5% of the 
equity share capital are entitled to participate and challenge the board agendas.115 In the 
section that follows, the concentration of ownership and control in Saudi Arabia is provided, 
highlighting similarities and differences on the above definitions of control.  
1.4.1 Concentration of Ownership and Control in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, the volume of the concentrated ownership represents about 70% of 
shareholdings structure in the securities market.116 Specifically, most listed corporations in 
the Saudi securities market are still working under the control of a relatively small network of 
prevalent Saudi families and business leaders.117 In fact, the dominance of ownership 
concentration in the Saudi market can be attributed to a number of factors, which are mainly 
political and legal. Saudi Arabia as a country is characterised by absolute monarchy, and 
indeed, the nature of the political system has a large impact on the life of trade and the 
economy.118 
According to the political perspective, the less democratic a State is, the weaker its minority 
shareholder protection and the more likely it is to have concentrated patterns of ownership.119 
From the perspective of the political economic theory, Gourevitch and Shinn argued that 
investor confidence is a function of political transparency and firm-level transparency.120 
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Indeed, it is not a surprise to see a high concentration of shares in the hands of few powerful 
individuals, particularly in the developing countries. These individuals, especially small 
wealthy families, own a large percentage of stocks, not just in one company, but in several 
listed corporations in the stock market. Such a tendency is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the 
Saudi stock market, characterised by high ownership of shares by wealthy families, who thus 
control the market in ways that are detrimental to the minority shareholders. Previous 
research has earlier shown that concentrated ownership structure empowers the controlling 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders’ rights.121 
 
The high concentration of ownership in Saudi Arabia is also explained from a legal point of 
view. According to the laws matter theory, the legal origin of a country has a strong influence 
in shaping the ownership structure of companies as well as the design of shareholder 
protection.122 According to this theory, countries with a background in common law offer 
good shareholder protection compared to those with civil law.123 In their major study Law 
and Finance, La Porta et al concluded that the environments favourable to shareholders are 
provided by common law countries, characterised by a dispersed ownership structure.124 
Specifically, the theory stresses an index regarding shareholder protection. In order to comply 
with certain ex-ante determined criteria, points are assigned to the legal system of a 
country.125 The criteria used for the judgement of the shareholder protection are outlined 
below. Thus, if the legal system fails to comply with these criteria, zero points are assigned. 
Scoring more points means better shareholder protection.126 According to Cools, these 
criteria serve as a standard reference in comparative corporate and financial law127 and they 
include: 
 
 One share – one vote 
 Proxy by mail allowed 
 Shares not blocked before meeting 
 Cumulative voting/proportional representation 
 Oppressed minority 
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 Pre-emptive right to new issues 
 The percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting has to be 
less or equal to 10% of the votes.128 
 
The analysis below reveals that ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is concentrated in the 
hands of the State and rich wealthy individuals. There are three main types of corporations 
that are recognised in terms of their ownership structure. These include: (1) State-controlled 
companies, (2) family-controlled companies and (3) publicly-owned companies. However, 
for the sake of analysis, only State-controlled and family-controlled corporations will be 
considered in this thesis. This is necessary in order to understand how ownership of shares is 
largely controlled by the State and in particular, wealthy families who hold huge shares in 
listed firms.  
1.4.1.1 State-Controlled Corporations  
According to the OECD, the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) constitute an integral feature of 
almost all economies in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.129 The rationale 
behind this can be seen from the post-World War II development economists, who argued 
that the State needs to take a leading role in capital accumulation and infrastructural 
investment as only the government can provide sufficient scale and capital to compete 
internationally and ‘catch up’ with advanced countries.130 Following the introduction of the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003, the involvement of State corporations in the Saudi 
Stock market has been very significant, and indeed, influential.131 This is reflected in huge 
investment in three large national funds, managed by its various agencies, which include:132 
the Public Investment Fund (PIF), General Organisation for Social Insurance and the Public 
Pensions Fund. For example, the Public Investment Fund, as part of the Ministry of Finance, 
has the mandate to invest in commercial projects that are wholly owned or partially State-
owned, either alone or in partnership with other government agencies.133 
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The official statistics revealed that the State owns 8.8 billion shares with a market 
capitalisation of 584.7 billion riyals.134 As in 2013, the statistics showed that the total stock 
market capitalisation reached SR1.75 trillion ($467.43 billion), increasing by 25.17% 
compared to the year 2012.135 By implication, this suggests that the Saudi government is 
perhaps the largest shareholder, with an ownership of almost 44% of shares.136 In the State 
corporations, the chairman and CEO of companies are appointed by the government. The 
government is also responsible for the hiring and firing of senior management, differing from 
countries where such responsibility is vested on shareholders or committees aligned with the 
board. Importantly, the strong engagement of the Saudi government in the stock market 
suggests that it is not only a major shareholder through its investments, but that it also has a 
strong managerial position. In other words, it performs two separate roles with unrestricted 
powers.137 Indeed, if the government controls the ownership structure of a company, then 
very little is left for other shareholders, regardless of their size, or to other board members 
who are not appointed by the government. Furthermore, board members not elected by the 
government cannot challenge managerial decisions made by the government representatives, 
especially if such decisions have a negative impact on the company. This in essence seems to 
work against the guidelines provided by the OECD on corporate governance of State-owned 
enterprises. The guidelines provide that: ‘the boards of State-owned enterprises should have 
the necessary authority, competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic 
guidance and monitoring of management. They should act with integrity and be held 
accountable for their actions’.138 
There are benefits to shareholders due to States’ presence in the boardrooms. For instance, 
State-owned companies are well managed, financed, resourced, and above all, the most 
profitable in the Saudi Stock market and most of these companies provide utilities such as 
electricity, whilst some invest in the petrochemical industry. Indeed, shareholders’ 
confidence in those companies is high because they believe that it is much safer to invest in 
companies where the government has a high stake and controlling power than in other 
companies. Examples of companies that fall into this category are the Saudi Arabia Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) in the petroleum sector, where the government owns 70% of 
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its shares and the Saudi Telecom Company (STC).139 As the largest listed company in the 
Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange (Tadawul), SABIC came into being in 1976 through a royal 
decree and was developed and staffed by a small number of young administrators and 
engineers who had been recruited selectively by the country’s then Crown Prince and later 
King Fahd.140 SABIC became the main agent of heavy industrialisation in Saudi Arabia, 
taking the responsibility for petrochemicals, as well as steel and fertiliser projects, away from 
the General Organisation of Petroleum and Minerals.141 Furthermore, investors are more 
likely to invest in State-controlled companies because the risk of the latter going bankrupt is 
low.142 Besides, the State invests in companies rated highly on credibility and transparency 
and such companies are likely to diversify their investments, which in turn reassures 
shareholders or investors. Indeed, a recent study by Yu revealed that a higher level of State 
ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure, due to the benefits of government 
support and political connections.143 
1.4.1.2 Family-Controlled Corporations  
Family firms represent the backbone for businesses throughout the world. According to 
Cadbury, the economic and social importance of family enterprises has recently been widely 
recognised.144 From the global perspective, they are the dominant form of business 
organisation and represent the backbone of the global economy.145 Indeed, as Stamm and 
Lubinski argued, the collapse of family firms could have an impact on the national 
economy.146 Family businesses thrive mainly in countries whose legal systems are founded 
based on civil law. According to La Porta et al, one key feature of countries with the insider 
system, which most developing countries are liable to is that its rich families are inclined to 
own substantial shareholdings in different companies listed in the stock market.147 This 
description defines the situation in the Saudi Kingdom, whereby rich families (because of 
their size) play a crucial role in the economy and invest in so many large companies. Indeed, 
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Saudi family firms dominate most of the firms that operate in the Saudi economy.148 With 
close ties with the members of the royal families through partnerships and joint ventures, 
their influence in the stock market is further strengthened.149 Besides, many companies listed 
in the stock market were originally controlled by Saudi families, who as a result wield strong 
control in the boardrooms and high managerial positions.  
For instance, companies such as banks, petrochemicals, agriculture, energy, cement, telecoms 
and transport have a heavy presence of Saudi families. Specifically, two Saudi families 
control 2 out of 11 local banks in Saudi Arabia.150 In 4 other banks, a high proportion of the 
ownership (about 15% of shares) is held by rich Saudi families.151 The majority of companies 
listed in the stock market are mainly owned by a single family. For example, the Al-Drees, 
Al-Othaim, Al-Zamil, Al-Babtain, Al-Abdullatif, Al-Hokair companies and several others 
have ownership that exceeds 40% of total shareholdings.152 
The evidence above reflects the size of family ownership in the listed companies in Saudi 
Arabia, which in turn explains how widely family-controlled firms make up companies listed 
in the stock market. Indeed, with the amount of shares controlled by these families, they are 
able to increase their wealth and wield influence over other companies. Interestingly, board 
composition in most of these companies is occupied and controlled by family members, such 
as the Al Rajhi Bank, which has members of the same family on the board including the 
firm’s CEO.   
1.4.1.3 Public-Controlled Corporations  
The review of State and family-controlled corporations above suggests that in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, corporate sectors are dominated by few State-owned enterprises and family-
held private businesses. Furthermore, the board of directors in those corporations are mostly 
government officials and/or members of the royal family. For instance, the SABIC has a 
royal family member as Chairman of the board. The two private sector representatives and 
the rest are government officials.153 The Saudi Aramco reports to its owner (the Saudi 
Arabian Government) through the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals Affairs, 
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chaired by the custodian of the two holy mosques. The Supreme Council for Petroleum and 
Minerals Affairs sets the company’s policy and objectives and its members are drawn from 
the government and the private sector.154 According to Almajid, the introduction of the CMA 
to the stock market has encouraged public participation in stock trading, which occurs in 
response to many IPOs launched, following a takeover by the CMA in regulating the stock 
market.155 However, compared to other MENA countries, the channels in which individuals 
can invest their wealth in Saudi Arabia are limited.156 Importantly, those who cannot invest in 
the real estate market tend to revert to the stock market as a viable resource for wealth. 
Specifically, this applies to the years 2004 and 2005, when the market share index increased 
dramatically with 120% of annual growth in 2005.157 
According to Almajid,  
 
Tempted by the spectacular increases in the share values of many companies, 
Saudis of all classes entered the stock market almost blindly and without 
sufficient experience, in the hope of quickly making large financial gains. To 
do this, they initially bought shares in all companies, regardless of financial 
stance or reputation.158  
 
Evidence suggests that such investors were only speculators, who did not pay much attention 
to the companies in which they invested, how they were managed, what plans they had, or 
whether they were profitable in the first place.159 In fact, it is examples such as this that led a 
high profile German banker, Carl Fuerstenberg to say that “Shareholders are stupid and 
impertinent: stupid, because they buy shares, and impertinent, because they demand a 
return”.160 
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1.5 Research Objectives and Questions 
The previous section provided an overview of corporate governance including the events that 
led to the establishment of corporate governance legislations (Chapter 1.1), protection of 
minority shareholders (Chapter 1.2), ownership structure and control in Saudi Arabia 
(Chapter 1.4.1) and dilemma of minority shareholders (Chapter 1.3). Based on the reviewed 
literature, a number of research questions are put forward to guide the analysis provided in 
the rest of this thesis. Specifically, evidence from the literature suggests that corporate fraud 
is associated with weak corporate governance and can undermine the trust and confidence of 
investors in the stock market.161 This in turn, suggests that effective corporate governance can 
perhaps enhance the protection of the rights of minority shareholders. Previous research has 
also shown that countries that are characterised by a low level of legal protection of rights of 
minority shareholders also have a high level of concentration of ownership and control, and 
vice versa. According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, ‘minority 
shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, controlling 
shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of redress. 
Abusive self-dealing should be prohibited’.162 
Indeed, as noted in the OECD document, the confidence of minority investors is enhanced 
when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when 
they have reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated. Although the 
principles are not binding, they are seen as a reference point to guide policy makers as they 
examine and develop their own economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances. Similarly, 
the OECD principle also state that ‘effective corporate governance requires a sound legal, 
regulatory and institutional framework that market participants can rely on when they 
establish their private contractual relations’.163 
 
In other words, for effective corporate governance to safeguard the rights of minority 
shareholders, a sound and effective legal system needs to be in place. However, the extent 
that the OECD principles can be applied effectively in the Saudi stock market operations, 
however, remains to be determined. Indeed, previous research suggests that the practice of 
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corporate governance is growing rapidly and increasingly in developing countries.164 This in 
turn, suggests that developing countries are closing the gap they have, in terms of corporate 
governance with developed countries.165 
According to the OECD reports on MENA countries, ‘State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are an 
important feature of the economic landscape in the MENA region and yet, their contribution 
to the local economies has not been subjected to a systematic investigation’.166 Furthermore, 
a study that looked at the ownership structures in MENA countries showed that as far as the 
board of directors of some of the largest companies in the MENA region is concerned, they 
are mostly government officials and/or royal family members.167 Specifically, the study 
found that the Saudi corporate sectors are dominated by few State-owned enterprises and 
family-held private businesses.168 Corporate governance is seen as the critical enabling factor 
for the development of family-owned businesses.169 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how corporate governance mechanisms influence the 
protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabian listed firms. Specifically, the thesis 
seeks to: 1) compare corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia and the UK and their 
influence on protecting the rights of minority shareholders; 2) it also examines whether Saudi 
Arabian and UK firms differ in share ownership structures; and 3) how these differences can 
explain how minority shareholders are treated in those countries. The board of directors are 
seen as a hallmark of effective corporate governance, which acts as a bridge between the 
company and the owners.170 Therefore, it is necessary to understand: 4) the role of the board 
of directors in Saudi Arabia and the UK and their impact on the protection of minority 
shareholders. The four objectives lead to the following research questions:  
(a) How does the current practice of corporate governance in the Saudi stock market 
reflect an adequate protection of minority shareholders' rights? 
(b) What are the major differences and similarities between Saudi Arabia and the UK 
concerning the protection of minority shareholders’ rights?  
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Taking the above questions into account, the thesis predicts that: 
Proposition 1: A strong corporate governance culture and shareholder protection mechanisms 
would safeguard the rights of minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, the thesis seeks to explore: 5) how the Saudi Arabia and UK legal systems 
mediate the relationship between corporate governance and protection of rights of minority 
shareholders. In other words,  
(c) What is the role of Saudi Arabian laws and regulations in protecting the rights of 
minority shareholder?  
Taking question (c) into account, the following predictions are made: 
Proposition 2: When a strong legal system exists, a greater level of minority shareholders 
protection is expected by the listed firms. 
 
Proposition 3: When a weak legal system exists, a lower level of minority shareholders 
protection is expected by the listed firms. 
 
Specifically, a legal system is considered to be strong when there are adequate enforcement 
mechanisms to deal with violators of security market laws and regulations. By contrast, a 
weak legal system exists when there is an absence of or inadequate enforcement mechanisms 
to deal with violators of provisions of security market laws and regulations. All the above key 
questions will be covered through Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis. These chapters will focus on 
a review of definitions and theories of corporate governance, the development of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, a review of relevant legal structures to corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholders rights in the Saudi stock market and mechanisms of 
protecting minority shareholders in the UK and Saudi Arabia.  
1.6 Importance of the Research 
Modern corporations need sound legal solutions to resolve their challenges. Thus, good 
corporate governance practice has become a fundamental prerequisite for long-term success 
and growth of corporations. It offers a better chance to access external capital and different 
economic resources and attract foreign cash flow, whilst also increasing investors' 
confidence. This view was supported by the 3rd meeting of the Eurasian Corporate 
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Governance Roundtable, which emphasised that ‘the continuing need for attracting the equity 
capital to finance corporate growth is one of the key incentives to enhance shareholders 
treatment and corporate governance practice in general’.171 
However, the major problem facing the development of corporate governance, particularly in 
developing countries including Saudi Arabia, is the dearth of research available to explain the 
significance of corporate governance regulations in supporting and improving the investment 
climate, as well as the confidence of investors in the stock market. Moreover, minority 
shareholders are considered a significant tool in any stock market and thus providing 
sufficient protection for them will enhance the reputation of the stock market in general and 
increase the confidence that investors have in this market. To my knowledge, this research is 
the first to examine the influence of corporate governance on the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia. In fact, this research is the first academic initiative in 
the field of analysing the corporate governance laws and regulations in the Saudi stock 
market, taking into account the impact of the recent regulations on improving the confidence 
of investors in the Saudi stock market and reinforcing the financial stability in Saudi Arabia. 
This novel research also compares the characteristics and drawbacks of the Saudi Arabian 
and the UK corporate governance systems, which in turn, can serve as a tool for reforming 
the Saudi stock market and perhaps the market in the Arabic Gulf States. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
In legal studies, it is broadly known that the use of a comparative study plays a fundamental 
role in developing and improving the reformation of laws and legislations in any country. 
According to Mantysaari, choosing the jurisdictions to be compared is vital because the work 
of a comparative lawyer is only meaningful if the choice of jurisdiction is meaningful.172 A 
comparative study is a significant tool used to facilitate legislative reforms and has also been 
shown to offer solutions for legal amendments.173 According to Zweigert and Kotz, 
comparative law not only aims to criticise existing rules but also to make law in general more 
efficient and indicative of the best ways to enhance the effectiveness of existing rules, as well 
as formulating entirely new ones.174 Aguilera and Jackson define comparative corporate 
governance as the study of relationships between parties with a stake in the firm and how 
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their influence on strategic corporate decision-making is shaped by institutions in different 
countries.175 Specifically, it deals with the diversity across countries and over time and 
focuses on explaining similarities and differences among cases in a systematic fashion.176 
By using a comparative approach, the regulator can use other legal systems styles and tackle 
common problems.177According to Maine: ‘it would, however, be universally admitted by 
competent jurists, that, if not the only function, the chief function of Comparative 
Jurisprudence is to facilitate legislation and the practical improvement of law’.178 Hill 
concluded in his study by affirming that comparative law can demonstrate the relationship 
between law, political and moral values clearly, more than the study of a single legal system. 
Besides this, a comparative method can help to ‘demonstrate the extent to which the form and 
substance of any legal system are not 'natural', but result from the implementation of moral 
and political values’.179 
 
Scholars who adopt this method have sought to address a number of distinct questions, such 
as: How is corporate governance practised in different countries? Why are corporate 
governance practices similar or different across countries? Is it possible to identify 
international best practices of corporate governance, or do clear economic, social, and 
political trade-offs exist between different corporate governance systems? To what extent 
may practices be borrowed or adapted across international contexts?180 The comparative 
method has been adapted in previous studies of corporate governance.181 
 
Corporate governance systems vary across countries around the world, reflecting variations in 
cultural, legal, social and economic environments in which companies operate, although, 
there is some element of convergence between countries.182 With this in mind, the present 
thesis seeks to compare the influence of corporate governance in protecting the rights of 
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minority shareholders in Saudi and UK listed firms. There are several rationales for choosing 
the UK as a benchmark to measure the influence of corporate governance on minority 
shareholder’s protection in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Firstly, the UK is among the few countries with good corporate governance practices in the 
world. Indeed, as Maseko suggests, ‘adopting international best practices in financial 
reporting and disclosure is crucial for ensuring transparency and thus effective corporate 
governance in all markets’.183 La Porta et al, Nenova and Yu asserted that the rights of 
minority shareholders in the UK are well-protected by a well-developed legal system, 
menegarial labour market and active takeover market.184 Grant and Kirchmair confirmed that 
the UK system provides stronger protection of shareholders’ rights. Thus, it might act as 
drivers of widely-held companies’ structures.185  
 
Secondly, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is an independent country with political and legal 
sovereignty, it has adopted a number of Western legal concepts into the Saudi legal system, 
especially in commercial, financial and administrative laws.186 According to Berkowitz et al., 
for practical implementation, legal policies and rules can perhaps be borrowed from a 
jurisdiction with a similar legal heritage so that domestic legal agents will be familiar with 
the imported laws.187 In keeping with this assertion, it is necessary to understand how the UK 
corporate governance model can be used as a reformative approach for Saudi Arabian 
corporate governance practice. Indeed, as Schneider and Chan suggest, this understanding is 
helpful for policy makers to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of implementing a 
particular philosophy in their corporation laws and adopting a particular board model.188 
 
Thirdly, it is important to acknowledge that the reader does not understand or read the Arabic 
language. Therefore, if the researcher wants to explain Saudi law to the English speakers so 
much would be lost in translation and many concepts that English speakers would take for 
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granted would not be translatable from Arabic to English. Consequently, in order to avoid 
this risk of mistranslation and misunderstanding, this research has included a brief review and 
analysis of corporate governance mechanisms and the relevant shareholders’ laws and 
regulations under the UK legal system. This approach is necessary in that it will offer a 
foundation for a comparative understanding of laws and certain technical terms that are 
common to both jurisdictions. In addition, although the review of UK law is brief, it provides 
a theoretical basis for comparing mechanisms of shareholders’ protection including relevant 
legal structures in both the UK and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Furthermore, the structures of Saudi firms reflect concentrated ownership, which is in the 
hands of rich families and the State. By contrast, ownership structure in the UK is entirely 
different. It is characterised by separation between ownership and management. In terms of 
the board system, both the UK and Saudi Arabia share a similar board structure. Both 
jurisdictions adopt a one-tier board, otherwise known as the unitary system, which is different 
to a two-tier board system, common in some European countries (such as Germany). The 
two-tier board system assigns the monitoring and executive functions of the company to two 
independent boards: the supervisory board and the management board.189 The unitary system 
on the other hand, combines the two functions and assigns all the duties to one board.  
 
Although the comparative approach has been adopted in many studies of corporate 
governance, it is not without limitations. For instance, Ungureanu argued that no model of 
governance is perfect and even better than the other.190 Their existence over time shows that 
each one is effective in its own way and corporate governance structure specific to a country 
is difficult to transfer to another country. According to Hill, one of the disadvantages of 
comparative law is the use of the data in order to substantiate a precedent thesis.191 This 
problem can be exacerbated by the fact that the legal tool, which the comparative method 
provides, is usually diverse and flexible.192 Thus, it has been suggested that choosing the 
comparative style is to a large extent dependent on the end of the comparative method.193 
 
Similarly, concerns have also been raised regarding the benefits of legal transplantation, 
which Kyselova defined as the movement of law from one legal tradition to another, by a 
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conscious process of law-making or legal reform.194 Some scholars argue for the necessity of 
a legal transplant, in that it will help to improve local laws and regulations. For instance, 
Watson assumed that ‘transplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of development. Most 
changes in most systems are the result of borrowing’.195 Indeed, as Mousourakis states, ‘at a 
time when our world society is increasingly mobile and legal life is internationalized, the role 
of comparative law is gaining importance’.196 
 
There are diverse views amongst scholars regarding the term ‘legal transplantation’. One 
view believes that legal transplantation is often mentioned to absorptive process of foreign 
law, including the legal concepts, norms, principles, systems and article, and the legal idea.197 
According to Erlandsen, legal transplantation is a transition of a legal system from one 
country to another country, or from one family to another family.198 Legal transplantation is a 
mutual process, involving implantation of the law and explanation of the law.199 Explanation 
of the law means that legal articles, rules and principles are migrated from country to another 
country, but implantation of the law means that legal norms and principles are output to other 
nations.200 It has been argued that legal transplantation chiefly relies on the needs of the 
construction of domestic legislations. Therefore, a lack of legal culture and legislative 
experience may contribute to the introduction of a foreign legal system to improve the 
domestic laws and regulations.201 For millennia, laws and regulations around the world have 
improved through legal transplantation.202 
 
Nonetheless, others have challenged this assumption. For instance, Ewald and Legrand 
argued that transplantation of law is not possible at all because every law is culturally 
determined.203 Legrand went further to state that ‘no form of words purporting to be a “rule” 
can be completely devoid of semantic content, for no rule can be without meaning’.204 As a 
corollary, since the meaning of law in different cultures can never be the same ‘meaning 
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cannot survive the journey’205 and transplantation as such, is impossible. This is because, as it 
crosses borders, the original rule undergoes a change that affects it qua rule.206 Others have 
also argued that even when the borrowed rule remains unaltered, its impact in the new socio-
cultural setting may be entirely different.207 
 
Despite the above criticisms, the success of legal transplantation has been observed in several 
developing countries. Previous studies have mentioned that legal implantation is a significant 
approach that enriches legal culture and improves the domestic laws.208 As a result, many 
examples have revealed that some countries have made significant modifications of their laws 
by means of legal transplantation. For example, the Chinese constitutional framework 
published in 1908 was completely influenced by the spirit of the Japanese Constitution.209 
Similarly, the Draft Law of Chinese Civil Procedure, the Chinese draft Criminal Law and the 
Chinese penalty system were borrowed principles and systems from civil law and British 
principles.210  
The interaction among trading nations and international agencies in the early 1990s increased 
legal harmonisation globally. The financial crisis that hit East Asia in 1997 was because of 
the weakness of laws and corporate governance rules. Consequently, global legal elites 
asserted that financial stability in developing countries requires Western legal structures.211 
For instance, in Japan, when the regulators decided to be an industrial State and become 
world force, they did not wait decades to extract financial and commercial regulations from 
internal practices, but they decided to introduce and borrow Western commercial law rules.212 
In developing East Asian countries, legal transplantation has been affected by ‘the law and 
development’ movement. The early literature suggested that due to causal links between the 
‘rule of law’ and industrial development, one cannot proceed without the other.213 
Importantly, developing countries were induced to reproduce the new institutional features of 
Western countries, such as legal education, judicial independence and particularly the 
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enactment of rights-based financial and commercial laws. It has been argued that there were 
no ‘free’ or ‘natural’ markets and those developing countries should tackle their dependency 
on globally dominant, economic classes. Consequently, legal harmonisation should be tightly 
controlled due to it favouring stronger countries.214 
This research shows that legal transplantation cannot be copied by another legal system or 
applied mechanically because transplantation of foreign law is a complicated process. 
However, the benefits can only be derived by focusing on its methods and techniques. 
Therefore, comparing the UK corporate governance model allows for a conclusion to be 
drawn, regarding the possibility of legal reforms in Saudi Arabia, especially as it relates to 
minority shareholders. In order to explore this issue, the current research will begin with an 
in-depth and critical review of literature in order to understand as much as possible of the 
previous findings related to the issue of minority shareholders’ protection. This revision will 
focus mainly on secondary resources. The approach will allow for an understanding of the 
underlying principles, concepts and rules regarding the protection of rights of minority 
shareholders and the application of corporate governance, whether at domestic or 
international levels. 
 
In addition, in order not to limit emphasis on secondary resources alone, the present research 
will utilize primary resources. Thus, the following primary resources in Saudi Arabia will be 
examined: Company Law (CL), Capital Market law (CML), Listing Rules (LRs), Case Laws, 
and Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs), as well as administrative bodies and judicial 
authorities. This analysis will also take into consideration the unique characteristics and 
disadvantages existing in the UK systems and compare them with the mechanisms of 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabian system. 
1.8 Overview of Thesis 
It has been suggested that the Saudi legal system does not provide sufficient protection for 
minority shareholders.215 Specifically, company law contributes largely to reinforcing the 
control of majority shareholders who exercise their influence over the company’s affairs.216 
Also, the law does not allow the minority shareholders to bring legal action against the board 
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members without approval of the controlling shareholders, who are mainly in control of the 
board of directors.217 With this in mind, it becomes necessary to understand corporate 
governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia in relation to minority shareholder protection. 
Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to critically examine the influence of corporate 
governance in protecting the rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. In order to 
explore this issue, a comparative approach will be employed to examine the corporate 
governance mechanisms and the legal protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, in 
comparison with the UK.  
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of theories of corporate governance in order to identify 
the most important factors for corporate governance analysis in Saudi Arabia and 
specifically, to understand whether one or a combination of theories is most suitable for the 
analysis of corporate governance within the Saudi context. Specifically, definitions of 
‘corporate governance’ from different scholarly perspectives are considered. In terms of 
theory, the agency, stakeholders, stewardship, resource dependent and myopic-model theories 
of corporate governance will be critically analysed, including their relevance to Saudi 
Arabian corporate governance practice. The rationale is to find out whether one or a 
combination of theories fit nicely to understanding corporate governance behaviour in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Chapter 3 will focus on the development of a corporate governance framework in Saudi 
Arabia. Importantly, the chapter will provide an overview of development of corporate 
governance, especially examining the external structures of corporate governance (such as the 
Capital Market Authority) in Saudi Arabia and their role in protecting minority shareholders’ 
rights. In keeping with the objective of the thesis, comparison will also be made between the 
UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Saudi Capital Market Authority, highlighting 
differences, similarities and possibilities of legal transplantation from the UK to Saudi 
Arabia. The shortcomings directed to the CMA, and the security market in general, will also 
be explored in this chapter.   
In Chapter 4, a brief historical overview of the Saudi legal system is provided. Specifically, 
the chapter examines the Islamic legal system and its perspective on corporate governance. 
The Saudi statutory laws, such as the basic law of governance, company law and capital 
market law will be examined. Furthermore, Saudi stock market regulations such as the Saudi 




Corporate Governance Regulations and listing rules will be examined. The rationale is to 
understand the existing judicial and legal provisions for protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia. The legal and judicial enforcement authorities in Saudi Arabia 
stock market will also be provided in this chapter, including their shortcomings.  
Chapter 5 will provide an analysis of internal structures or mechanisms of protecting minority 
shareholders in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Specifically, it compares share ownership 
structure, shareholders’ protection mechanisms, the board system and duties, the board 
committees, shareholders institutions and minority shareholders’ rights in both the UK and 
Saudi Arabia. The rationale for this comparison is to highlight the points of difference and 
similarity between the two jurisdictions and also to examine the possibilities of adopting 
some of the UK corporate governance mechanisms in the Saudi context. Finally, the thesis is 
concluded in Chapter 6 highlighting the main findings and recommendations, the contribution 














Chapter 2  
Corporate Governance: Definitions and Theories 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A critical review of the existing literature on corporate governance is provided in this chapter. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 seeks to achieve the following objectives. First, it provides a 
definition of corporate governance from different scholarly and organisational perspectives. 
Second, it reviews relevant theories associated with corporate governance. The rationale is to 
form a baseline of comparison between the global and international studies and the Saudi 
context. Finally, the chapter is summarised, highlighting the key issues discussed and the 
transition to the next chapter.  
2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
There has been diversity among views regarding the meaning of ‘corporate governance’. 
Perhaps because different scholars investigate firms from different viewpoints, they are 
bound to differ in their views of corporate governance.218 According to Schneider and 
Scherer, corporate governance refers to a mechanism aimed at minimizing the risk borne by 
shareholders, who are regarded as the owners of a firm.219 Al-Suhaibani and Naifar on the 
other hand, define corporate governance as the factors that affect firm processes (including, 
among others, financing strategies).220 Other scholars have also shed light on the meaning of 
corporate governance. Dignam and Lowry view corporate governance as a set of processes, 
customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, 
administered or controlled, and its purpose is to influence (directly or indirectly) the 
behaviour of the organisation towards its stakeholders.221 Corporate governance has also been 
conceptualised as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’.222  
 
This definition offered by Sir Adrian Cadbury further stated that:  
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Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. 
The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of 
resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those 
resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society.223  
Donaldson defined corporate governance as ‘the structure whereby managers at the 
organisational apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated structures, 
executive incentive, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding’.224 According to the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC), corporate governance represents the relationship 
between different interest groups including: management, the board of directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders.225 The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance recognised as the global standard of “good corporate governance” 
that:  
 Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.226 
 
The principle further states that good corporate governance should provide proper incentives 
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders, as well facilitating effective monitoring. However, the principles are not 
binding. Instead they are seen as a reference point to guide policy makers as they examine 
and develop their own economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances. The principles seek 
to identify objectives and make various suggestions on how to achieve them. Indeed, good 
governance provides better transparency in corporate structures and operations, and reduces 
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the opportunities for political interference in the interactions amongst government, 
management and stakeholders.227 
 
Importantly, the definition of corporate governance can be viewed from at least two major 
perspectives: the narrow definition and the broad definition. The narrow definition of 
corporate governance is restricted to the issues of shareholders’ protection, management 
control and other issues associated with the agency theory problem.228 According to this 
perspective, corporate governance is seen as an instrument that handles the problems that 
arise due to the separation of ownership and control in large corporations.229 Supporters of 
this view define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms that aim to create a balance 
between interests of shareholders and management.230 According to this perspective, 
corporate governance should concentrate on structures and mechanisms that prevent a 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, as well as guarantee the rights of 
shareholders. 
On the contrary, the broad perspective of defining corporate governance is concerned with 
the so-called stakeholders’ theory.231 According to this school of thought, corporate 
governance should focus on regulating the relationship between a corporation and the wide 
range of other stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, employees, creditors, 
bondholders, suppliers and society in general.232 It is clear from this standpoint that corporate 
governance is recognised as a set of laws, rules, regulations and acceptable business practices 
that govern the relationship among the owners (principals), managers (agents) and 
stakeholders in general.233 This wider perspective is consistent with the views of Shleifer and 
Vishny who suggested that:  
Corporate governance ensures fairness, transparency, accountability, 
sustainable financial performance, increased shareholder confidence, access to 
external finance and foreign investment, fair treatment of the stakeholders in a 
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company, maximization of shareholders' value and the enhanced reputation of 
a company, nation and economy.234 
Freeman defined corporate governance as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’.235 Hence, the company has to 
take into consideration the interests of other people who are associated with the company, 
such as customers, employees, creditors, suppliers and even the society at large.236 According 
to the broad perspective, it can be said that corporate governance systems should do the best 
to serve the relationship between the company and its stakeholders, as well as to ensure that 
the executive management is monitored properly and acts in the interest of stakeholders. 
Indeed, the above definitions reveal diversities in the concept of corporate governance. 
According to Alzahrani, these diversities are due to differences in the subject matter 
(business, economics, investment), the countries where it is practised, the type of trade policy 
followed, the practitioner and the researcher. For instance, in Saudi Arabia the terminology 
‘corporate governance’ is a relatively new phenomenon and a recent addition to the Saudi 
legal system.237 Thus, applying any of the above definitions to situations in Saudi Arabia has 
to be treated with caution. This is because the definition of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia and the concepts it covers are unclear.238 It is important to note that Saudi Arabia was 
the second State in the Gulf Cooperation Countries after Oman, to adopt the concept of 
corporate governance.239 As a consequence, the Saudi Capital Market Authority (to be 
described later) enacted a code in 2006, otherwise known as the Corporate Governance 
Regulations, analogued to other international corporate and capital market standards. This 
code was transplanted into the Saudi corporate and capital market system but it does not 
contain a comprehensive definition of corporate governance. Indeed, with the lack of 
familiarity with the terminology itself, due to its novelty, there is a need for more clarification 
of the full meaning of the concept and for each person, including the shareholders, to be 
aware of its solemnity.  
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With the above in mind, the definitions in the Cadbury report240 and the OECD principles of 
corporate governance241 will serve as working definitions in this thesis. These definitions 
have a ubiquitous application in the field and discourse of corporate governance. Unarguably, 
the Cadbury report was the first corporate governance report that was well received, both 
domestically (in the UK) and internationally. It has an admirable criterion and is seen as the 
set of paramount UK corporate governance regulations that offers valuable suggestions and 
recommendations to deal with corporate governance issues, including the rights of 
shareholders, duties and responsibilities of the board of directors, as well as board’s sub-
committees. Furthermore, the OECD principles of corporate governance represent a global 
standard of corporate governance and are seen as a ‘panacea’ for good and sound corporate 
governance. Importantly, the principles focus on sustaining the rights of shareholders 
including minority shareholders, disclosure and transparency requirements, the action of 
stakeholders, equitable treatment of shareholders and responsibilities of the board of 
directors. Indeed, the World Bank has a procedure in place that encourages transparent 
gathering of country information in relation to corporate governance practices. Thus, 
information gathered is used to develop corporate governance regulations and practices in 
each country by improving work plans, academic conferences and the levels of practical 
support required by each country.242  
In keeping with the above, the framework of Saudi corporate governance is assumed to be 
built on recommendation of the 1992 UK Cadbury report as well as the OECD principles of 
corporate governance. Specifically, the CGC recommends the adoption of a single or unitary 
board system, which consists of executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), who are 
primarily accountable to shareholders through a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ compliance 
and disclosure regime.243 Similarly, the Saudi code covers the principles outlined by the 
OECD, for example, the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency requirements and 
responsibilities of the board of directors.244 Despite these similarities, there exist some 
contextual differences, such as a strong hierarchical social structure, importance of kinship 
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and personal relationships, religion245 and concentrated ownership structure (State and 
family), which may hinder effective implementation of corporate governance mechanisms in 
Saudi Arabia.  
2.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance relates to different fields, namely economics, finance, law, 
management, politics and organisational behaviour.246 As a result, it is unnecessary to rely or 
focus on one theory (such as the agency theory) as a basis of analysis and interpreting 
corporate governance practices and behaviour.247 Specifically, Zattoni et al suggested that 
research on corporate governance must shift emphasis from agency theory and consider other 
theoretical frameworks.248 Over the years, numerous theories have dominated the 
interpretation of data acquired from the fields of economics, law, finance and organisational 
behaviour in relation to corporate governance behaviour. Prominent among these theories are 
the agency (shareholder) theory, the stakeholder theory, the stewardship theory, the resource 
dependence theory and the myopic market model. In the section that follows, a critical review 
of these theories is provided in order to broaden understanding of the concept, as well as form 
a baseline of comparison to the corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia. 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory is regarded as the dominant model of corporate governance that is based 
on a shareholder-oriented approach. The underlying premise of this theory emerged following 
the problems that arose from changing relations between ownership and control of 
businesses.249 For instance, shareholders ran the risk of managers utilizing the money 
supplied to the company to maximize their own utility, rather than maximizing corporate 
value and the value of shares. As a result, a form of control mechanism (corporate 
governance) is needed to prevent managers from shirking and misusing their fiduciary 
function. According to this theory, maximizing the interests of the shareholders must form a 
top priority of the firm, with the benefits of the employees subordinate to that of the 
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shareholders.250 In other words, the primary responsibility of the firm is to protect the 
interests of the shareholders because they are unarguably perceived as the owners of the 
company, while those of the employees should be considered a secondary responsibility. In 
fact, the theory views employees as insignificant in corporate governance and places great 
emphasis on shareholders. Moral responsibilities to act in someone else's interest are 
considered a second priority.251 The implication of this definition, as Kim and Kim argued, is 
that the interests of other organisational stakeholders (employees, customers and community) 
are likely to be compromised.252 Notably, countries that had a tradition of common law, such 
as Australia, the UK, the US, Canada and New Zealand developed corporate governance 
structures that focussed on shareholders’ returns or interests. Therefore, the role of corporate 
governance is to ensure that corporations achieve the objectives set by their owners.253 
The assumptions of the agency theory suggest that the interests of shareholders and managers 
are likely to be different and their behaviours characterised by self-interested opportunism.254 
In the US and Great Britain, the regimes of Regan and Thatcher encouraged the adoption of a 
shareholder approach, as a corporate governance principle which saw many corporations 
emphasising the maximization of shareholder value.255 Importantly, a boom in the US stock 
market and economy impressed corporate executives in major economies such as Germany, 
Italy, France, Korea and Japan to adopt a shareholder approach as a principle of corporate 
governance.256  
An important consideration in terms of the assumptions of the theory, is the principal agent 
conflicts that arose due to the separation of ownership and management functions,257 which 
according to Ugurlu may lead to managers pursuing their own interests at the expense of the 
principals’, or create information asymmetry, thus leading to agency costs.258 In their seminal 
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study, Berle and Means provided a crucial explanation of the contractual relationships 
between owners (principles) and managers (agents). Importantly, they argued that as 
countries became industrialised and expanded their markets, the ownership and control of 
enterprises became separated.259 The dominant view is that the shareholders usually expect 
that the managers will act and make the best decisions in the owners’ interests. Nonetheless, 
the managers may not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the shareholders. 
The conflict of interests between these two parties can be attributed to two main sources: 
owners (shareholders) are interested in gaining high profits and increasing cash flows, 
whereas the management is interested in high salaries and allowances.260 Jensen and 
Meckling proposed a convergent of interest model to address the agency conflict that arose 
due to separation of ownership and control.261 The model predicted a zero agency cost when 
those who owned the company also managed the company.262 
Specifically, managers can be given incentives to share some of the shareholders’ risk, for 
example by being remunerated with stock options or bonuses for excellent firm 
performance.263  In other words, by encouraging managers to own the company’s shares, the 
interests of the internal and external shareholders are aligned.264 Mustapha and Ahmad 
investigated the effect of managerial ownership in relation to agency theory in the Malaysian 
business environment. Data from 235 companies indicated that managerial ownership in 
various segments has an inverse relationship with total monitoring costs, as predicted in the 
agency theory.265  The findings contradicted previous meta-analysis conducted by Deutsch.266 
Deutsch found little empirical support regarding the impact of board composition, especially 
with the proportion of outside directors, on critical decisions (such as CEO compensation, 
risk and control that involved a potential conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders).267 
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Agency theory suggests a reduction in the number of executive board members, which 
according to some scholars could enhance the board’s independence268 and thus, help 
shareholders hold board members to account.269 Importantly, the theory suggests that 
establishment of sound corporate governance should help reduce monitoring and bonding 
costs, which in turn, leads to net improvement in governance practices, voluntary disclosure 
and financial performance.270 Indeed, this recommendation is reflected in corporate 
governance codes of many countries including the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance 
Regulations and the 1992 UK Cadbury report. In summary, the theory acknowledges the 
establishment of board sub-committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees, which are seen as vital instruments to monitor managerial behaviour.271  
The theory however, has been heavily criticised for its strict emphasis on shareholders, whilst 
ignoring the impact of other stakeholders. As Lazonick and O’Sullivan argued, viewing 
shareholders as the sole residual claimants was an increasingly tenuous description of the 
actual relationships among a corporation’s various stakeholders.272 Given the influence of 
these stakeholders in the management of business enterprises, as well as heightening 
competition and increasing complexity surrounding organisations domestically and globally, 
it became harder for companies to reach their business goals without satisfying these 
stakeholders.273 Indeed, as Schneider and Scherer argued, agency theory does not considers 
the risks accruing from changing economic and political conditions of business firms 
operating in a global environment, or the resulting legitimacy problems of business firms 
adequately.274 
In keeping with the assumptions of agency theory, the Saudi government has embarked on a 
number of measures aimed at reforming its corporate governance culture. Specifically, the 
enactment of the SCGRs in 2006 is seen as a major milestone in the history of the Saudi 
capital market.275 In line with other corporate governance codes and regulations, the SCGRs 
seek to mitigate agency conflict between principles (owners) and agents (managers) through 
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improving transparency, accountability and responsibility of boards of directors of several 
corporations.276 However, these mechanisms seem to work in theory rather than in practice, 
due to a high concentration of ownership in the hands of the State and powerful, rich Saudi 
families. It is important to note that diverse shareholder ownership, and resulting separation 
of ownership and control suggested by the proponents of agency theory, is only applicable in 
Western countries. In fact, this type of ownership structure, which highlights stewardship and 
monitoring aspects of non-executive directors’ functions, is absent in Saudi Arabia. 
Importantly, with a high concentration of ownership, which characterises the Saudi situation, 
the rights of minority shareholders could be adversely affected277; thus creating a conflict of 
interest between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders (State and family 
owners). The above analysis revealed the importance of applying agency theory to 
understanding corporate governance behaviour in Saudi Arabia. 
2.3.2 The Stakeholder Theory 
This theory is considered the most fundamental challenge to the agency theory and emerged 
in response to the criticism of the agency theory that exclusively focusing on shareholders’ 
interests has not held the key to good corporate performance and effective accountability.278 
Importantly, there was a growing realisation that a company is not just a production system, 
but that it is comprised of several other diverse and often interrelated systems, all of which 
require equal attention and strategic thinking.279 The theory was developed by Freeman280 
and popularized by Blair.281 Freeman defines stakeholders as ‘any group or individual who 
can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a firm’s purpose’.282 Stakeholders can 
include employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and even the wider community and 
competitors.283 The stakeholder theory emphasizes social responsibility and takes the 
interests of shareholders, and all parties involved, into account.284 In other words, the 
importance of democratic participation in corporate decision-making should form a top 
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priority of the firm285 and the maximization of social wealth, rather than mere maximization 
of shareholders’ welfare (seen as the objective of management).286 
According to this theory, corporate governance problems arise when corporate objectives are 
narrowly defined. Therefore, in order to resolve the problem, the purpose of the firm should 
be broadly defined rather than the mere maximization of shareholder welfare. That is, the 
firm’s objective should be geared towards serving broader societal interests, beyond 
economic value creation for shareholders. In fact, the stakeholder theory represents an 
important element of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and demands that interests of all 
stakeholders be considered, even if it reduces company profitability.287 Previous research has 
shown that countries that followed civil law (such as France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands) developed corporate governance frameworks that focused on stakeholders.288  
Importantly, the objective of corporate governance focus is on balancing the interests of a 
variety of key stakeholders such as employees, managers, customers, creditors, suppliers and 
the entire wider community.  
 
An important consequence of the difference between the stakeholder and shareholder theory 
is that they are fundamentally distinct when it comes to the firm’s profit. Under the 
shareholder theory, non-shareholders can be viewed as means to the ends of profitability; 
under the stakeholder theory, the interests of many non-shareholders are also viewed as 
ends.289 Another difference between the two models lies in the purpose of the firm. 
According to the shareholder theory, the objective of the firm is to maximize shareholders’ 
value. The stakeholder theory, on the other hand, assumes that the purpose of the firm is to 
commercially serve the interests of society.  
 
Evidence in support of the stakeholder theory has been demonstrated in a study of 214 
Korean firms.290 The study contrasted the stakeholder and shareholder perspectives of 
corporate governance on employment relation outcomes in Korean firms. The results 
revealed that a stakeholder corporate governance orientation (as compared to the shareholder 
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orientation) had positive relationships with education/training expenses, average employee 
tenure and industrial relations (IR) climate, but negative associations with the number of 
strikes (contrasted with the stakeholder and shareholder perspectives of corporate governance 
in investigating the impact of corporate governance on employment). The findings led the 
authors to suggest that stakeholder orientations of firms have more beneficial effects for 
employees and more consensual relations with labour unions than shareholder orientations 
did. 
 
A recent study that analysed the annual reports of a sample of 222 listed companies suggests 
that firms providing more CSR information have better corporate governance ratings, are 
larger, belong to higher profile industries and are more highly leveraged.291  In another study, 
Guosong found that ‘stakeholder-oriented governance mechanisms, including reduced 
institutional ownership, increased insider ownership, enlarged board representativeness, 
increased board interlocks, fixed compensation for CEOs and directors, and certain takeover 
controls like dual class shares and poison pills, were positively associated with media firms' 
performance’.292 From the perspective of stakeholder opportunism, not only can the 
management of a company exercise opportunism, but rather all stakeholders of a company 
can (and will to some extent) have options to behave opportunistically and at the same time 
bear the risk of being victims of the opportunism of other stakeholders.293 Using a 
stakeholder approach, Kansal and Joshi conducted a study to understand the perceptions of 
shareholders and brokers regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives by Indian 
companies. Results from the respondents in both categories of stakeholder groups agreed that 
CSR‐oriented companies enjoy higher levels of investor confidence, which is reflected in 
higher stock prices and leads to enhanced reputation and corporate goodwill.294 On the basis 
of these finding, the authors suggest that Indian companies are in fact implementing CSR 
initiatives and that stakeholders have a considerable interest in such initiatives.295 
 
Hillman et al studied 250 firms and more than 3000 directors and found no association 
between the presence of stakeholder directors on the board and organisational 
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performance.296 Ayuso et al found evidence that CSR responsibility on the board is positively 
associated with indicators for dealing with primary and secondary stakeholders.297 They 
further explored the effects of stakeholder engagement on firm financial performance and 
their results showed that whereas board responsibility for CSR had a positive effect on firm 
financial performance in firms in the United States, Australia, and Hong Kong, for companies 
in the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa, a positive impact of stakeholder 
engagement on firm profitability could be observed.298 
 
Despite its emphasis on CSR, the stakeholder theory has been criticised for providing no 
formula for adjudicating among the stakeholders’ disparate interests.299 Also, concerns have 
been raised regarding diversity of and lack of clarity about stakeholder expectations, 
complexity of trade-offs (if stakeholder interests are to be taken account of) and the need for 
a simple focus of the bottom line for managers.300 Indeed, as Chambers et al argued  
 
Despite the fact that stakeholder governance models are deeply embedded in 
some countries in Europe, notably Germany, and in Japan, and that claims for 
these countries' industrial and social success are often based on this model, the 
empirical evidence for stakeholder theory is weak. The theory is further 
criticised for encouraging risk-averse, inoffensive but bland and lowest 
common denominator decision-making.301 
 
There is evidence to suggest that Saudi corporate governance practice reflects some elements 
of the stakeholder theory. For instance, Article 1a of the CGRs made provisions in relation to 
protection of stakeholders’ rights and social responsibility.302 By implication, firms operating 
in Saudi Arabia are expected to pursue the interests of other stakeholders (employees, local 
communities and governments) in addition to advancing the interests of shareholders. 
Besides, the Islamic sacred obligation of zakat (alms-giving) is thought to reflect the concept 
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of CSR advocated in stakeholder theory. In fact, the Islamic perspective of corporate 
governance requires firms to make donations, which can be equalised with zakat. These 
donations can come in the form of building and maintaining mosques, schools, charitable 
trusts, hospitals, providing relief supports and programmes to Muslims worldwide.303 The 
rationale is that by engaging in such acts, their CSR as a key instrument of corporate 
governance is raised, thus increasing the trust and confidence of the masses including 
minority investors. 
   
Importantly, firms such as the Saudi Zain Company, the Kingdom Holdings and the Saudi 
Research and Marketing Group are among the few listed firms that demonstrate CSR 
principles in their business activities. Also, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (popularly 
known as Saudi Aramco and reputed to be the biggest company in Saudi Arabia) has a profile 
of a multinational corporation and is fully owned by the Saudi government. According to 
information available on the company’s website, Saudi Aramco has sought to undertake 
activities that add real value for the people of Saudi Arabia, from building roads, railroads, 
schools and hospitals, to establishing wildlife sanctuaries and growing a knowledge 
economy.304 This reflects elements of corporate social responsibility as advocated by 
stakeholder theory. Perhaps these firms may have adopted this valuable principle due to the 
demands for CSR in the CGC, even though they may lack precise direction.305  
 
However, it is important to note that the application of stakeholder theory in Saudi Arabia 
seem to work in theory rather than in practice. This is because, as discussed later in Chapter 5 
of this thesis, compliance with the provisions of the CGRs is voluntary rather than obligatory 
(a ‘comply or explain’ principle) in Saudi environments where concentration of ownership is 
a ubiquitous phenomenon. As a result, a review of boards’ annual reports and websites 
showed that a significant number of Saudi listed firms (such as Saudi Ceramics Company, 
Al-Babtain Power and Telecommunication Company) still do not acknowledge CSR. Perhaps 
lack of an explanation by the CGRs and ignorance of the boards of listed corporation, as to 
this valuable principle, may further explain low or poor engagement of some listed firms in 
corporate social responsibility.306   
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Taken together, the concept of corporate governance from a broader perspective may still not 
be fully developed and accepted in Saudi Arabia due to poor awareness and appreciation of 
good corporate governance among key corporate stakeholders. Therefore, it may be 
premature to assess the full impact of the stakeholder theory in the Saudi corporate 
environment.  
2.3.3 The Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory was developed by Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson in response to the 
agency theory pessimistic assumption that managers are always self-interested and self-
serving, rational maximizes.307 Instead of regarding managers as opportunists, the theory 
assumes that the goals of managers and shareholders are aligned (with the former being 
intrinsically motivated to act in the best interests of the organisation and to focus on 
intangible rewards, such as opportunities for personal growth and achievement).308 In other 
words, both the managers and shareholders have interests in maximising the long-term 
stewardship of the company and are therefore already well-aligned.309 According to this 
theory, combing the roles of a chairman and chief executive is necessary in that it will help to 
protect a key aspect of high performance: the strength and authority of executive leadership. 
Implicit in stewardship theory is the understanding that the owners (principals) are prepared 
to take risks on how managers will run their business and provide a return on their 
investment, indicating a level of trust that is absent in agency theory.310 
Chambers et al outlined the implications of stewardship theory for an understanding of board 
governance.311 First, managers on the whole direct their efforts to the well-being of the 
organisation that they are serving.312 Secondly, managers and owner representatives (outsider 
directors, non-executive directors, lay members or governors) on boards work together to 
develop strategy and to monitor performance.313 And thirdly, the value of directors lies in 
using their knowledge to advise their executive colleagues on the board.314 According to 
Schneider and Scherer, one advantage of the stewardship theory lies in its emphasis on the 
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integrity of managerial decision-making.315 However, the stewardship theory seems to be 
unsuited to respond to the challenges that corporations are confronted with in the risk society. 
Other critiques of stewardship theory have raised concerns that its applications can lay 
organisations open to risks of governance failure and strategic drift.316 There is also a 
problem with groupthink317, or what Hambrick and Mason call “upper echelons” - dominated 
thinking, in which there is not enough independent challenge on the board.318 Stewardship 
theory has also been challenged for its lack of details about board activities and for not 
describing how directors make decisions.319 
A critical look at Saudi corporate governance practice reveals a sharp contrast to the 
assumptions of stewardship theory. For instance, Articles 12c and 12e of CGC emphasized 
the need to appoint independent non-executive members of the board who should enjoy 
complete independence.320 Similarly, Article 12d of the same code also emphasizes the 
separation of the functions of the chairman and CEO of the company.321 The rationale is to 
provide accountability of management of the corporation through supervision and 
monitoring. Indeed, the above provisions contrast with the stewardship theory assumptions, 
which view managers as trustworthy individuals, with no need of direct supervision or 
monitoring of their performance. In fact, applying such a view within the Saudi context can 
have an adverse impact on voluntary corporate disclosure and financial performance, and in 
turn encourage the excesses of controlling shareholders. However, considering the high 
concentrated ownership structure that characterises the Saudi corporate environment, one 
may argue that appointment of relatives and friends as directors and CEOs may likely fit the 
perspective of stewardship theory because these individuals are likely to be perceived as 
trustworthy. Thus, the application of stewardship theory becomes even more relevant in the 
context of Saudi Arabia.  
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2.3.4 The Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependency theory is a strategic contingency theory that originated from 
economics and sociology.322 Popularized by Pfeffer, the theory emphasized the distribution of 
power in the firm and focused on the board as a human capital resource, seeing it as the 
primary task of the board members to use their powers, knowledge and skills internally, to 
advise the management of the firm.323 According to Pfeffer and Salancik, the board of 
directors can bring four benefits to the firm, including advice, access to information, 
legitimacy and preferential access to resources.324 Furthermore, ‘boards, and especially 
outside board members, can bridge the gap between the firm and its environment and serve as 
a mechanism for attracting resources and thereby add to the value creation of the firm’.325 
From a resource-based view, it can be argued that the unique combination of the expertise, 
the wider experience of the board (boards’ human and relational capital) and the quality of 
top management, will contribute positively to the strategic decision-making and ultimately to 
the successful performance of the firm.326  
Chambers et al summarise the implications of resource dependence theory for the 
understanding of corporate governance as follows. ‘First, the organisations depend on others 
for survival. Secondly, board members add value because of their background, skills and 
contacts. Thirdly, the main role of the board is leveraging and managing external 
relationships. Fourthly, board members may belong to a network of other powerful people 
who exercise control over the direction of public life in a series of board interlocks’.327 
In the Saudi context for instance, the composition and appointment of board members seem 
to contradict the assumptions of resource dependency theory. Importantly, the Saudi 
government and Saudi wealthy families are basic shareholders in many listed corporations. 
As a consequence, most Saudi corporate boards are dominated by members, who are selected 
by the State or rich families. Specifically, the concentration of ownership and control in the 
hands of owners and controlling shareholders still influence the operation and activities in the 
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Saudi capital market, especially in relation to the appointment of chairmen and members of 
boards of directors. In fact, appointing members of the board by controlling shareholders is 
still a common practice in the Saudi securities market.328 These appointments are 
characterised by favouritism and nepotism and do not follow the legal procedures set out in 
corporate governance regulations. In fact, individuals who are politically well-connected may 
be appointed as directors or CEOs without due regard for their ability to perform those 
roles.329 Indeed, the board of directors are seen as a hallmark of effective corporate 
governance, which acts as a bridge between the company and the owners.330 Therefore, 
disregarding the skills and background of the board members during appointment raises 
doubt as to whether the board members will add to the value creation of the firm, as the 
resource dependency theory postulates.      
Taken together, the resource dependency theory focuses on how uncertainty caused by 
external environmental factors and dependence on outside organisations can be minimised.331 
The theory has received support in the literature, as revealed in a study by Hilman, Withers 
and Collins, which showed that the contention that firms are constrained by, and can affect 
their environments, is well-accepted.332 Indeed, as Davis and Cobb suggest, resource 
dependence theory will continue to provide insight as long as power plays a part in the 
conduct of organisational life.333 In a recent meta-analysis of 157 tests of resource 
dependency theory, Drees and Heugens confirmed its main predictions: ‘organizations 
respond to resource dependencies by forming interorganizational arrangements like 
interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, in-sourcing arrangements, and mergers and acquisitions. 
In turn, these arrangements make them more autonomous and more legitimate’.334 
However, the theory’s over focus on external factors has been challenged by many.335 
Chambers et al argued that reliance on external factors underplays the views of the board 
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role, in determining its own future through strategising and in exercising oversight of internal 
management actions and performance.336 
2.3.5 The Myopic Market Model 
The myopic market model shares the same premise with the agency theory, which states that 
the purpose of the firm is to serve the sole interests of the shareholders. However, it evolved 
as a challenge to the agency theory because of what Hayes and Abernathy termed 
‘competitive myopia’,337 due to its consequent preoccupation with short-term market value 
(such as returns, profit and stock price) and other performance measures induced by 
inefficient market forces.338 According to the myopic market model, failures in corporate 
governance arise because the current institutional arrangement encourages managers to focus 
on short-term performance, while diverging from the maximization of long-term wealth for 
shareholders and competitiveness of the firm.339 The theory suggests that corporate 
governance reform should create an enabling environment whereby shareholders (particularly 
large and/or institutional shareholders) and managers are encouraged to share long-term 
performance horizons.340 Other solutions recommended by the theory to improve corporate 
governance include (a) increasing shareholder’s loyalty and voice, (b) reducing shareholders’ 
exist, (c) encouraging ‘relationship investing’ to lock financial institutions into long-term 
positions, as well as restrictions on the takeover process and on voting rights for short-term 
shareholders, and finally (d) empowering other groups such as employees and suppliers that 
have long-term relationships with the firm.341 
Evaluation of the myopic market model in the Saudi context showed that Saudi corporate 
governance regulations (SCGRs) have sought to create an enabling environment whereby 
shareholders, including minority shareholders and managers, are encouraged to share long-
term performance horizons. Specifically, the SCGRs clearly stipulate that shareholders 
should be empowered to exercise their rights, especially their right to attend the general 
meeting and vote on fundamental issues, the right to oversee the board's activities and the 
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right to obtain sufficient information.342 It is clear that by allowing shareholders to exercise 
these rights, they will contribute in meeting the long-term performance horizon of the 
company. However, empowering their right to vote on fundamental issues seems to contrast 
with the assumptions of the theory, which suggests restricting voting rights on short-term 
shareholders. Even though the theory fails to clarify what it means by short-term 
shareholders, there is a clear indication that this might refer to minority shareholders within 
the Saudi context.  
An important consideration in terms of the differences between the corporate governance 
theories is that they make conflicting assumptions regarding the problems and solutions of 
corporate governance. According to the agency theory, corporate governance problems 
emerge due to separation of ownership and management function. Thus, strengthening the 
incentive system and removing restrictions on markets would help address the agency 
conflict that characterizes failures in corporate governance. According to the stakeholder 
theory, lack of stakeholders’ involvement is seen as an underlying cause of failure in 
corporate governance. A broad definition of corporate objectives geared towards serving 
broader societal interests beyond economic value creation for shareholders, is seen as a 
panacea for corporate governance problems. A pessimistic assumption that managers are 
always self-interested and self-serving rational maximizes underlies the cause of corporate 
governance failures, according to the stewardship perspective. To address this, the goals of 
managers and shareholders should be aligned to maximize the long-term stewardship of the 
company. From the perspective of the myopic market model, corporate governance failure 
arises due to inefficient market forces. Thus, increasing shareholder loyalty and voice, 
reducing shareholders’ exits and encouraging relationship investing, are seen as remedies for 
corporate governance failures. Indeed, the differences in perspectives reveal a real gap 
between the theoretical models and corporate governance.  
Previous research has also revealed differences between the agency and stewardship theories 
in relation to ownership and management of family firms. For instance, a study of 56 Italian 
family businesses by Giovannini (2010) showed that the agency theory had a strong 
explanatory power in some firms, but in others, stewardship theory prevails.343 Based on 
these findings, the author concluded that a one-size-fits-all remedy does not exist, even in 
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firms where ownership structure and size are similar.344 Furthermore, Westhead and Howorth 
(2006) studied over 200 UK-based family firms and their results showed that management, 
rather than the ownership structure, of a family firm was generally associated with selected 
firm-performance indicators and nonfinancial (stewardship-oriented) company objectives.345 
 
Despite these differences however, some of the theories share common assumptions. For 
example, both the agency theory and myopic market model share the assumption that the goal 
of the firm should focus on maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. Other theories (such as the 
stakeholder and the stewardship theory) recognise the contribution of various stakeholders in 
meeting the objectives of the corporation. It is important to note that despite the plethora of 
case studies of corporate governance of many countries, there is no single theory that 
captures the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia uniquely, especially regarding how 
corporate governance may be explicitly protected under the current Saudi regulatory regime. 
In fact, each of these theories seems to offer a parsimonious explanation of corporate 
governance issues in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, a combination of the assumptions of these 
theories could shed light on the understanding of corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia. Besides, some scholars have previously argued that no model of governance is 
perfect and even better than the other.346 In fact, their existence over time shows that each one 
is effective in its own way and corporate governance structure specific to a country is 
difficult to transfer to another country. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the definition of corporate governance from various perspectives. 
As the review shows, these variations reflect differences in scholars’ backgrounds, country 
experiences, trade policy and standards. However, despite these conflicting views, the 
definitions by the UK Cadbury report of 1992 and the OECD principles of corporate 
governance were considered as working definitions for the rest of this thesis. This direction 
was taken due to the lack of comprehensive definition of corporate governance by Saudi 
CGRs. Besides, both the Cadbury report and the OECD principles have an admirable 
criterion, and the latter has been chosen by several countries across the world as a global 
standard when it comes to good corporate governance. The chapter also reviewed critically 
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different theoretical underpinnings to the understanding of corporate governance. 
Specifically, agency theory alongside stakeholder, stewardship, resource dependency and 
myopic market theories were considered. This has helped in understanding corporate 
governance issues and in particular, interpreting the findings from the rest of this thesis. 
Importantly, how and whether one or a combination of these theories fits best to the Saudi 
situation was also considered. The analysis suggests that none of the theories fully account 
for corporate governance behaviour in Saudi Arabia, instead understanding of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia lies on the combination of the assumptions, of each of these 
theories. In keeping with the objectives of this thesis, the next chapter (Chapter 3) will focus 






















Chapter 3  
Development of a Corporate Governance Framework in Saudi Arabia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The present chapter provides a general description as well as evaluation of corporate 
governance framework in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, it provides background 
information to the development of security markets in Saudi Arabia, whilst also highlighting 
the role of external structures of corporate governance (the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, the Capital Market Authority and the Saudi Stock Exchange). Since the study 
focuses on the protection of minority shareholders’ rights, the chapter devotes great attention 
to the analysis of the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia including its history, 
formation and roles in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. The major drawbacks 
directed to the Capital Market Authority, as well as stock market operations, in Saudi Arabia 
are also provided. The rationale is to understand those issues that may perhaps impede 
effective corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia. 
3.2 Saudi Corporate Governance: An Overview 
The growth of the stock market in Saudi Arabia has passed through two main phases. The 
first phase virtually lasted from the year 1932 until the year 2002. The second phase began in 
the year 2003. During those periods, the Saudi stock market witnessed a series of dramatic 
events, especially the financial crisis that occurred in 2006 (which led to a big leap in the 
march of the development of the stock market in Saudi Arabia). The history of joint stock 
companies in Saudi Arabia dates back to the early 1932, when the first joint stock company, 
the Arab Company for Cars, was established in 1934. Two decades later, an Arabian Cement 
Company was set up in 1954, followed by the commissioning of three electric companies. In 
1953, the Mahfouz and Kaki Company incorporated into one entity to become the first local 
bank, which later came to be known as the National Commercial Bank (NCB).347 In order to 
keep pace with the demands of the development, the Saudi government established the 
second local bank in 1957, otherwise known as the Riyadh Bank. The bank was established 
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to carry out banking services and had an initial capital of SAR 50 million ($13.3 million) 
distributed to 50,000 shares.348 
The actual emergence of the stock market in Saudi Arabia can be traced to the early 1970s, 
when the number of joint stock companies increased significantly. In 1975, there was a 
qualitative leap in the Saudi economy, when the Saudi government decided to merge the 
electricity companies in the central, Eastern and Southern regions as one consolidated 
company. This decision led to the issuance of additional shares to shareholders without 
charge.349 In order to boost the private sector, the Saudi government established six major 
government lending institutions, namely the Saudi Agricultural Bank, the Saudi Credit Bank, 
the Public Investment Fund, the Industrial Development Fund and others.350 
 
The late 1970s witnessed considerable changes in the Saudi stock market, when the 
government nationalized foreign banks operating in the Saudi economy. Following this 
nationalization programme, the government urged the banks to sell their shares to members 
of the public in the form of public offers. Privatization agendas have also had a huge impact 
in creating a regulated market for the Saudi stock trading.351 The ministry of commerce and 
industry have also contributed to the development of stock trading in Saudi Arabia through 
the allocation of some of its shares, in order to expand the basis of investment in the stock 
market. This increased investors’ interest in stock trading at that period. Furthermore, the 
1980s saw the introduction of mutual funds in the Saudi Arabian stock market, which led to 
the establishment of the National Commercial Bank (NCB).352 Although these mutual funds 
helped to increase investment culture amongst Saudi investors, the stock market still 
remained small and unattractive. As a result, some of the activities in the Saudi stock market, 
such as sale and purchase of shares, were conducted by unlicensed stockbrokers. However, 
due to the lack of sound legislations to regulate the activities of these stockbrokers, the Saudi 
market continued trading under these unlicensed agents until the beginning of the year 1980, 
when increases in oil prices led to improvement in the stock market, which in turn led to 
increases in trading volumes and high market prices. Following this, the Saudi government 
began to see the need to reform and regulate the stock market activities. 
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The initial step that the government took was to suspend the activities of the unlicensed 
stockbrokers and then set up an agency, otherwise known as the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA), to regulate the stock trading. According to this new trend, the dealings in 
stocks had become limited to the commercial banks. The SAMA has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to monitor the shares in order to protect them from reverse speculations and also 
to regulate the market, making it more organised and stable financially.353 Importantly, the 
Saudi government has shown a serious desire to involve the private sector to engage in 
supporting and sustaining this development. The efforts of the Saudi government have also 
culminated in the incorporation of the stock market as an emerging market under the 
supervision of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). This step is in response to 
international recognition of the importance of the Saudi stock market, which was seen as 
playing a leading role amongst the lists of emerging markets listed in the IFC’s database.  In 
1984, the Saudi government took a decision to establish the Saudi Share Registration 
Company (SSRC), which was operated by the local banks under the supervision of the 
SAMA in order to manage the records of shareholders in joint stock companies.  
In addition, the SSRC has a responsibility to carry out all of its supported operations, 
including the settlements, transfer and registration of property and other transactions that are 
implemented via the automated system. To support the investment in the stock market, the 
Electronic Securities and Information System was adopted in 1990 to provide an automated 
information system (AIS) for the dealers in the stock market. At first, the Saudi stock market 
was restricted only to the Saudi shareholders. However, between the periods of 1994 and 
1999, a radical change was introduced in the Saudi stock market, which saw the citizens of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC) allowed owning shares and participation in 
the Saudi stock market.354 In 1999, the stock market headed towards allowing the foreign 
investors to invest their funds, particularly in the banks’ mutual funds. This was done to 
enhance and promote the foreign cash flowing into the Saudi economy.355 The 
encouragement of the foreign investment led to the establishment of the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) in 2000, to oversee the investment affairs in the 
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State, including foreign investment.356 In 2001, the Saudi government abolished the ESIS and 
replaced it with the so-called Tadawul, which is deemed as the official name of the Saudi 
Arabian stock exchange. It is monitored by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the 
capitalization weighted index (all share index) and is named after Tadawul, hence Tadawul 
All Share Index (TASI).357 In fact, following the establishment of the TASI, using the 
internet in share trading operations accelerated the trading process, speed transactions and 
boosted the volume of the stock market.  
Furthermore, the Saudi market confidence was increased by the rising oil prices during 2005 
and beyond. As a result, the TASI increased significantly from 2518 to reach 16.713 point 
and the market capitalization climbed from SR281 billion ($75 billion) to RS2.44 trillion 
($651.5 billion). With the launching of the Tadawul All Share Index, the market expanded to 
involve about 128 traded companies in 2009.358 Other developments in the Saudi stock 
exchange were related to the emergence of the bond market, where bonds become tradable on 
the Tadawul in 2009. The increase in the issuance of the bonds was associated with the 
companies’ desire to invest in the bond market.359 The volume of corporate bonds issued 
between 2006 and mid-2009 was estimated at about SR30 billion ($8 billion).360 
The SAGIA set out a specific target, which was to see the Saudi Arabian economy emerging 
as one of the top 10 countries in the World Bank’s. Consequently, this strategy had led to 
sparkling success, as the Saudi economy reached 13 out of 183 countries in 2009.361 The 
Governor of the SAGIA confirmed this by saying:   
We are right on track and were just ranked 13th in the World Banks’ 2009 
“Doing Business” report up from 16th place in 2009, 27th in 2007, 38th in 2006, 
and 67th in 2005. We have a very comprehensive list of what needs to be done 
to reach our goal and in 2009 there has been a very tight schedule as to when 
each step has to be completed. This involves cooperation with each and every 
Saudi agency and ministry-as well as the private sector- on procedural. Among 
                                                 
356The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) has been established under the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 2 
(1421/1/5 H corresponding to 2000/10/2 G). For more insight see http://www.sagia.gov.sa.  
357For more insight http://www.tadawul.com.sa.  
358Saudi Arabia Report (Oxford Business Group 2009) 70. 
359ibid pp 72. 
360ibid.  
361Saudi Arabia Report (Oxford Business Group 2009) 31. 
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others, there are some 300 indicators in total to be considered that apply to the 
whole corporate life and competitiveness.362 
The Saudi Company Law (SCL) of 1965 is considered the principal body for regulating 
companies. In practice, however, there were clearly shortcomings in a number of aspects, 
particularly with legislations and regulations concerning the stock exchange. In order to 
address these problems and keep pace with the rapid developments of the Saudi stock market, 
the Saudi government issued a bundle of reformative legislations in recent years, such as the 
Capital Market Law (CML), the listing rules and the Corporate Governance Regulations. It is 
important to note that the most prominent factor in the reformation of the Saudi stock market 
was the stock bubble and the collapse of the stock market, which occurred in 2006. 
As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) has a mandate to 
supervise and monitor the share trading and all commercial activities in Saudi Arabia. Before 
the emergence of the Saudi stock market, the CL of 1965 had given the MOCI the statutory 
rights to oversee and govern the stock activities. Consequently, the MOCI enjoyed a bundle 
of jurisdictions (such as legal and judicial). Gradually, the share trading started becoming 
more complex, especially with the increasing number of joint stock companies and the initial 
public offerings (IPO). These developments and many others suggest that the MOCI cannot 
perform all the duties and responsibilities alone, hence the need for change.363 
In order to improve the performance of the MOCI, the Saudi Central Bank, otherwise known 
as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was brought in to relieve the MOCI of some 
of its duties and responsibilities (regulating and overseeing the share trading), in particular 
the Saudi banks. It can be said that the MOCI and the SAMA have shared responsibility of 
monitoring and controlling share trading. The MOCI is responsible for regulating the stock 
market, whereas the market operation and stock activities, such as buying or selling of shares, 
security advertising and others is controlled and overseen by the SAMA.364 In reality, the 
shared responsibilities between these two bodies may inevitably lead to conflict of 
jurisdiction. In order to avoid these conflicts, the Saudi government established two high 
ranking committees, which were called the Ministerial Committee365 and the Supervisory 
                                                 
362Amr Abdullah Al-Dabbagh, the Former Governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). This interview has made 
by the Saudi Arabia Report (Oxford Business Group 2009) 34. 
363H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed Markets (Kegan Paul International, 
London, 1997) 141-42. 
364F. M. Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative 
and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (School of Law, University of Manchester, 2011) 198.  
365The Ministerial Committee was established by a Royal Decree No.12308, dated 11/07/1403 H (24.04.1983), and included members of the 
Minister of Finance, the MOCI and the Governor of SAMA. 
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Committee366, to review the activities of the MOCI and SAMA and give them fundamental 
recommendations and suggestions regarding their performance. In spite of the Saudi 
government’s efforts to encourage the work of the share trading however, the Saudi stock 
market has not reached the expected aspirations.  
The fall of financial institutions in Asia, Russia, the US and some European countries during 
the period of 1997 has contributed largely to the establishment of corporate governance as a 
top concern for international financial institutions around the world (Hossain, 2007). 
Specifically, the 1987 market crash and corporate scandals (such as Enron WorldCom) that 
hit the global economy in 2002 and beyond have accelerated the need for new principles and 
regulations to address the status quo. The Saudi Arabian government was concerned about 
these crises surfacing in its economy. Hence, it began to launch a series of reforms aimed at 
restoring trust and confidence in its financial system, thus protecting its financial and 
economic institutions from the hazards of a global financial crisis.   
It is important to note that the development of the stock market in Saudi Arabia coincided 
with the establishment of the Saudi Capital Market Authority in 2003, which saw a legal 
landmark in the regulation of share trading in the Saudi stock market. As mentioned above, 
the stock market was subject to the directives of the MOCI and the SAMA, which led to 
duplication of functions between the two bodies. Thus, the Saudi stock market is 
characterised by what is known as a duplication of the regulatory structure. However, an 
independent body (the CMA) was set up with a bundle of jurisdictions. The main purpose of 
the CMA is to issue the essential regulations, rules and instructions in accordance with the 
provisions of Saudi Capital Market Law (CML). Consequently, the legal function of the 
CMA can be shortened to the following points367:  
(1) Regulate and develop the stock exchange, securities transactions and reduce the stock 
market risk. (2) Regulate and monitor the issuance and trading in securities. (3) Regulate and 
monitor the works and activities that are subject to the control and supervision of the CMA. 
(4) Protect citizens and investors from unfair and unsound practices, or practices including 
fraud, deceit and manipulation. (5) Act to achieve efficiency, transparency and fairness in 
security transactions. (6) Regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information related to 
                                                 
366The Supervisory Committee was set up by the Executive Rules, comprised members representing the Ministry of Finance, MOCI and 
SAMA. 
367Art (5) Capital Market Law 2003, which issued pursuant to Royal Decree No (M/30) dated 4/6/1424H - 31/7/2003.  
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securities and their issuers. (7) Regulate proxy and purchase requests and public offers of 
shares. 
 
Figure 1: Tadawul market overview 2012 368 
 
Today, the Saudi stock market is the biggest market in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. It has a market capitalization of $373.42 billion and daily trade of $2.05 
billion, as at the end of 2012. In the Gulf Cooperative Countries (GCC) region, for instance, 
the Saudi Stock Market represents about 90% of the volume of investment.369 Furthermore, 
there were about 5 million investors registered at the Tadawul depository over 30 licensed 
brokerage companies.370 The Saudi stock market is classified as one of the best emerging 
markets, which involves about 160 listed firms covering several sectors, such as cement, 
petrochemicals, banks, food, agricultural, industrials, energy, construction and other 
industries.371 
 
As previously mentioned investors lost confidence in the Saudi securities market, particularly 
in the wake of the financial crisis in 2006. Indeed, the lack of transparency and insufficient 
information provided by the CMA has largely contributed to the failure of the market in 
2006. Saudi securities market is deemed as one of the biggest and fastest growing markets in 
the MENA region. However, it is still characterized by some irregularities, especially in 
relation to issue of transparency and disclosure. Furthermore, it has also been stressed that 
most shareholders in the Saudi securities market have limited knowledge about the activities 
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and operations of the stock market, thus they are not fully empowered to participate 
effectively in stock market operations and transactions. To lessen major problems facing the 
Saudi stock market, the Capital Market Authority has issued a new strategic plan in 2015. 
The new strategy plan 2015-2019 aimed at developing the stock market and protecting 
shareholders’ rights. The strategic plan is going to implement during four years and including 
strategic objectives and initiatives which has been broken down into four plans, namely:372 
(1) foster capital market development, (2) promote investor protection, (3) improve the 
regulatory environment, and (4) enhance CMA’s organizational excellence. 
3.3 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
As the findings from the preceding section reveal, the Saudi stock market regulation has 
witnessed a number of crucial historical developments since its inception in 1957. Through 
the last decade, several attempts have been launched by the Saudi government with a view to 
improving local investment in the Saudi economy. Importantly, the major revolution in the 
Saudi Arabian economy started following the enactment of Capital Market Law in 2003 by 
the Saudi Arabian government, which made provisions for the establishment of the Capital 
Market Authority. In fact, the introduction of the CMA to the stock market was considered a 
paradigm shift in Saudi Arabia and a major legal landmark in the business and economic 
activities of the Kingdom. Specifically, it is considered the most important external corporate 
governance reform in Saudi Arabia.373 The financial scandals that hit the global economy, 
which led to collapse of several international giant corporations over the world, such as 
Enron Company, WorldCom and so on also had a negative impact on the global economic 
activities, including that of Saudi Arabia. These financial scandals and frauds have forced 
many countries to launch a bundle of legal reforms in order to restore the trust and confidence 
of investors in their local markets and institutions.  
Indeed, the regulatory and supervisory authority in any market plays a fundamental role in 
protecting the market, and investors alike, from manipulation and fraud. Therefore, providing 
an overview of the history and role of the Capital Market Authority is necessary in 
understanding its capability to protect the rights of minority shareholders at the hands of 
controlling shareholders. In keeping with the above, the sections below will examine the 
                                                 
372Capital Market Authority Strategic Plan (2015-2019). Strategy and Research Division - Strategy and Program Management, pp.1-47. For 
more insight see: http://www.cma.org.sa/en/Pages/home.aspx.    
373K. Hussainey and A. Al-Nodel, ‘Corporate governance online reporting by Saudi listed companies’ (2008) Corporate Governance in Less 
Developed and Emerging Economies, vol 8, pp 39-64;  A. Al-Matari et al., ‘Corporate governance and performance of Saudi Arabia listed 
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internal structure and legal nature of the CMA and its role in regulating and monitoring the 
stock market. According to Capital Market Law, the CMA is considered as the sole entity 
responsible for monitoring the stock market and supervising its activities.374 As a 
consequence, it plays a crucial role in building confidence among investors in the stock 
market and ensuring that the statutory protection of all shareholders, including minority 
shareholders is guaranteed.  
3.3.1 The Internal Structure of the Capital Market Authority  
The Saudi government represented by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency commenced 
drafting of the Capital Market Law in May 1998.375 The aim of enacting the CML and its 
relevant rules was to govern the stock market’s activities. Consequently, the CML was issued 
in 2003 and become the main source of the Saudi Stock Market regulations. The CML is 
comprised of 10 chapters, divided into 67 articles as follows: 
1) Definitions  
2) The Capital Market Authority 
3) The Stock Exchange  
4) The Securities Depositary Centre  
5) Brokers’ Regulation 
6) Investment Funds and Collective Investment Schemes 
7) Disclosure 
8) Manipulation and Insider Trading 
9) Regulation of Proxy Solicitations, Restricted Purchase and Restricted Offer for Shares 
10)  Sanctions and Penalties for Violations 
The Capital Market Authority has appeared within the articles of the CML as one of the most 
significant initiatives that has been presented by the Saudi government in order to enhance 
the confidence within its market and economy. In reality, there is no doubt that this paradigm 
shift in the emergence of the Saudi stock market, by creating the CMA, has had a positive 
impact, especially in relation to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. The internal 
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regulatory structure of the Capital Market Authority plays a crucial role in controlling the 
market behaviours. Given the importance of the CMA in developing the market and 
protecting the rights of dealers and traders, studying its internal structure will aid the 
understanding of how the CML regulations are enforced by the CMA. 




In the section that follows, the main duties and the formation of the Capital Market Authority 
is provided. 
3.3.2 The Main Duties and the Formation of the Capital Market Authority  
According to Article (7) of the Capital Market Law, the CMA should have a board, known as 
the ‘Board of Capital Market Authority’, consisting of five members. The board members are 
appointed by the Royal Order on a full-time basis. The period of membership on the board is 
five years, which can be renewed once. All the members should be citizens of Saudi Arabia 
and their salaries, rewards and privileges should be specified by the Royal Order. The 
members of the board of the CMA should be highly qualified with a wealth of experiences 
and familiarity in economics, business and law. In order to ensure fairness and independence 
of the CMA, the CML clearly states that the members of the board and employees of the 
CMA are not allowed to engage in any form of commercial or economic activities, have a 
private interest in any project intended for profit, borrow or lend any funds, or to acquire, 
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own or issue any security.377 In addition to that, the CML has stipulated that as the CMA is 
considered the regulator body of the stock market, its members and employees should 
disclose to the authority the securities they possess in their name, including that of their 
relatives, and furthermore should declare any change thereafter, within three days of 
becoming aware of such change.378 
It is clear from the above that the CMA was established to fulfil the first OECD principle of 
corporate governance: ‘ensuring the basis for effective corporate governance framework’.379 
Specifically, the principle states that ‘the corporate governance framework should promote 
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities’.380 
It is important to note that the CMA has implemented three major corporate governance 
initiatives in order to improve the standard of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. These 
initiatives have been implemented in three phases.381 The first phase was completed 
following the publication of the CGRs. The second phase, which is currently in progress, 
deals with creating awareness among market participants on the corporate governance and 
how to apply its regulations. The third phase will focus on the revision of the CGRs and 
perhaps make parts or the entire CGRs are mandatory. It is also important to note that the 
CGRs are currently implemented on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.382 Importantly, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the description and evaluation of the CGRs will shed 
light on how legal systems mediate the relationship between corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights. In fact, by establishing the CGRs, the CMA has 
contributed in improving the effectiveness of the market as an active, external corporate 
governance mechanism. 
The board of the CMA should have the sufficient financial and administrative resources and 
it should be autonomous. This board should be headed by a chairman, otherwise known as 
the chief executive officer (CEO). The chairman should manage the affairs of the CMA, 
implement the board decisions, draw policies and place all the strategies that help the CMA 
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to do its duties in the best way. The vice-chairman should also exist among the members of 
the board and implement the responsibilities of the chairman, if the chairman is absent or he 
is unable to do his duties for any reason. In order to implement the responsibilities and 
functions of the CMA, the board should place the internal regulations of the CMA and 
determine the ideal method upon which its employees are appointed, including their salaries 
and remuneration. The board should specify the key structure of the CMA and distribute its 
main circuits and departments. In fact, the activities of the CMA, in relation to board and 
employee appointments, are consistent with the stakeholder theory of corporate governance. 
According to the stakeholder theory, the operation of the firm should focus not only on the 
financial benefit to their owners, but also for the interests of the relevant broader society 
(employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, managers and the entire wider community).383 
The OECD principles of corporate governance, especially in relation to the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance384, are also relevant at this point. Specifically, the 
principle provides that: ‘the corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises’.385 
3.4 The Role of the CMA in Protecting Minority Shareholders’ Rights 
It has been clear, since the outset, that the Saudi Regulator was keen to make the CMA more 
powerful and influential. Therefore, the Capital Market Law has stated, in a bundle of rules, 
that giving the CMA a broad range of powers and jurisdictions would help to improve the 
economic growth and enhance the confidence of investors in the Saudi stock market. The 
CMA’s roles are implemented in different ways: 1) through regulatory and legislative roles; 
2) investigative and punitive roles; 3) monitoring and supervisory roles; and 4) disclosure and 
informative roles. As stated in the introductory part of this chapter, a substantial attention will 
be paid, looking at the extent to which the CMA has contributed in protecting the rights of 
minority shareholders. In the sections below, a detailed analysis of the role of the CMA in 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights is provided.   
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3.4.1 Monitoring and Supervision of the Stock Market386 
Capital Market Institutions Supervision (CMIS) is also considered as one of the most 
significant departments in the CMA, which is responsible for ensuring that authorised 
persons adhere strictly to the provisions of Capital Market Law and its implementing 
regulations.387 The CMIS has supervisory and monitoring authority over authorised persons’ 
activities in the CMA. It works to ensure the soundness of financial institutions, the stability 
of the stock market and fairness of an orderly investment environment that safeguards the 
motives of investors and promotes proper regulations and development of the industry.388 In 
fact, this duty is implemented through various departments. The Authorisation Department is 
primarily responsible for receiving and reviewing all applications related to security business, 
which are presented to the CMA in order to conduct security business in the Saudi stock 
market. By virtue of Article 2 of the Securities Business Regulations (SBR), the security 
business includes a set of deeds, such as dealing, arranging, managing, advising and 
custody.389 In addition, the Authorisation Department is responsible for reviewing changes 
and amendments in the situation of authorised persons, such as to business profiles and 
changes in ownership and employees' registration requirements.390 It is also in charge of the 
review of notifications received from the authorised persons, in accordance with the 
determined situations in Annexe 3.2 of the Authorised Person Regulations.391 
Another division in this department is the Inspection Department.392 This division is 
responsible for carrying out comprehensive inspections on the site of authorised persons to 
ensure that it is in compliant with the Capital Market Law and its implementing regulations. 
Moreover, the CMA has established the so-called Prudential Department to make sure that 
the capital of Authorised Persons is adequate and to ensure that there are sound financial 
resources to meet their business obligations, as per the requirements of the implementing 
regulations. This department is also responsible for reviewing and analysing the balance 
sheet, income statement and performance risk assessment of authorised persons, so as to 
identify their financial risks and resolve them in a proactive and timely manner.  In order of 
fight against financial crimes and protect the Saudi Arabian market from exploitation, the 
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CMA has established the Department of Compliance and Anti-Money Laundering 
Department. These departments are responsible for monitoring the authorised persons in 
order to ensure their activities are compatible with the CMA’s Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules, and other related laws.393 
In fact, the above duties of the CMA reflect the assumptions of the agency theory (described 
in Chapter 2.3.3). The dominant view is that the shareholders usually expect that managers 
will act and make the best decisions in the owners’ interests. In practice, however, it has been 
shown that managers tend to express their opportunistic nature and look to maximize their 
own personal goals and selfish interests, to the detriment of the shareholders.394 Therefore, a 
form of control mechanism (corporate governance) is needed to prevent managers from 
shirking and misusing their fiduciary function.395 According to the agency theory, corporate 
governance reforms, geared towards monitoring the role of the board and supported by 
processes such as external audit and reporting requirements, are likely to reduce problems of 
management pursuing their own interests, or performing poorly.396 In other words, by 
monitoring and supervising the market, the CMA is contributing towards reducing agency 
conflict, which in turn creates an investment climate that ensures adequate protection of the 
rights of minority shareholders. 
3.4.2 Applying Corporate Governance Regulations 
In order to consolidate the great efforts made by the Saudi Arabian government in 
maintaining the best practices of corporate governance, the Corporate Governance 
Regulations have stipulated clearly that any listed corporations working in the Saudi stock 
market should identify the essential procedures and precautions it has in place to help 
shareholders and empower them to exercise all of their lawful rights.397 As a result, the listed 
companies were subjected to strict monitoring in order to ensure that they implement these 
regulations effectively. Furthermore, the CMA established the so-called Corporate 
Governance Department, which is charged with the responsibility of assessing the extent to 
which the listed corporations comply with the Corporate Governance Regulations. 
Importantly, the main objective of establishing this department is to contribute to promoting 
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best practices in protecting shareholders’ and stakeholders’ rights alike.398 In fact, the CMA 
established this department in order to fulfil its mission objectives, which are to raise 
awareness of the importance of good Corporate Governance Regulations and practices, as 
well as to promote a culture of good governance amongst the listed companies in the Saudi 
capital market. Another goal is to reinforce the concepts of responsibility, transparency, and 
fairness in addition to raising the awareness of investors, concerning good governance. 
Furthermore, the Corporate Governance Department seeks to enhance coordination and 
communication with professional, international and domestic organisations as well as 
institutional investors so as to improve and develop effective corporate governance practices 
in the Saudi stock market.399 
To protect minority shareholders and other investors, the department also creates and 
develops sufficient procedures that help to oversee the governance practices of listed 
companies and also ensure effective protection of shareholders and investors in the stock 
market. In this regard, the Corporate Governance Department uses the best tools to ensure the 
efficient application of the statutory requirements for corporate governance.400In addition, 
previous research has shown that soft regulation is one of the hallmarks of good corporate 
governance practice.401 As a result, promoting a culture of soft regulation of corporate 
governance in listed corporations, through continuous communication, is one of the main 
goals of this department.402 It is important to note that soft regulation is one of the initiatives 
put forward by practitioners to improve corporate governance practices. There is an ongoing 
debate as to whether firms should follow hard or soft regulation in their corporate governance 
practices. Whereas the hard regulation defines a set of mandatory instructions (laws) that 
firms have to adopt, the soft regulation on the other hand, deals with a collection of non-
binding guidelines (codes), which are accompanied by a ‘comply or explain’ principle,403 
whereby firms are expected to report whether they comply with each of the guidelines (or 
not, and if so, why not).404 Supporters of soft regulation argued that soft regulation is 
appealing because it allows firms to choose individual governance structures that reflect firm-
specific trade-offs.405 Importantly, it forces firms to release a Declaration of Conformity 
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(DoC), which reveals the firm’s government structures to outsiders. One potential benefit of a 
DoC is that it increases transparency of firms’ government structures, which ‘allows 
shareholders – even if they are non-monitoring but decide by exit – as well as the public, to 
put managers under external pressure to establish efficient governance structures’.406 In fact, 
a recent study by Rapp et al407 suggests that, from the perspective of shareholders, soft 
regulation of corporate governance practices is an efficient way to regulate governance 
mechanisms of firms. Despite these benefits, critics have argued that soft regulation does not 
improve corporate governance in firms with powerful and self-interested managers.408 
Importantly, whether soft regulation will help improve corporate governance practice in 
Saudi firms dominated by concentrated ownership of wealthy families and the State, 
however, remains to be determined. Thus, from shareholder’s perspective an important 
question arises: How does soft regulation guarantee adequate protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights? Perhaps given the high level of ownership concentration in Saudi 
Arabia, hard regulation might likely be preferred to soft regulation, in order to ensure 
adequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
  
3.4.2.1 Inspection and Investigation 
Conducting proper inspection and investigation into the securities market is one of the most 
significant factors that contribute largely in implementing the enforcement action. A chronic 
lack of resources, skills and independent agency to undertake inspection, investigation and 
bring enforcement actions, are key reasons for the weakness of regulatory systems over the 
world.409 Public enforcement mechanisms, particularly inspection, investigation and penalties 
are considered a significant means that can contribute to deter those who might be engaging 
in fraudulent market activities or manipulation. The importance of inspection and 
investigation, as vital mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of public enforcement, has 
been affirmed in the Principles of the IOSCO: ‘The regulator should have comprehensive 
inspection, investigation and surveillance powers’.410 
In fact, giving the security market authorities an absolute power to undertake the inspection 
of the listed corporations’ activities, and conduct investigation with those who violate the 




409Corporate Governance Department. Available at: http://www.cma.org.sa. 
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provisions of the Capital Market Law and its regulations, is very significant in order to create 
a sound stock market and protect the interests of investors from fraudulent manipulators. The 
power of the regulator to enforce security market regulations is based on his ability to 
commence investigation into violations of the law and bring appropriate action, to deter or 
punish the offenders.411 
 
It is obvious from literature that there is a solid relationship between effective enforcement 
mechanisms and protection of minority shareholders’ rights, as well as its role in developing 
the securities markets in general.412 In Saudi Arabia, the CMA has declared, since its 
inception, that its main enforcement task is to protect investors and the public from unfair and 
unsound practices involving fraud, deceit, cheating, manipulation and insider information 
trading.413 In fact, since its outset, the Saudi regulator has acknowledged the value of 
inspection and investigation as effective mechanisms, especially as it relates to the protection 
of the security market and minority shareholders from harmful violations. Thus, the CML has 
given the CMA all jurisdictions to exercise its responsibilities and duties entirely. In 
accordance with the CML, the CMA established four departments in order to facilitate its 
mission. The Investigation Department is one of the significant divisions in the Saudi 
securities market. In accordance with the CML,  
 
The members of the authority and its employees designated by the board are 
empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence and require the production of 
any books, papers, or other documents which the authority deems relevant or 
material to its investigation.414 
 
The key role of the Investigation Department is to oversee all investigation processes, collect 
evidence, interview offenders and conduct interrogation. Furthermore, the department also 
seeks to:415 
 
1) Investigate violations referred by different sources  
2) Investigate electronic violations referred by different sources  
                                                 
411P. A. Loomis, ‘Enforcement Problems under the Federal Securities Law’s’ (1959), Business Lawyer, vol 14, pp  665. 
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Economics, vol 18, pp 519-525. 
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3) Request data and records that support the investigation processes from internal and 
external sources 
4) Subpoena suspects and witnesses for interview and interrogation.  
 
In fact, these investigative powers of the CMA are in line with the recommendations of the 
agency theory, especially in mitigating the agency conflict. Specifically, the theory 
recommends that the main role of the board is to obtain the necessary information to monitor 
the performance of the company and to hold the managers accountable.416 
 
With respect to inspection, the CMA is empowered to carry out inspection of the records or 
any other materials, whoever the holder may be, to determine whether the person ‘has 
violated, or is about to violate’ any provision of the CML or its implementing regulations.417 
In addition to that, the Capital Market Law (CML) has also given Tadawul the power to carry 
out investigations and inspections of any licensed broker or broker’s agent, to determine 
whether a violation of rules has occurred or is about to occur. This power and function is 
working in concert with the CMA’s powers of investigation and involves the power to require 
the production of any person’s testimony, papers, books and documents, which the exchange 
deems necessary or relevant to its inquiry.418 
 
The evidence above suggests that the Saudi regulatory body has given the CMA full statutory 
powers and functions to discharge its responsibilities and to ensure active enforcement of the 
securities law and its relevant regulations. In order to protect the stock market and the rights 
of the minority shareholders against fraudulent manipulators, the CMA established the 
Investigation Department to achieve this end. The comparison between the CMA and its 
counterparts in other Arab countries has shown that the Saudi Arabian stock market is more 
independent and it outperforms its counterparts, in discharge of its function.419 
 
In the UK, the investigation process conducted for violations of the Financial Services Act 
2012 is slightly different from the situation under the CML. According to the Act, 
investigations may be conducted based on the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) initiative 
                                                 
416
 N. Chambers et al., ‘Towards a framework for enhancing the performance of NHS boards: a synthesis of the evidence about board 
governance, board effectiveness and board development’ (2013) Health Services and Delivery Research, vol 1, no 6, p 17. 
417Art (5-c) Saudi CML. 
418Ibid art (35). 
419S. Al-Fadhli, ‘Independency of the Capital Market Authority Is a Red Line, Statutorily and constitutionally’, Alqabas Newspaper (28 
September, 2011) Available at: http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/16747. 
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or upon the directives of the Treasury.420 The FCA Transitional Board421 should oversee all 
the investigation processes, even though the role of the FCA is to verify the objectives of the 
enforcement system. However, it seems that there is no specialized enforcement department 
under the UK Act of 2012 because the FCA has to notify the Treasury before commencing or 
suspending an investigation, which then determines when it will start or resume the 
investigations.422 In accordance with the U.K. Financial Services Act of 2012, the Treasury 
has the right to place certain directions for the regulator, such as:423  
 
1) The scope of the investigation424  
2) The period during which the investigation is to be carried out425 
3) The conduct of the investigation426  
4) The making of reports.427  
 
3.4.2.2 Imposing Penalties and Sanctions 
Effective enforcement mechanisms should comprise of severe penalties and sanctions. 
Indeed, without harsh sanctions against violators of security market regulations, the 
enforcement system would not achieve its objectives. Public enforcement mechanisms refer 
to the use of government bodies to disclose and impose sanctions and penalties against each 
company or individual that violates security market laws and regulations.428 The power to 
make orders and impose sanctions on offenders has become a cornerstone of the process of 
activation of the enforcement system.429 Similarly, empowering the stock market agency to 
impose appropriate sanctions and penalties on those who breach security law has become a 
crucial factor in ensuring the stability of financial systems and the development of the 
security market. In fact, imposing penalties plays a fundamental role in protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights from mismanagement and the abuse of controlling shareholders. The 
above fact has been echoed in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which states 
that: 
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The corporate governance framework provides either ex ante mechanisms for 
minority shareholders to protect their rights that have proven effective and/or 
ex post sanctions against controlling shareholders for abusive action taken 
against them. There are effective means of redress for minority shareholders 
and adequate remedies.430 
Indeed, sanctions and penalties are considered as one of the most significant ex post means 
that can contribute largely in reforming the management and protecting the minority 
shareholders against the oppression of controlling shareholders. Similarly, administrative, 
financial or criminal punishments are seen as effective mechanisms of redress for minority 
shareholders, whose rights have been violated. Given the effectiveness of sanctions as a 
public enforcement mechanism, many countries adopt sanctions as a component of their 
regulatory milestones.431 
Specifically, in Saudi Arabia the Articles 57 and 59 of the CML have given the CMA all the 
rights to impose sanctions against those who violate the provisions of the CML or its relevant 
regulations. These sanctions range from administrative, monetary and criminal penalties. 
Article 57 of the CML gives the CMA the right to require the Committee for the Resolution 
of Securities Disputes (CRSD) to impose the criminal sanctions and punish the violators of 
Articles 49 and 50, with imprisonment terms for up to five years.432 In addition to the 
imprisonment term, Article 59 of the CML also gives the CMA the power to bring other legal 
action before the CRSD, against a violator, or a potential violator of any of the CML 
provisions. The administrative sanctions for accusations brought under Article 59 range from 
the following sanctions:433 
 
1) Warning the violator434 
2) Ceasing and desisting the offending person from carrying out the act which is the 
subject of the suit435 
3) Travel ban436  
4) Seizing and implementing on the property of the offender437  
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5) Obliging the person concerned to take the essential steps to avoid the violation or to 
conduct such necessary corrective steps to remedy the consequences of the 
violation438  
6) Preventing the violator from working with companies whose are listed on the 
exchange439  
7) Suspending the trading in the securities market440 
8) Obliging the offender to pay to the authority’s account the gains realized as a result of 
such violation441  
9) Preventing the offending person from working as a broker, portfolio manager or 
investment adviser for a necessary period, for the safety of the securities market and 
the protection of investors.442  
 
With regard to the amount of public penalties imposed, Article 59b) has given both the Board 
of the Capital Market Authority (BCMA) and the CRSD the right to impose a financial fine 
against any person responsible for a violation of the CML, its implementing regulations, and 
the rules of the CMA (or the exchange's regulations), but the fines shall not be less than SR 
10,000 ($2,666) and not exceed SR 100,000 ($26,666), for each violation perpetrated by the 
defendant.443 Moreover, if the violator is a security professional (such as an unlicensed dealer 
or broker), then he or she should be subjected to either a fine, not less than SR 10,000 or 
more than SR 100,000, for every violation, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding nine 
months.444 
 
In addition to what has been defined by Article 49, concerning the limited actions and 
practices that lead to false and misleading impressions, the CML also states that any person 
(as identified in Article 55b)),445 is responsible for compensation of investors, when the 
prospectus contains incorrect statements of material matters or omitted substantial facts 
required to be stipulated in the prospectus. To fulfill the responsibility of protecting investors, 
including minority shareholders, the CML stipulates that any person who announces, or is 






443ibid art (59-b). 
444Ibid art (60-a). 
445The Saudi CML give investors entitled to compensation for the damages incurred by them as a result of incorrect prospectus. The persons 
who are responsible for issuing incorrect prospectus are: The party issuing the security, The senior officers of the issuing party of the 
financial security, The members of the board of directors of the issuing party, The underwriters who are responsible for offering on behalf of 
the issuer the security for sale to the public, The accountant, engineer or appraiser and others defined in the prospectus. For more insight see 
Art (55-b-1-2-3-4-5) SCML. 
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responsible for another person who announces, either orally or in writing, an untrue statement 
of material fact, or omits to declare the material facts (leading to misled investors in relation 
to the sale or purchase of security) should be responsible for compensation of the damages 
incurred by investors.446 
 
With respect to penalties imposed for the interest of affected investors, the CML states that 
damaged investors are entitled to claim compensation equivalent to the value of the damages 
incurred by financial security.447 Despite the seriousness of the CML in enforcing sanctions 
imposed against violators of its provisions, it should be noted that the provisions of Article 
55a) are ambiguous, as they state that the affected investor is entitled to claim compensation 
for the damages incurred by him, but he must prove that these damages were as a result of 
incorrect statements or misleading information contained in the prospectus. Sadly in Saudi 
Arabia, minority shareholders do not have powers to obtain information from companies or 
boards of directors, apparently due to the concentration of ownership and control at the hands 
of controlling shareholders and rich families.  
 
It should be noted that the CMA and its Semi-Judicial Committee have a genuine desire to 
punish any person who violates the provisions of the CML or any of the implementing 
regulations. Hence, the Saudi security market has witnessed a set of sanctions and penalties 
against offenders since its inception. The volume of cases that has been dealt with by the 
Capital Market Authority Board (CMAB) and the CRSD, regarding manipulation and fraud, 
is high. A recent example is the decision by the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Conflicts (ACRSC), dated 01/07/2014, regarding the suit filed by the CMA against 
Hamad bin Abdulwahab bin Mohammed Alabdulwahab (the defendant).448 The verdict ruled 
against the defendant, who was found to have violated Article 49 of the CML, as well as 
Article 2 and Article 3 of the market conduct regulations, whilst trading the equities of the 
Astra Industrial Group, Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co., Mohammad Al Mojil Group Company, 
Saudi Transport and Investment Company, Saudi Industrial Services Co., Malath Cooperative 
Insurance and Reinsurance Company, Saudi Fisheries Co., Saudi IAIC Cooperative Insurance 
Co, Tourism Enterprise Co., Saudi Indian Company for Co- operative Insurance, ALAHLI 
Takaful Company and National Agriculture Marketing Co., during the period 03/03/2009 to 
26/05/2009. These practices constituted fraud and manipulation and created a false and 
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misleading impression. Following the verdict, the defendant was urged to pay all the 
revenues he collected at a total amount of SR 8,146,388, which was equivalent to 
$2,172,136.18. A penalty charge of SR 300,000 (equivalent to $79991.15) was also imposed 
as a result of these violations.449 
In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has the legal right to exercise its powers 
and authorities against those who violate the provisions of security market laws. 
Consequently, the FCA is empowered as a sole entity to take action against any person 
(individual or corporation) that violates the provisions of the Authority.450 It imposed fines of 
about £241,305,700 in 2014 against violators of its standards and provisions.451 In this regard, 
the FCA has a bundle of disciplinary, civil and criminal powers to undertake action against 
firms or individuals who are failing, or have failed to meet the FCA’s standards. The 
sanctions imposed by the FCA can be summarized as follows:452 
 
1) Withdraw a company’s license453  
2) Outlaw an individual from working in financial services454 
3) Deter an individual from conducting specific regulated activities455 
4) Cease a firm for up to 12 months from undertaking identified, regulated activities456 
5) Halt an individual for up to 2 years from undertaking determined controlled functions457  
6) Censure companies and individuals via public statements458 
7) Impose financial penalties459 
8) Require injunctions460  
9) Apply to courts to freeze assets461  
10) Require restitution orders462   
11) Litigate companies and individuals who undertake regulated activities without 
licenses.463  
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It is important to note that the method used to punish violators of the provisions of the CML 
and its implementation of regulations, does not differ much from those punishments applied 
in the UK. Indeed, there are some differences among these legal systems but they also share 
some similarities. For example, the CML has stated clearly that manipulation and insider 
trading are prohibited actions in the Saudi stock market. In accordance with the CML, any 
person who intentionally behaves or engages in any action that results in creating false or 
misleading impressions concerning the market, the prices and the value of securities, which 
influence a third party to buy, sell or engage in any securities or refrain from acting or 
exercising their rights according to the CML, is guilty against the law.464 The CML defined 
the actions and practices that fall within a ‘false and misleading impression’ as follows:465 
1) To perform any act or practice aimed at creating a false or misleading impression of 
an existing active trading in security, as may be contrary to the reality. These acts and 
practices shall include, but not be limited to the following:  
(a) Undertaking transactions in securities which do not involve a true transfer of 
ownership thereof. 
(b) Entering an order or orders for the purchase of a particular security with prior 
knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, price and timing for 
the sale of the same security has been or will be entered into by a different party or 
parties.  
(c) Entering an order or orders for the sale of a particular security, with prior knowledge 
that an order or orders of substantially the same size, price and timing for the purchase 
of the same security, has been or will be entered into by the same party or different 
parties. 
2) To affect, alone or with others, the price of a particular security or securities traded on 
the exchange through executing a series of transactions in such security or securities, 
creating actual or apparent active trading or causing an increase or decrease in the 
prices of such securities, for the purpose of inducing third parties to buy or sell such 
securities as the case may be. 
3) To affect, alone or with others through any series of transactions such as buying or 
selling a security traded on the exchange for the purpose of pegging or stabilizing the 
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price of such security, in violation of the rules set forth by the authority for the safety 
of the market and the protection of investors. 
Furthermore, the CML prohibits direct and indirect trading in the security market for any 
person who obtains insider information through family, business, other party or contractual 
relationships, especially if this information will have a material effect on the frenzy or value 
of the security.466 Accordingly, much of the current debate revolves around the fact that 
further criminal prosecution may be required in the UK securities market in order to 
guarantee additional protection for the financial system. Some scholars are of the opinion that 
criminal prosecutions are weak in the UK securities market, that the FSA’s resources are very 
broadly spread among its large jurisdictions, or that the enforcement approach sends out 
selective messages and some illegal activities leave without sanctions.467 These views were 
supported by Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement in FSA, who said that: 
 
For the last two years or so I have been signaling our intention to use our 
powers as a criminal prosecutor. Why? It is a direct reaction to the findings of 
the market cleanliness study, anecdotal evidence from the marketplace and the 
media, the things we see as a result of real time market monitoring, and the 
belief that criminal prosecution, where a custodial sentence is a real risk, will 
act as a stronger deterrent than a civil/administrative market abuse prosecution 
under the FSMA, even though we have the power to impose unlimited fines. I 
don't think this can be described as being enforcement averse. It is a significant 
shift of emphasis for the FSA and it comes with risk. Commentators are always 
eager to point out the UK's poor record on prosecutions for insider dealing.468 
 
Unlike the fines imposed under the UK FCA, the penalty charges imposed against violators 
of the CML and its implementing regulations in Saudi Arabia are relatively weak, especially 
compared with those imposed by the FCA in the UK. Meanwhile, regarding criminal 
sanctions, the CMA and its counterparts in the UK are not authorized to award custodian 
sentences to anyone who violates the provisions of security laws. However, the main 
difference here is that the prison sentences imposed by the ACRSC are not commensurate 
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with the size of the material damage to these violations, or the period of imprisonment, which 
may not be sufficient to prevent and deter the commission of similar offence in the Saudi 
securities market. This is because the CML identified the period of imprisonment as only five 
years, while perpetrating insider trading in the UK leads to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding seven years.469 In addition, the CML has excluded any of the persons mentioned in 
paragraph b.2, 3 and 4 of Article 55 from liability, if their act was committed unintentionally, 
or if there was no violation at all.470 
 
Despite minor differences between the UK Financial Conduct Authority and Saudi’s Capital 
Market Authority, the evidence above suggests that both jurisdictions have mechanisms in 
place to punish offenders who violate the provisions of security market regulations. Hence, 
this is a reflection of good corporate governance practice and it is consistent with the OECD 
principles of corporate governance. 471 
3.5 Major Drawbacks Directed to the CMA 
3.5.1 Lack of Cooperation between Investigation Authorities 
Giving regulators the absolute right to undertake inspection into corporations and conduct 
appropriate investigations into listed corporations has been seen as a crucial factor in 
protecting security markets from legal infringements. Indeed, the lack of an independent body 
to undertake inspections and investigations and enforce laws and regulations efficiently was 
one of the key issues facing security regulators worldwide.472 As mentioned previously, the 
importance of the investigation procedures was demonstrated in the Principles of IOSCO, 
which recommends for adequate powers to be given to regulators, to carry out inspections 
and investigations effectively.473 This recommendation suggests that there is a robust 
relationship between effective investigation tools and the protection of the rights of minority 
shareholders.474 The rationale behind this is empowering the investigation agency to 
contribute largely in detecting and deterring unfair and unsound practices, such as deceit, 
fraud, manipulation and cheating. For instance, in Saudi Arabia the CML has given the 
Capital Market Authority the right to carry out proper inspection and investigation of those 
who they think have breached the provisions of the law. As previously mentioned, the CMA 
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has established the specialized Investigation Department in this regard. However, in practice 
there are some obstacles that may impede its work. Perhaps a shortage of staff and limited 
financial resources may be two of the main barriers hindering the Investigation Department 
from achieving its objectives.   
Furthermore, collaborating with competent governmental and financial authorities and bodies 
in order to collect information and materials that help to identify those who violate the 
provisions of the CML and its implementing regulations is an essential element in the course 
of strengthening the activities of the Inspection and Investigation Department. The 
importance of collaboration amongst investigative authorities has been confirmed in several 
studies. For example, Ana Carvajal and Jennifer Elliott suggest that: 
 
The regulator should have mechanisms to obtain such information either 
directly or through other authorities subject, of course, to due-process 
protections. In the latter case, it is particularly important that there be 
mechanisms in place (such as memoranda of understanding) to ensure effective 
and efficient cooperation from the other authority (for example, the securities 
regulator commonly needs cooperation of the banking regulator). There should 
also be mechanisms to enforce such power, including sanctions for 
noncompliance and for providing false information.475 
 
The present study has revealed, through analysing the work of Investigation Department in 
the CMA, that there is a weak relationship between the CMA and other Saudi Arabian 
agencies, especially in the context of investigations concerning violations of the securities 
law. To support the collaboration theory among governmental bodies, some studies have 
recommended that the CMA should cooperate with the Saudi Arabian bodies (such as the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)) to obtain and access banks records, or with the 
Ministry of Justice in order to effectively implement its policies, or deal with cases that 
contravene the provisions of the CML.476 
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3.5.2 Weak Information Provided by the CMA 
Maintaining transparency in the security market is an essential element in providing 
necessary protection for minority shareholders. The importance of the transparency has been 
affirmed by international bodies such as in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
and by the International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO). Both international 
bodies have agreed that security regulators should play a vital role in ensuring protection 
through enacting robust regulations that support and provide information regarding the stock 
market, as well as the performance of the security regulators.477 
Investors lost confidence in the Saudi securities market, particularly in the wake of the 
financial crisis in 2006. Indeed, the lack of transparency and insufficient information 
provided by the CMA largely contributed to the failure of the market in 2006. Some studies 
argued that the information provided by the CMA was insufficient.478 The Saudi securities 
market is deemed as one of the biggest and fastest growing markets in the MENA region. 
However, it is still characterized by some irregularities, especially in relation to the issue of 
transparency and disclosure.479 A report presented by one of the analysts in the Saudi 
economy illustrates that the Saudi securities market will not only be the largest market in the 
region, but rather that it will be the most liquid and developed. Regarding transparency, 
however, this report further suggests that ‘hopefully, the progressive involvement of 
international institutions will dive forward transparency and governance in the Kingdom’.480 
 
Therefore, it is obvious that the situation of the transparency and governance process is still 
worrying for those interested in the affairs of the Saudi securities market. In reality, it is 
reasonable to say that the capital market suffers from losing the investors’ confidence but 
there are many irregularities in the market, which have been ongoing without the knowledge 
of the CMA.481 As a result, the CMA is required to restore public confidence in the security 
market by reinforcing the principle of transparency and disclosure within its actions.  
                                                 
477Principle (v) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999;  J. Zufferey and M. Tschanz-Norton, Regulation of Trading Systems on 
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480Grant Thornton International Ltd, ‘Middle East: towards innovation and transparency’ (2008) Capital Markets Guide p 8. 
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3.5.3 Weak Intervention by the CMA to Protect Minority Shareholders 
It has been suggested that the effective enforcement of the securities market regulations is 
largely based on the ability and expertise of the regulators, to address and deal with all the 
threats facing the securities market. Indeed, protecting the security market and minority 
shareholders’ rights from manipulation and fraud needs fast and quick intervention, at the 
appropriate time. Previous research has demonstrated a relationship between the professional 
regulators and the efficient enforcement of security laws. By contrast, the lack of experience 
or expertise amongst security authorities usually leads to weakening of the enforcement of 
market law.482 
The International Organisation of Securities Commission has discussed this issue and 
concluded that security bodies must possess a set of abilities that assist in protecting security 
markets from unsound practices. Therefore, the commission recommends that the existence 
of technical factors and specialized circuits in its own field is substantial in order to ensure 
the enforcement of security laws and regulations.483 In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2008, the IOSCO issued a report for appraising the performance of the securities 
market, in particular for the emerging markets. It affirmed that ‘…prompt and consistent 
enforcement action is undoubtedly one of the key criteria for building a fair, efficient and 
transparent market’.484 
 
As far as protection of minority shareholders’ rights is concerned, the early interference by 
security bodies to prevent illegal speculations that usually lead to the abnormal rise in stock 
prices, is considered a significant factor in the course of protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders. The intervention of the capital market authority in a timely manner is one of the 
successful means that stabilizes the financial system. Indeed, weak intervention and the 
weakness of enforcement mechanisms were key reasons behind the US financial crisis.485 
 
After establishing the CMA in Saudi Arabia, there have been many attempts to control and 
adjust the securities market. In reality, the CMA has always sought, since its inception, to 
enhance the performance of the capital market and protect the investors, and therefore it 
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enacted a bundle of laws and regulations to help in this regard. However, the problem facing 
the Saudi Arabian securities market was related to the weak intervention by the CMA.486  
Hence, the financial crisis that hit the Saudi Arabian securities market in 2006 was attributed 
to the weak interference of the CMA. Prior to the collapse of Saudi Arabian securities market 
in 2006, there had been indications and warnings, which showed overpricing of shares that 
were unrelated to the actual performance of the listed corporations.487 Nonetheless, the CMA 
disregarded those warnings and did not intervene to save the market. As a result, many Saudi 
people lost their money and they are still unable to retrieve their investments, or at least be 
compensated for their losses.   
 
Intervention of the Capital Market Authority through suspension of trading, particularly in 
the wake of huge volatility in the stock market or in the situation of abnormal speculations, is 
a successful strategy that is needed to protect the market and its shareholders, including 
minority shareholders. For example, the IOSCO report after the financial crisis showed that a 
trading halt was deemed as one of the significant instruments used by the securities regulator 
for protecting investors.488 Other evidence demonstrated that a trading halt would effectively 
contribute to confronting the risks that threaten the stability of the securities market, as well 
as protecting the market through detecting unreasonable prices.489 
 
Once again, in Saudi Arabia, it can be said that the Saudi securities market suffers from a 
deficiency of intervention by the CMA in a timely manner, even though the Capital Market 
Law (CML) gives it the genuine right to intervene and suspend the market’s activities for a 
period (not exceeding one day) when it is essential to protect the market and its investors.490 
However, practice on the ground indicates that the failure of the securities market in 2006 and 
the stock market slackness in 2008 were attributed to weak intervention, as well as a lack of 
sufficient experience in dealing with situations such as this.  
 
Several Saudi scholars have directed their criticism against the work of the CMA in the wake 
of the financial crisis in 2006 ‘…the governmental authorities remained passive and stood by, 
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pp125-147. 
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watching this painful economic catastrophe without attempting to intervene and halt the 
collapse in an effort to save the country and its citizens from its destructive consequences’.491 
3.5.4 Inadequacy of Imposing Penalties and Sanctions against Violators 
The CMA has exercised a great deal of effort in ensuring that the securities market and 
minority shareholders’ rights are protected through imposing a set of fines and sanctions 
against any firm or individual that breaches the provisions of the Capital Market Law, or any 
of its implementing regulations. However, compared with other jurisdictions (such as the UK, 
Germany and the US) there is a severe deficiency, particularly in terms of the financial 
penalties and criminal sanctions imposed by either the CMA or the CRSD. The present study 
has shown that those penalties are not compatible with the volume and magnitude of the 
capital of Saudi listed companies. In fact, the listed firms in the Saudi securities market are 
characterized by the high financial capabilities which make those fines useless. As we have 
seen above, the CML has granted the CMA the power to impose a financial penalty against 
any violators of the CML, the implementing regulations or the stock exchange's regulations, 
but the penalties shall not be less than SR 10,000 ($2,666) and not exceeding SR 100,000 
($26,666), for each violation perpetrated by the defendant.492 In addition, it has the right to 
require the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) to impose criminal 
sanctions against the violators of Articles 49 and 50 with imprisonment terms of up to five 
years.493 
Nonetheless, certain analysts who are interested in the Saudi Arabian securities market 
commented by saying that the penalties imposed by the CMA against listed firms are lenient, 
and not commensurate, to the impact these violations have on the market and/or its 
investors.494 According to the Annual Report of the CMA in 2013, the aggregate of cases 
violated was about 287.495 Previous research has shown that the total financial penalties 
levied against violators of the security laws are considered one of the most significant 
standards of implementing the enforcement tools.496 The aim of imposing appropriate 
sanctions is to force listed corporations to comply with the provisions of the security market 
laws, as well as to prevent breaches that will harm investors and damage their interests. It is 
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reasonable to say that the amount of financial penalties and imprisonment terms enforced by 
either the CMA or the CRSD are not sufficient to deter offenders, and in addition they are not 
compatible with the size of the securities market in Saudi Arabia.  
 
As a consequence, it is essential that the Saudi regulator intervenes and places new 
adjustments on Articles 57c) and 59b) of the CML in order to boost the level of the financial 
penalties and criminal sanctions. Indeed, amendments of the CML’s Articles, by imposing 
severe penalties to violators of the CML, will contribute to protecting minority shareholders’ 
rights and project the CML as a strong pillar that will stabilize the Saudi Arabian securities 
market. 
3.6 The Major Shortcomings Directed to the Stock Market in Saudi Arabia 
 
The previous sections have demonstrated some of the huge efforts made in reforming the 
Saudi capital market. However, these developments have also been characterized by certain 
limitations, which have important implications for the CMA’s desire to achieve its functions 
and roles effectively, and in particular, protect the rights of minority shareholders. Several 
reasons have been given but the main reasons are discussed in the sections below. 
3.6.1 Concentrated Ownership and Absence of Awareness 
As previously mentioned, the concentration of ownership and control in the hands of a small 
number of controlling shareholders/owners is deemed as one of the significant factors that 
may harm or damage the rights of minority shareholders (especially in those markets 
characterised by weak disclosure, transparency and poor corporate governance practices).497 
Previous research has shown that wealthy families dominate and control the majority of 
widely-held corporations, especially in Asian countries including Saudi Arabia. Importantly, 
it was found that the percentage of market capitalization in those countries’ stock exchanges 
is dominated by 1, 5 and 10 rich families.498 In the Saudi stock market for example, the 
ownership of a considerable percentage of equities is owned by the board members and 
founders. Importantly, several listed companies are still being managed and controlled by 
their founders. For example, in the Al Khodari Company, the chairman and 2 other board 
members out of 6, belong to the same family who own about 60% of its shares.499 
                                                 
497H. K. Leong, ‘Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics, and Regulations’ (2005) Institute of the 
Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, pp 20-23. 
498ibid. 
499Abdullah Al Khodari Company. Available at: http://www.alkhodari.com/organizational.html, accessed 8 October 2013.   
 91 
 
Furthermore, there are at least 2 out of 11 local banks that are controlled by wealthy Saudi 
families.500 The proliferation of the government and family ownership structure of listed 
corporations in the Saudi capital market is considered to be one of the main problems faced 
by the market.501 
This dominance and control of shares by a small number of wealthy individuals will 
definitely jeopardise the efforts of the CMA and thus make its surveillance and overseeing 
functions more complicated. It is difficult for one government body to monitor and direct 
these listed corporations in the light of this absolute dominance, in particular if we keep in 
mind the poor collaboration between the CMA and the controlling shareholders or families. 
In addition, the effective application of the corporate governance rules in Saudi Arabia is 
based on a self-regulation and non-binding manner. Consequently, there is no real guarantee 
that the family-listed corporations adhere strictly to the provisions of these laws and 
regulations, given the inefficiency and shortage of personnel in the CMA.  
Furthermore, the idea of relying on shareholders so as to implement the Corporate 
Governance Regulations (CGRs) may be unsuccessful in the Saudi securities market for a 
good number of reasons. Perhaps the most important of them is that the engagement of the 
minority shareholders in the company's decision-making is somewhat vulnerable. Indeed, 
Saudi Arabia is considered an emerging State, thus the exercise of rights and participation in 
popular life has not reached full maturity yet. This phenomenon is reflected in the way and 
manner in which people engage in business and economic life in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
there is limited participation in the decision-making and ineptitude when it comes to 
challenging the controlling shareholders and managerial decisions.502 In addition, most 
shareholders in the Saudi securities market have limited knowledge about the activities and 
operations of the stock market, thus they are not fully empowered to participate effectively in 
stock market operations and transactions.503 Another problem is that the Saudi securities 
market is based on predictions and rumours, given the lack of sufficient, substantive analysis 
and accurate information.   
It should be noted that even in certain sophisticated legal systems, such as in the UK, the 
stock market seeks to encourage the shareholders to participate effectively in implementing 
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the provisions of corporate governance rules, but in general this participation does not usually 
work in practice.504 Moreover, it is important to note that one of the crucial factors that can 
help the CMA to achieve its objectives smoothly is through determining and defining the 
institutional investors. The institutional investors can be used to improve and motivate 
corporate governance practice, as is the case in the UK and the US. However, in the Saudi 
securities market, the CMA has not yet identified these institutions as disciplinary forces and 
thus the market is relatively low in terms of institutional ownership.505 It has been suggested 
that protection of shareholders, including minority shareholders and the security market in 
general, from manipulation and misconduct of directors and the abuse of controlling 
shareholders needs constant checking. The institutional shareholders can contribute largely in 
safeguarding the market, particularly in the light of the lack of scrutiny on the senior 
executives of listed firms.506 
In effect, the Saudi security market is still suffering from increasing the proportion of 
individual investors, which accounts for 92% of trading transactions in the Saudi stock 
market, without encouraging the culture of institutional shareholders, as seen in the UK and 
the US. The implication of this is that individual investors lack adequate experience that can 
enable them to make suitable decisions and challenge any violations of their rights. Thus, the 
absence of institutional shareholders may lead minority shareholders to lose their rights.507 
3.6.2 Volatility and Instability of the Stock Market 
According to the views of many Saudi financial analysts and economists, the security market 
is still volatile and unstable in Saudi Arabia. The instability of the market has been attributed 
to two main reasons. Firstly, the financial crisis that hit the Saudi securities market in 2006 
has led to a negative result on the performance of the market. This has been 
counterproductive, leading to a lack of confidence in the securities market generally. In 
particular, the 2006 crisis has led to withdrawal of most investments from the market, which 
in turn led to an 8% decline in profits over 4 years.508 Indeed, the trust in the securities market 
plays a crucial role in attracting investors. However, the market collapse in 2006 has led to a 
decline in investors’ confidence in the Saudi securities market. The securities market is still 
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suffering from investors fleeing the market, as they prefer not to invest their funds in the 
market. This has led to a significant decline in the trading volume and flow of funds in the 
securities market. The observers said that the market crashed in 2006 and that market 
volatility and weaker market were the key factors that led to the loss of investors’ 
confidence.509 
As previous research has shown, investors’ confidence in the securities market is seen as a 
fundamental element in investment decision-making, and indeed an essential factor in 
promoting the investors to place their funds into the market.510 As a consequence, it is 
reasonable to say that the financial market crash that hit the Saudi securities market in 2006 
has negatively affected the growth of the capital market so far. Secondly, the Saudi Arabian 
economy is based entirely on the oil industry. Therefore, high or low oil prices can directly 
affect the securities market, either negatively or positively. Importantly, there is a nature of 
relationship between oil production and the securities market in Saudi Arabia. Some reports 
in this regard have shown that increased oil prices in the period from 2003 to 2005 had a 
positive impact on Saudi economic growth, including increasing the performance of the 
securities market.511 The causal relationship between these two elements (oil prices and the 
stock market) has been endorsed by a recent empirical study, which showed that ‘the 
strongest influence on the Saudi stock market returns variation was the price of the oil, 2.2%, 
followed by the U.S. stock market, 2%’.512 
Other empirical evidence suggests that most securities markets in the GCC region are largely 
dependent on the prices of oil. This study revealed an interesting finding: that there is a 
strong connection between the oil prices variables and the input and output variables of the 
securities markets, especially in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.513 In fact, 
the price of oil is one of the hazards that threaten the securities market in Saudi Arabia and 
others in the GCC.514 As a result, many have been calling for investments in resources other 
than the oil, so as to protect the securities market and its investors from the crisis, due to the 
drop in oil prices. 
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3.6.3 Inadequate Compliance of Listed Firms in Meeting with the Disclosure 
Requirements 
As is well-known, disclosure and transparency of company’s information and its financial 
reports are considered as crucial elements in reforming any financial system across the globe, 
and importantly, they are one of the most significant tools of corporate governance 
principles.515 One main objective of a sound corporate governance practice is building a solid 
financial system. Hence, financial systems in listed corporations should be kept in such a 
manner that ensures accurate and timely information.516 Indeed, sound disclosure and 
transparency policies assist shareholders in making decisions concerning whether to retain or 
purchase the company shares. One of the key issues identified as contributing to the collapse 
of some giant international corporations was a poor disclosure system in the company. Thus, 
it remains a crucial factor in building investors’ confidence in the capital market. Indeed, the 
importance of disclosure has been emphasised by many, as contained in the following report:  
‘Disclosure can be a powerful regulatory tool; it creates an incentive to comply with best 
practice, and allows members and third parties to take necessary actions. Disclosure 
requirements can be more efficient, more flexible and easier to enforce’.517 
In the Saudi Arabian case, for instance, the importance of disclosure and transparency has 
been emphasized, in particular following the enactment of the CML and its sister regulations, 
such as Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Regulations. According to the Saudi capital 
market regulations, disclosure of the company’s information is forming part of the corporate 
culture among listed firms operating in the stock market.518 Specifically, the board of 
directors and chief executives have the responsibility of ensuring that each company 
implements disclosure and transparency requirements efficiently. The board of directors must 
disclose a wide range of proceedings and operations conducted at the board level and should 
also explain how it conducts its duties. In fact, the board’s report should include the 
following items: 1) the company’s performance; 2) the compliance of the company for the 
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CML and other relevant regulations, particularly the Corporate Governance Regulations; 3) 
how it implements its duties; and 4) the role of its committees.519 
Disclosure policy mandates all listed corporations to report all developments and changes 
undertaken by the company during each financial year. Changes in the financial status, 
changes in management or board members and adjustments in ownership shareholdings, as 
well as descriptions of the company’s business activities, issues and other changes identified 
by the law, are considered as substantial information, which must be included in the 
company’s annual and quarterly reports and/or financial statements.520 In fact, previous legal 
cases decided by the CMA, in matters relating to violations of the disclosure provisions, 
suggest how serious the CMA is about implementing the disclosure requirements. However, 
previous court cases have shown that some of the listed companies are yet to fully comply 
with the disclosure and transparency standards. In the Saudi securities market, there is a kind 
of weakness in financial statements and reports provided by the listed corporations, which 
according to some studies suggests negligence of the policy by the listed firms.521 
The prevalence of the financial penalties imposed by the CMA against violations of the Saudi 
securities market has proven that there have been large breaches to the CML’s provisions, 
especially with the disclosure and transparency regulations. For example, in 2010, Al-Baha 
Investment and Development Company failed to illustrate in its board annual report that its 
board members were also working with other listed corporations’ boards. Accordingly, the 
CMA imposed a fine of $13,333.522 Other cases reported showed that on 26 March 2011, the 
Saudi Cement Company took a loan of $120,000,000 from the SAMBA Financial Group in 
2011. Yet, the company failed to declare this debt in its board’s annual report. Therefore, in 
virtue of Article 43b) 2 of the Listing Rules, the CMA issued a punitive decision against this 
company, which was a fine of $13,333.523 
3.7 Chapter Summary    
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the development of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
A detailed analysis of the Capital Market Authority has also been provided including its 
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history, formation and roles in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. Indeed, the 
stock market in Saudi Arabia has greatly developed over the years, through combined 
influences of many activities such as nationalization of foreign banks operating in the Saudi 
economy, the introduction of mutual funds in the Saudi Arabian stock market and the 
establishment of the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC), to mention but a few. The 
analysis further shows that over the years, the capital market in Saudi Arabia has undergone 
significant reforms. Specifically, the major revolution in the Saudi Arabian economy, which 
started following the enactment of the Capital Market Law in 2003 by the Saudi Arabian 
government, which made provisions for the establishment of the Capital Market Authority.  
In fact, the introduction of the CMA to the stock market in Saudi Arabia was seen by many as 
a paradigm shift and importantly a major legal landmark in the business and economic 
activities of the Kingdom. Particularly in keeping with the OECD principles of corporate 
governance, the Saudi government introduced other laws alongside the CML to regulate the 
activities of the stock market. As a result, the Listing Rules and the Corporate Governance 
Regulations were born. This also suggests that the country was quick to respond to the 
financial crisis and corporate scandals that hit the global economy in 2002. The role of the 
CMA in protecting minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia was also explored. Specifically, the 
analysis showed that the CMA, through its various regulations, has outlined different 
mechanisms to ensure minority shareholders’ protection. These include monitoring and 
supervision of the stock market, inspection and investigation, applying Corporate Governance 
Regulations and imposition of penalties and sanctions. Despite all these efforts, the Saudi 
stock market, as well as the CMA, has suffered some major shortcomings over the years.  
These shortcomings have been attributed to a number of factors, which include concentrated 
ownership and absence of the awareness, volatility and instability of the stock market, 
inadequate compliance of listed firms in meeting with the disclosure requirements, lack of 
cooperation between investigation authorities, weak information provided by the CMA, weak 
intervention by the CMA to protect minority shareholders and so on.  
 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis was done between the UK FCA and the Saudi Arabian 
CMA with regards to investors’ protection. As the analysis suggests, one of the greatest 
challenges facing the Saudi Arabian securities market is weak intervention by the CMA. This 
was evident in the financial crisis that hit the Saudi Arabian securities market in 2006, which 
was attributed to the weak interference of the CMA. The UK FCA performs better than the 
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CMA in this regard. Specifically, as mentioned in their conduct mandate, the FCA approach 
to intervention focused on prevention rather than redress.524 This was echoed in the FCA 
Position Paper, which stated that ‘the FCA will need to: spot issues earlier; be willing to 
intervene early to improve standards either in specific firms or wider; take robust action 
designed to address weaknesses in competition revealed by economic analysis’.525 
 
Similarly, the FCA’s intervention strategy places much emphasis on intelligent gathering to 
identify emerging conduct risks. In particular, the FCA Position Paper focused on thematic 
review and trend-spotting, rather than close supervision of individual firms. As a 
consequence, the FCA stated ‘by bringing together our information-gathering analysis, 
research and policy making into one place, we aim to make sure that we are in a position to 
make timey and effective interventions when we identify risks’.526 These recommendations 
suggest that the UK FCA has taken a proactive approach in intervening about issues relating 
to corporate governance. Indeed, there is a possibility of transplanting this initiative in order 
to improve the activities of the CMA in protecting the Saudi Arabian stock market and 
minority shareholders’ rights in general. Indeed, protecting the security market and minority 
shareholders’ rights from manipulation and fraud needs fast and quick intervention at the 
appropriate time.  
Another drawback of the Saudi Arabian CMA is lack of cooperation between the CMA and 
other regulatory authorities in Saudi Arabia, such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. However, in 
the UK, there is increased cooperation between the FCA and other regulatory authorities such 
as the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).527  
Indeed, with such cooperation the confidence of investors is enhanced. This research 
recommends that the Saudi Arabia CMA will benefit from the UK, especially in the areas of 
intervention and cooperation among regulatory bodies.  
Taken together, the analysis above suggests that Saudi Arabia is complying with the 
principles of Good Corporate Governance as recommended by the OECD. According to the 
OECD principles of corporate governance ‘effective corporate governance requires a sound 
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legal, regulatory and institutional framework that market participants can rely on when they 
establish their private contractual relations’.528 
Therefore, the protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia is indeed supported by 
regulatory frameworks. However, the effectiveness of these legal structures in safeguarding 
the rights of minority shareholders remains a contentious issue. As the analysis reveals, the 
existing legislations are not strong enough when it comes to enforcement of the provisions of 
the Capital Market Law and its implementing regulations. Perhaps the weakness of these 
legislations is exacerbated by the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia, which sees many 
wealthy families and controlling shareholders wielding their enormous power and influence 
in the Saudi stock market. It is also important to note that the issue regarding the role of 
controlling families in expropriating the minority shareholders, especially in countries with 
weak legal protection of their shareholders (and where family control is a ubiquitous 
practice), has remained a subject of controversy and scholarly debate in the corporate 
governance literature. In the next chapter (Chapter 4), a review of relevant legal structures to 
corporate governance and protecting minority shareholders rights in Saudi Arabia is 

















                                                 




Chapter 4  
Relevant Legal Structures to Corporate Governance and Protecting Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights in Saudi Arabia 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The issue regarding the protection of minority shareholders has been greatly acknowledged 
amongst different approaches to corporate governance in recent years. The OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance are a public policy instrument intended to assist governments and 
regulators in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework for corporate governance. First published in 1999 and revised in 2004, the current 
draft amendment of the OECD principles of corporate governance states that ‘effective 
corporate governance requires a sound legal, regulatory and institutional framework that 
market participants can rely on when they establish their private contractual relations’.529 
The principle also suggests that a sound legal structure should be in place to promote efficient 
and effective processes of corporate governance. Indeed, as noted in the OECD document, 
the trust of investors is enhanced when the legal and judicial system allow for minority 
shareholders to bring legal action when they have reasonable grounds to believe that their 
rights have been violated.530 The provision of such enforcement mechanisms is a key 
responsibility of legislators and regulators.531 Dulic and Kuzman also reasoned that if a 
violated right cannot be protected by the shareholder in front of coercive authorities (such as 
courts and security committees), the shareholder shall not enjoy effective and actual 
protection, even when he/she is protected by ‘the right on the paper’.532 
Concerns have been raised regarding the infringement of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders, which according to La Porta et al is a global phenomenon (although, 
the extent of infringement differs across countries, depending on whether it is a developed or 
developing country).533 Indeed, there is greater minority protection in the developed countries 
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compared to developing countries.534 For instance, Yu noted that despite dispersed ownership 
structure in countries like the UK and the US, the rights of minority shareholders are well 
protected by a well-developed legal infrastructure, managerial labour market and active 
takeover markets.535 Similar to La Porta et al536 and Nenova537, a study by Grant and 
Kirchmaier affirmed that the UK and the US systems provide stronger protection of 
shareholders’ rights. Thus, they might act as drivers of widely-held corporations’ 
structures.538 Previous studies suggest that the effectiveness of a governance system relies on 
the strength of the legal system in a State. Therefore, a sufficient legal system protects 
minority shareholders' rights from being expropriated by management or by controlling 
shareholders.539 
According to Enriques, having sufficient protection of minority shareholders encourages 
financial stability and economic growth.540 He further stressed that accounting standard rules 
are stronger in the UK and the US systems compared to civil law countries, whereby the legal 
protection of minority shareholders is weak.541 In fact, the traditional view that minority 
shareholders are mere opportunists and useless has been changed. The minority shareholders 
are seen as significant engines for financial development and economic growth.542 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, the concepts of minority shareholders were explored including the 
rights of minority shareholders and their protection issues. In Chapter 2, a critical review of 
relevant theories of corporate governance was conducted in order to understand which theory 
or theories are appropriate in explaining how corporate governance may be explicitly 
protected under the current Saudi regulatory regime. This analysis was supported by looking 
at how corporate governance framework developed in Saudi Arabia (Chapter 3). In the 
current chapter, an analysis of relevant legal structures to corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholders rights will be provided. Importantly, this analysis will 
contribute in addressing the research objectives stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis: how the 
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Saudi Arabian legal system mediates the relationship between corporate governance and 
protection of rights of minority shareholders. To this end, the chapter will provide an 
overview of the Saudi legal system. This will be followed with a review of Islamic law and 
their relationship with corporate governance, especially in relation to protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights. It is important to note that, the mention of Islam is to provide 
background information about the foundation of the Saudi legal system and specifically, how 
the principles of corporate governance are supplemented in Islamic laws. Therefore, the 
analysis of the Saudi legal system in relation to corporate governance and minority 
shareholders will not be based on Islamic law. Instead, the analysis will focus on statutory 
laws that are based on Western tradition. Therefore, a review of statutory laws and 
regulations in Saudi Arabian corporate governance will be provided and their relevance in the 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights. The judicial enforcement committees that deal 
with security market disputes will also be covered as well as the shortcomings directed to 
those committees. The chapter is concluded with a summary, highlighting keys issues 
discussed and the transition to the next chapter.  
4.2 The Saudi Legal System: An Overview 
The Saudi Arabian legislations are described as sophisticated, contradictory and ambiguous 
in many aspects.543 Specifically, the Saudi Arabian legal system is built upon a duality 
method with shariah principles on the one hand and the civil law principles on the other hand. 
The inconsistency in the Saudi legal and judicial setting may be attributed to the variation in 
the views on maintaining the Islamic traditions, in which the State was built upon, and 
accepting the contemporary laws. This duplication of Saudi regulatory and legislative 
structure has been described by Vogel in the following statement:    
In most Islamic states, the legal system is bifurcated: one part is based on man-
made, positive law; the other part is Islamic law. Saudi Arabia also has a dual 
legal system … the Islamic component of the legal system is fundamental and 
dominant. The positive law, on the other hand, is subordinate, constitutionally 
and in scope.544 
                                                 
543G. N. Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol 36, p 734. 
544Vogel, F., (2000), Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill, Boston 2000) 322. This reference has quoted from 
Fahad, M.A., (2008), A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A 
Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (The Faculty of Humanities, University of Manchester 2008) 140.   
 102 
 
As a consequence, the Saudi Arabian laws are divided into two categories:545 one is based on 
the rules of Islamic law (shariah), in particular personal status law, criminal law and property 
law; and another is based on the modern laws, in particular those which depend on 
international conventions or global standards. The legal system in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is based on the rules of Islamic law, which were established by King Abdulaziz. 
However, the oil discovery in 1938 saw the need to enact a set of modern statutory laws and 
regulations to regulate and govern its relations with other countries, especially the Western 
countries. Consequently, between the periods of 1957 and 2006, the Saudi government have 
made considerable progress in reforming parts of its laws and regulations.  
Specifically, since 1965, statutory laws in Saudi Arabia have played a vital role in activities 
such as commerce, the banking sector, business, labour, taxation, arbitration and the 
settlement of commercial and securities disputes. The contemporary legal system in Saudi 
Arabia has been affected by the model of civil law countries, particularly in commercial law, 
company law, securities law and administrative law. As a result, the concept of company, as 
an independent legal, personal, as well as the legal provisions has been transplanted into the 
Saudi Company Law from Western European laws.546 
 
Importantly, most of the company law’s Articles are analogous to Egyptian Company Law, 
which is based largely on civil law. In fact, the modernization of the Saudi legal system has 
been challenged by Islamic scholars who are concerned with replacing Islamic law (shariah 
law) with Western laws. Despite the adoption of the new laws, Islamic law is still viewed as 
the major source of legislation in the State.547 
 
In order to give a whole picture about the legislation and regulatory structure in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the section below provides an analysis of Islamic law and its effects on 
protecting the rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. It also examines statutory laws 
regulating the Saudi stock market, especially the Company Law of 1965, the Capital Market 
Law of 2003, the Corporate Governance Regulations of 2006 and the Listing Rules of 2004, 
respectively. 
                                                 
545Macgorine A. Cassell and Rebecca J. Blake, ‘Analysis of Hofstede’s 5-D Model: The Implications of Conducting Business in Saudi 
Arabia’ (2011 New Orleans International Academic Conference New Orleans, Louisiana, USA) 1055. 
546Fahad, M. Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A 
Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (The Faculty of Humanities, University of Manchester, 2008) 208. 
547George, N. Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (2008) American Society of Comparative Law, vol 36, no 4, pp 729-759. 
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4.3 Islamic Law 
In reality, shariah principles are a comprehensive framework for laws in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. The Basic Law of Governance affirmed that the Quran and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) are the State’s constitution, where it clearly states 
that:  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its 
religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the 
Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be upon 
him (PBUH).548 
 
Given the significance of Islamic law in all aspects of life in Saudi Arabia, all deeds and 
people must be subject to sharia rules. Shariah consists of a set of essential principles derived 
from a number of various sources, including the Holy Quran, the Sunnah (sayings and deeds 
of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him), Al- Ejma’a (collective) and Al-Qeas 
(measurement). The Holy Quran is considered a main source of laws. However, if there is 
any issue not mentioned in the Quran, then Sunnah will be the second source of evidence to 
resolve the matter. If the Holy Quran and Sunnah do not address the issue, then the Islamic 
scholars should create new rules and standards to find appropriate solutions for all matters 
facing the Islamic community, on the condition that these solutions do not conflict with the 
Quran and Sunnah provisions. To assert this principle, the BLG has provided that ‘The courts 
shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic Shari‘ah, as indicated by the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not in conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
which the authorities may promulgate’.549 
 
From the above considerations, laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia should be based on 
these basic sources that govern the Saudi community. Specifically, as earlier mentioned 
Islamic laws take precedence to other existing laws in Saudi Arabia. This is the basic 
foundation of the Saudi legal system given that the State was established by its founder, King 
                                                 
548Art (1) Basic Law of Governance issued by the Royal Order No (A/91) 27 Sha’ban 1412 H (1 March 1992.of 1992). 
549ibid art (48). 
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Abdulla-Aziz Al-Saud, who affirmed his commitment to the Saudi people to build a country 
according to the Islamic directives.550  
4.3.1 Protecting Minority Shareholders from the Shariah Law Perspective 
Shariah law provides full programmes of life for the individual and the community alike. It 
organised a set of relationships among humans, communities and Allah (God), respectively. 
Islamic law has come to regulate two aspects of the people’s life: worship and transactions. 
Worships are the actions that Muslims are required to perform to Allah, such as Iman (faith), 
Salah (prayer), Zakah (charity), Saum Ramadan (fasting), and Hajj (pilgrimage). Transactions 
are the dealings that all Muslims do with each other, with the non-Muslims and also with 
their environment.551  
In Muslim communities, there is a famous aphorism that ‘Islamic religion is treatment’. 
Consequently, the Islamic religion aims to set and remedy all issues facing human beings. It 
is a comprehensive system for family, neighbours, society, the environment, business, law, 
the economy, politics, ethics and all factors surrounding the people’s life. In order to establish 
the justice principle, Islamic law has defined people’s responsibilities and rights. Shariah law 
has required Muslims to adopt the Islamic directives and teachings in all aspects of their lives 
and dealings. As a result, it is hard to dissociate Islamic teachings and the way and manner in 
which the adherents behave. To affirm that all transactions are conducted within the 
framework of Islamic principles, the Holy Quran said ‘This day I have perfected for you your 
religion and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion’.552 
Therefore, since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the heartland of Islam, it is necessary when 
studying corporate governance in the Kingdom to consider the effects of Islam on corporate 
governance, especially in relation to minority shareholders. In effect, shariah law has placed 
some guiding principles, which regulate people’s behaviour and conduct. One of the most 
important Islamic principles is fairness and accountability, which are deemed as essential 
factors in Islamic law and regulations. Allah (God) has put humans as successors on the earth 
in order to operate and develop them in the best way as Allah requested. Therefore, Allah 
said: 
                                                 
550Khaled I. Falgi,  Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A stakeholder Perspective (University of Dundee, U.K, 2009)  43-44;  Fahad, 
M. Almajid., A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and 
Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (The Faculty of Humanities, University of Manchester, 2008) 142-143. 
550ibid 
551For more insight visit: http://www.islam101.com/dawah/05_concept_worship.html.  
552Holy Quran, Surat Al-Maidah, Verse, 3. 
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O David, indeed We have made you a successor upon the earth, so judge 
between the people in truth and do not follow [your own] desire, as it will lead 
you astray from the way of Allah. Indeed, those who go astray from the way of 
Allah will have a severe punishment for having forgotten the Day of 
Account.553 
 
Justice and fairness are two of the basic humanity values in Islam which are considered 
fundamental elements in building communities. The Holy Quran, making the construction of 
fairness between people, is the aim of the heavenly messages, where Allah said “We have 
already sent our messengers with clear evidences and sent down with them the Scripture and 
the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice”.554 
Justice in Islam is not affected by love or hate. It does not differentiate between poor or rich. 
And it does not differentiate between a Muslim and non-Muslim, but it is enjoyed by all 
residents on his land, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Islam encourages fairness and 
considers oppression as a taboo, whether it causes injustice of self or others, the injustice of 
the rich against the poor, or the injustice of the ruler against the ruled. Consequently, the 
Messenger of Allah, the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) in Hadith Al-Qudsi has 
affirmed that by saying "O My servants, I have forbidden oppression for Myself and have 
made it forbidden amongst you, so do not oppress one another”.555 
According to the speech of Allah and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), the 
research found out that there is an inherent relationship between the Islamic principles and 
international corporate governance standards in relation to prevention of the oppression of 
minority shareholders and the expropriation of their rights unjustly. Therefore, it can be said 
that there is convergence between the Islamic provisions and teachings and the corporate 
governance principles in many aspects, especially in terms of forbidding the oppression of 
minority shareholders’ rights. Specifically, in order to satisfy Allah’s requirements for 
sanctification while conducting business, Muslims (whether individuals or corporations) are 
expected to undertake their diverse obligations. For instance, business dealings should be 
stimulated and directed by the concept of tawheed (unity with God), which refers to 
                                                 
553Holy Quran Surat Al-Sad, Verse, 26. 
554Ibid Surat Al-Hadid, Verse, 25. 
555Imam Muslim, Book of Righteousness and Morality and the Relevant,  p 2577. This reference is written in Arabic Language. Translation 
available at: http://www.dailyhadithonline.com.  
 106 
 
awareness and continuance of the unity and oneness of Allah in everyone’s activities.556 
Therefore, from the Islamic perspective, corporations should be encouraged to conduct 
business with a sense of fairness, which is one of the basic principles of good corporate 
governance. In fact, boards of directors are expected to offer fair treatment to all shareholders 
without discrimination.557 
Evidence for the above has been demonstrated by the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) who 
affirmed that fairness and accountability are fundamental standards in all aspects of people’s 
lives and their dealings, including financial and economic transactions. Hence, the Messenger 
of Allah said that: 
 
You are all custodians, and you all will be questioned about the things under 
your custody. The Imam (Leader) is a custodian and he shall be questioned 
about his custody. The man is a custodian of his family and he shall be 
questioned about his custody. The woman is a custodian in her husband’s 
home and she will be questioned about her custody. The employee is a 
custodian of the property of his employer and he shall be questioned about his 
custody.558 
 
Accountability from the Islamic perspective is divided into two parties, which we call the 
principle and the agent. Compared with the current contractual relationships in financial 
institutions, the principle can be classified as the government, the community, shareholders 
and other stakeholders, who authorise others to do something on their behalf. The agent is a 
person who accepts to do the task on behalf of the principal, who are usually managers and 
boards of directors. According to Islamic principles, Islamic banking should be accountable 
to the community and stakeholders.559 For instance, managers are accountable to provide 
employees with welfare, training and development opportunities and reasonable rewards. 
Specifically, this idea about stakeholder responsibility is not binding. The rationale is that by 
engaging in such voluntary actions, the company’s CSR, as a key element of corporate 
governance, is raised eventually, which in turn increases investors’ confidence in the 
corporation. 
                                                 
556M. Haneef, ‘The Islamic Worldview, and Islamic Economics’ (1997)  IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, vol  5, no 1, p 39.   
557F. Al Omar, ‘The Role of Values and Ethics in Enhancing the Confidence of Shareholders, Customers and Investors: International 
Experiences, Methods and Models’, Arabic edition, (Seminar of the Organisation for Economic Institutions, 2008) 5.   
558SahihAl- Bukhari, Hadith no 844.  Al-Bukhari is one of the most famous Muslim scholars; his book is considered as one of the three most 
trusted collections of hadith (Speech of the Prophet Mohammed). 
559Haniffa, R. & Hudaib, M., ‘Exploring the Ethical Identity of Islamic Banks via Communication in Annual Reports (2007) Journal of 
Business Ethics 76, pp 97-116. 
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Furthermore, shareholders also have rights in Islam to get sufficient information about the 
performance of the company.560 As far as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is 
concerned, the relationship between the principle and the agent must be built on the basis of 
transparency, accountability and fairness. As a consequence, literature has shown that Islamic 
law orders companies to exercise full disclosure in order to demonstrate social accountability: 
‘private accountability and limited disclosure are insufficient criteria to reflect the ethical 
precepts of Islamic law. Consistency of disclosure practices with Islamic law requires 
application of the more all-embracing criteria of social accountability and full disclosure’.561 
 
Furthermore, the board of directors is considered as one of the most significant mechanisms 
of effective application of corporate governance. According to the Islamic perspective, the 
decision-making should be made in accordance with the participation principle. As a 
consequence, the Holy Quran has endorsed the consultation principle, which states that ‘.... 
and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, 
Allah loves those who rely [upon Him]’.562 
 
The Holy Quran urged the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) to consult Muslim scholars and 
intellectuals in the matters facing Muslims and give all interested parties the chance to be part 
of the consultation process (Shura). The participation principle in Islam is not restricted to 
worship alone. It also extends to include all legal, economic, business and managerial aspects 
in our life. As a result, the Shura principle encourages all companies to establish a 
consultation board, whose duty is to mentor, supervise, recommend, account and control. The 
board of director should consist of all various stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, debtors and the community as a whole, so that all a company’s deeds and 
activities are subject to supervision and monitoring by the consultation board. The function of 
the consultation board in Islam is entirely compatible with the role of the board of directors, 
as shown in the global principles of corporate governance. Hence, the role of the Shura board 
(consultative board) is to enhance and strengthen the fairness and accountability principle 
into the financial institutions, as well as to prevent mismanagement and opportunistic 
corporate executives. As far as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is concerned, 
there is no doubt that the Shura principle (consultative board) reinforces the concept of 
protecting minority shareholders’ interests against the controlling shareholders and 
                                                 
560ibid. 
561Baydoun, N, & Willett, R., ‘Islamic Corporate Report’ (2000) A Journal of Accounting, Finance and Business Studies, BACUS, 36(1), p 
81. 
562Holy Quran, Surat Al-Imran, Verse 159. 
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wrongdoing of management. Table 2 below presents Islamic principles in relation to 
corporate governance and minority shareholders protection, and how these principles 
compare with the OECD principles of corporate governance. 










1 Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework 
  
Promotion of transparent and 
efficient markets with rule of 
law and division of 
responsibilities.  
 
 Promotion of business 
within ethical 
 framework of shariah; 
 Believes in profit and 
loss; 
 Primacy of justice and 
social welfare with 
social and spiritual 
obligations; 
 Prohibition of interest. 
2 The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
  
 Basic shareholder 
rights;  
 Participation in 
decision-making at the 
general meetings; 
 Structures and 
arrangements markets 
for corporate control; 









 Property as trust from 
God; 
 Sole authority is God. 
 Society as stakeholders; 
 Accountability not only 
to stakeholders but also 




3 The equitable treatment of shareholders 
  




 Just and fairness of 
value; 
 Equitable distribution of 
                                                 
563See A. M. Abu-Tapanjeh, (2009), “Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A comparative analysis with OECD principles”. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol.20, Issues.5, pp. 556-567.  
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wealth to all 
stakeholders and 
disadvantages for 
members in the form of 
Zakat and Sadqa; 
 Social and individual 
welfare with both 
spiritual and moral 
obligation; 
 Sensation of equality. 
4 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
  
 In creating wealth, jobs 




 Islamic accountability 
to social welfare 
orientation; 
 Haram/Halal dichotomy 
in transaction; 
 Social & individual 
welfare from both 
spiritual and material; 
 Consideration to whole 
community. 
 
5 Disclosure and transparency 
  
 Matters regarding 
corporation ; 
 Financial situation;  
 Performance, ownership 
and governance. 
 
 Accountability with 
shariah compliance 
 Socio-economic; 
objectives related to 
firms’ control and 
accountability to all its 
stakeholders; 
 Justice, equality, 
truthfulness 
transparency; 
 Wider accountability 
with written as well as 
oral disclosure. 
6 The responsibilities of the board 
  Strategic guidance;  
 Monitoring of 
management; 




 Accountability not only 
to company or board or 
stakeholders but also to 
Allah the ultimate 
authority who leads to 
welfare and success; 
 Holistic and integrative 
guidance; 




 Consultation and 
consensus seeking for 
each decision with 
related stakeholders. 
 
Table 2 suggests that there is some degree of convergence between the OECD principles of 
good corporate governance and Islamic (shariah) law perspectives on corporate governance. 
However, as Al-Harkan argued, there is little genuine difference between the ethical and 
altruistic foundation of Islamic law and the ethical principles of good corporate 
governance.564 For instance, one element, which is at variance, is that shariah law generally 
prohibits interest, whereas corporate governance principles do not.565 According to Al 
Kahtani, due to the link between corporate governance from the Islamic view and the islamic 
religious teachings, such as the Islamic objective of wealth and the Islamic view for values, 
researchers have discussed whether corporate governance from the Islamic perspective 
converges with the the corporate governance models in the West countries, and they found 
out that:  
 
There are a variety of ideologies that highlight the differences between the 
model of Islamic corporate governance and theories that are common 
elsewhere. Firstly, the ethical basics of Western business morals stem chiefly 
from socially derived secular values and not religious moral values. Secondly, 
the fundamental beliefs and values of Western corporate governance theories 
persist in emphasising self-interest, although there is a trend to amend some 
principles to suit the interests of society. Finally, the greatest corporate 
governance theoretical framework is based on the agency theory.566 
 
To sum up, the research has found, from the above discussion and analysis, that the attitude 
of shariah law, in terms of protecting minority shareholders, is very clear as Islamic law has 
established a solid basis, stating that all people’s rights and interests must be protected 
against any assault or expropriation. From the above, the Saudi Arabian laws and regulations 
should apply the Islamic provisions and teachings in all aspects of life. Consequently, the 
Saudi regulator has a responsibility to take into account the fairness considerations stipulated 
                                                 
564A. Al-Harkan,  An Investigation into the Emerging Corporate Governance Framework in Saudi Arabia  (Unpublished thesis: Cardiff 
Business School, 2005). 
565J. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2nd Edition, Hoboken, NJ, Wiley, Chichester, UK, 2010). 




by sharia law, in particular those related to the rights of minority shareholders. However, as 
stated in the introduction of this chapter, the analysis of legal structures and how they mediate 
the relationship between corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders’ rights 
will be only based on Saudi statutory laws, rather than Islamic teachings. This is because of 
the fundamental differences between Islamic law and Western law in many aspects. This will 
also reduce some ambiguities that may perhaps affect the comparison between UK and Saudi 
corporate governance, in relation to protection of minority shareholders’ rights. In this regard, 
the subsequent sections will focus on providing analysis of Saudi statutory laws and their role 
in protecting minority shareholders’ rights. 
4.4 Statutory Laws 
4.4.1 Basic Law of Governance 
In principle, there is no formal institutional law in Saudi Arabia because as previously 
mentioned, the Saudi constitutional system is based purely on the Holy Quran and the Sunnah 
principles.567 The alternative for constitutional law is the so-called Saudi Arabian Basic Law 
of Governance (BLG). The BLG emerged in the era of King Fahad Al-Saud in 1992.568 It is 
considered as a relatively recent law. The BLG was issued by the Royal Order and has four 
significant laws, namely: the Basic Law of Governance (BLG), the Consultative Council 
Law, the Law of Regions, and the law of Council Ministers.569 
The Consultative Council was one of the greatest bodies that have recently originated in 
Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the Consultative Council was established mainly to act as 
an advisory body to the Council of Ministers, it has lately been playing a crucial role in 
reviewing and developing the laws, regulations, contracts, international conventions and 
others. It has a commitment to advise and comment on government policies and offer 
suggestions concerning annual reports prepared by the ministries.570 In some cases, the 
Consultative Council has a jurisdiction to query the Saudi ministers about performance of 
their ministries.   
 
The Basic Law of Governance consists of 83 Articles. The BLG involve many sophisticated 
principles. Perhaps the most important of them are: the system of government; the foundation 
                                                 
567Art (1) Saudi BLG 1992. 
568King Fahad Al-Saud is the fifth king of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
569The Basic Law of Governance issued by the Royal Order, No. A-90, dated 1 March 1992. The Consultative Council Law issued by the 
Royal Order, No. A-91 (1 March 1992). The Regional Law issued by the Royal Order, No. A-92 (1 March 1992), and the Council of 
Ministers Law issued by the Royal Order, No. A-13 (20 August 1994).   
570For more insight visit: http://www.shura.gov.sa. 
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of Saudi society; economic principles; rights and duties of the State and citizens; authorities 
of the State; financial affairs and auditing agencies. The BLG has included several legal 
principles, which can be used to reinforce protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the 
Saudi stock market.  
In this regard, it is very obvious, from the provisions of the BLG, that protecting human 
rights represents a key element in the Saudi Arabian government policy. Therefore, the BLG 
has affirmed that human rights must be protected by the law.571 The rights of minority 
shareholders are also contained in some of the BLG Articles. For instance, ‘the right of 
litigation shall be guaranteed equally for both citizens and residents in the Kingdom. The law 
shall set forth the procedures required thereof’.572 
 
From the foregoing, the BLG has granted anyone the right to bring legal action before the 
Saudi courts and it also states that the laws and regulations should be enacted to facilitate this 
purpose. Indeed, the above text seems to support the interests of minority shareholders. It can 
be said that the former text has explicitly affirmed the rights of minority shareholders to bring 
a liability suit against anyone who assaults or abuses their rights, whether they are controlling 
shareholders, management or the board of directors.  
 
Linking the provisions of Article 47 of the BLG and the Global Standards of corporate 
governance, particularly the OECD Principles show that there is, to a large extent, some 
degree of convergence between the provisions of Article 47 and the global principles of 
corporate governance.  
4.4.2 Company Laws of 1965 
Despite the early emergence of business and economic activities in Saudi Arabia, following 
the discovery of oil in the year 1938, there were no laws to regulate companies’ activities 
until the year 1965.573 During that period, the commercial and economic life was governed by 
Islamic law and this was no without written laws and regulations.574 From 1931 to 1972, 
there were some modest attempts to regulate the firms’ activities in the Saudi Arabian 
economy. At first, there was a special regulation issued by the Commercial Council otherwise 
                                                 
571Art (26) Saudi BLG 1992. 
572Ibid art (47). 
573Company Law of 1965 was the first code issued by the Royal Decree No. (M/6) Dated 22/3/1385H (corresponding to 22/7/1965AD) to 
regulate the companies' affairs in Saudi Arabia. 
574Hamdallah, M. Hamdallah, (2005), ‘the Saudi Commercial Law’,  (Al-Khawarism, Jeddah, 2005).21. [Arabic edition]. 
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known as the Nizam Al-Majilis Al-Tijari (Commercial Council Law 1972). This law was 
approved by the Saudi Arabian Consultative Council and it aimed to organise the business 
activities in the Saudi market.  
In that year, the Commercial Council also established the so-called company registry system, 
which required all companies to be registered in this system. To support the organisation of 
companies’ activities, the Saudi government established the Nazam Al-Mhakamah Al-Tijari 
(Commercial Court Law 1931), which was deemed as the first formal court in Saudi Arabia. 
Unfortunately however, this court faced some obstacles which ultimately led to its being 
repealed in 1954.575 The paradigm shift occurred in 1965, when the Saudi regulator issued 
company law (CL).576 Since that time, CL has been considered the main legislative body and 
the key reference for all types of commercial business activities in Saudi Arabia.  
 
In reality, company law contributed largely in developing investment and regulating the stock 
market and companies’ affairs, in particular joint-stock companies’ affairs until the 
introduction of Capital Market Law in 2003, which was solely established to regulate the 
stock market affairs. It should be noted that most of the Company Law’s Articles were taken 
from Egyptian Company Law, which is largely based on civil law principles. Therefore, there 
were initial fears and concerns amongst the Saudi people that the Westernization of the Saudi 
laws could end up as a replacement or alternative to Islamic Law.  
 
However, company law has explicitly stipulated that all existing companies are permitted to 
work in commercial and economic activities in Saudi Arabia. However, these companies 
must not contravene the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence.577 Company law contains 233 
Articles which extensively cover eight forms of business entities, which are classified as 
follows: (1) general partnership; (2) limited partnership; (3) joint venture; (4) a joint stock 
corporation; (5) partnership limited by shares; (6) limited liability partnership; (7) company 
with variable capital; and (8) a cooperative company.578 
 
Of specific importance is part five of company law (Articles 48 to 148), which regulates all 
aspects associated with the affairs of the joint-stock corporations, such as registration, 
                                                 
575Aleqtisadiah Newspaper ‘The Commercial Court Jurisdictions’ (2012) issue no 6879. Available at: http://www.aleqt.com. 
576The Saudi Company Law issued by the Royal Decree NO. M/6 Dated 22/3/1385H equivalent 1965. It has been amended four times; the 
last amendment was made by the Royal Decree No. M/29 dated 16/09/1418 H equivalent 15/01/1998. 
577Art (2) Saudi CL 1965. 
578ibid art (2-a). 
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configuration, public offerings, annual and extraordinary general meetings, general assembly 
responsibilities, duties of board of directors, disclosure requirements, accounting rules, 
merger and acquisition, tenders offers, shareholders’ rights and others. The SCL defined the 
joint-stock company as follows:  
 
The capital of a joint-stock corporation shall be divided into negotiable shares 
of equal value. The members thereof shall be responsible only to the extent of 
the value of their shares, and their number shall not be less than five.579 
 
In accordance with Article 49 of the SCL, the capital of a joint-stock company, that offers its 
shares for public offerings, shall not be less than SR 10 million which is equivalent to $2.67 
million. The joint-stock companies are incorporated by two methods: namely by virtue of an 
authorisation issued by a royal decree, which is approved by the Council of Ministries and the 
recommendations of the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Other corporations may be 
incorporated by the decision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.580 
 
It should be noted that the SCL contains a set of provisions related to corporate governance 
rules. As a consequence, Articles 66 to 97 and 106 to 109 deal mainly with regulating the 
internal corporate governance structure of publicly listed corporations, such as the 
responsibilities of the board of directors, the civil liability of directors, the duties of the 
general assembly, the procedures of the annual general and extraordinary meetings, 
shareholders’ rights and remedies, the discloser requirements and other relevant issues.  
 
With respect to the issue of protecting minority shareholders, the SCL has included some 
Articles to deal with issues related to the rights of minority shareholders in the joint-stock 
corporations. However, the problem is that the SCL gives the majority shareholders 
unrestricted control at the expense of minority shareholders. The protection of minority 
shareholders in the SCL is, to a large extent, ambiguous and unclear. Furthermore, it was 
enacted since 1965 and thus it is no longer able to keep with the pace of new commercial and 
economic variables in the Saudi securities market.  
 
                                                 
579ibid art (48). 
580Ibid art (52). 
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The SCL created serious problems that hindered the development of the Saudi stock market. 
These problems relate to primary and secondary offerings. Firstly, the main shortcomings in 
the primary offerings were as follows:581 
 
1. Corporations had just 30 days to decide whether they would become public after 
incorporation or not.582 Thus, this procedure placed unjustified restraints on the 
company’s decision-making.  
2. Buyer of shares was not required to receive or read the prospectus if he or she acts as 
an agent.583 
3. Such prospectuses were not required to involve useful information about the 
company’s operation and assets.584  
4. There was no monitoring on the seller's behaviour, communications, or advertising 
during the initial publicly offering (IPO).585 
5. Company law did not contain provisions covering anti-competitive behaviour, such as 
deceptive marketing, insider trading and market manipulation.586 
6. The sanctions issued against violators of company law were relatively weak, as the 
Company Law of 1965 stated that:  
 
without prejudice to what is required under the provisions of the 
Islamic regulation, violators of this law provision shall be punishable 
by imprisonment for a period not less than three months but not 
exceeding one year and a fine of not less than five thousand Saudi 
Riyals and not exceeding twenty thousand Saudi Riyals, or either.587 
 
Secondly, in spite of the procedures associated with the secondary offerings, it is still better 
that the primary offerings in general.  However, it also had some limitations which are 
described as follows:588 
 
                                                 
581Joseph W. Beach,  ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets’ (2005) 
Stanford Journal of International Law, p 7. 
582Art (54) Saudi CL. 
583Joseph W. Beach, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets’ (2005) 
Stanford Journal of International Law, p 7. 
584Art (119) Saudi CL 1965. 
585Joseph W. Beach, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets’ (2005) 
Stanford Journal of International Law, p 7. 
586ibid. 




1. There was no required license or regulatory scheme for market brokers. 
2. There was no professional or regulatory oversight on investors’ actions.  
3. There was no liability for misdeeds or manipulation in the stock market. 
4. The regulatory framework of merger and acquisition was inadequate. 
5. Transparency and disclosure was insufficient.     
 
Given the above limitations of the SCL, the Saudi Arabian regulator is working now to 
introduce a new company law which will replace the current SCL of 1965.589 Therefore, it is 
expected that the new company law will be introduced sooner to help in addressing some of 
the miscellaneous issues facing the business sector in Saudi Arabia. Recently, the Saudi 
legislator introduced several regulations, such as the Capital Market Law (CML) of 2003, the 
Listing Rules of 2003, and the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) of 2006 to tackle 
those shortcomings created by the SCL, including those that relate to the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights. As a consequence, the SCL jurisdiction over the publicly listed 
companies has been reduced, following the release of the above new regulations.  
 
In spite of the Capital Market Law has jurisdiction over stock market issues. However, the 
SCL is still regulating some relevant aspects, such as the establishment and incorporation of 
joint-stock corporations, the board of directors and its duties, shareholder meetings, the 
company’s account, auditing, capital increase and reduction and the expiration of a joint- 
stock corporation. 
4.4.3 The Capital Market Law of 2003 
The Saudi stock market witnessed a paradigm shift when the Saudi government issued the 
Capital Market Law (CML) in 2003.590 This was in response to a boost in the Saudi economy, 
which led the Saudi government to take decisive measures to enact a bundle of laws and 
regulations to deal with stock market issues and other financial matters facing the economy. 
As a result, the CML was established, which in turn led to establishment of the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA). The CMA was established to govern and supervise the issues 
                                                 
589The Former Minister of Commerce and Industry, Abdullah Yamani, announced in 2007 that the bill of the new Company Law sent to the 
Prime Minister, King Abdullah Al-Saud, waiting for approval it by a royal decree;  Asharq Alawsat Newspaper (edition 10284, 24.01.2007). 
590The Capital Markets Law promulgated under the Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424 H (31 July 2003).  
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facing the Saudi securities market. The CMA is an independent government authority and is 
directly linked to the president of the Saudi Council of Ministries.591 
By law, the Capital Market Authority is deemed as a legal personality and enjoyed with 
financial and administrative autonomy.592 Furthermore, it is responsible for issuing 
regulations, rules and instructions for implementing the provisions of the Capital Market 
Law.593 In reality, the aims of the CML are to produce an appropriate investment 
environment, to protect investors and guarantee accountability, fairness and efficiency in the 
stock market. 594 According to the CML, the CMA must be governed by a board known as 
the Capital Market Authority Board (CMAB). The CMAB comprises of five members, who 
must be Saudi Arabian citizens working on a full-time basis, and they must be professionally 
qualified. The board members must be appointed and their salaries and financial benefits 
determined by the Royal Order. Among the board members, the Royal Order shall specify the 
chairman and deputy chairman (who will replace the chairman in his absence).595 
 
The Capital Market Law contains 67 Articles, which became enforceable at the beginning of 
2004.596 The CML is a legislative framework for all miscellaneous security matters in Saudi 
Arabia. According to the CML, the Capital Market Authority has issued eleven key 
implementing regulations597, namely: (1) prudential rules; (2) listing rules; (3) anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing rules; (4) authorised persons regulations; (5) 
merger and acquisition regulations; (6) real estate investment funds regulations; (7) securities 
business regulations; (7) market conduct regulations; (8) corporate governance regulations; 
(9) offers of securities regulations; (10) investment funds regulations; (11) the resolution of 
securities disputes proceedings regulations. 
 
The Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) is one of the most significant institutions established by 
the Capital Market Law. The key objective of Tadawul is to maintain market integrity, 
operate the market effectively and efficiently, present a quality services for investors, 
brokers, issuers, vendors and others. Also, it aims to increase investors’ education and 
awareness efforts and develop the exchange’s capabilities and competencies.598 According to 
                                                 
591Art (4) Saudi CML 2003.  
592Ibid art (4-a). 
593Ibid art (5). 
594Ibid art (5&6). 
595Ibid art (7). 
596Ibid art (67). 
597Implementing Regulations at the website of the CMA. Available at: http://www.cma.org.sa.  
598For more insight see the website of Tadawual. Available at: http://www.tadawul.com.sa. 
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the CML, Tadawul shall be ‘...the sole entity authorised to carry out trading in securities in 
the Kingdom’.599 
 
The above text reveals the seriousness of the Saudi regulator, which concentrated the function 
of market monitoring into a single exchange so that it facilitates the task of regulatory 
oversight over the shares trading operations. In effect, the CML has paved the way for the 
Capital Market Authority to create new rules, make decisions and place appropriate 
procedures, which contribute to addressing all matters affecting the market, including 
challenges and stockholders demands. Evidence in support of this is contained in the CML 
provision, which defines the function of the Capital Market Authority as follows: ‘the 
Authority shall be the agency responsible for issuing regulations, rules and instructions, and 
for applying the provisions of this Law’.600 
 
As far as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is concerned, the CML has also 
stated that one of the objectives of the establishment of the CMA is to provide a statutory 
protection for those dealers in the Saudi stock market including minority shareholders. As a 
consequence, in order to accomplish the protection of investors and achieve the market 
integrity, the CML has stipulated clearly that the CMA must do the following:601 
 
1. Regulate and develop the exchange, seek to develop and improve methods of systems 
and entities trading in securities and develop the procedures that will reduce the risks 
related to securities transactions. 
2. Regulate the issuance of securities and monitor securities and dealing in securities. 
3. Regulate and monitor the works and activities of parties, subject to the control and 
supervision of the authority. 
4. Protect citizens and investors in securities from unfair and unsound practices or 
practices involving fraud, deceit, cheating or manipulation. 
5. Seek to achieve fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions. 
6. Regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information regarding securities and their 
issuers, the dealings of informed persons, major shareholders and investors, and 
define and make available information which the participants in the market should 
provide and disclose to shareholders and the public. 
                                                 
599Art (20-a) Saudi CML 2003.  
600Ibid art (5-a). 
601Ibid art (5-a). 
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7. Regulate proxy and purchase requests and public offers of shares. 
 
The CML has, indeed, put in place the legal framework for regulating the securities market, 
including those provisions that provide sound protection for minority shareholders. 
Consequently, the CMA released a bundle of regulations in this context. For example, the 
Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) were enacted in 2006 in order to provide further 
protection for investors and buyers of securities. These new regulations were indeed, a great 
step in the process of protecting shareholders and enhancing the confidence in the Saudi 
securities market. Moreover, the listing rules were enacted in 2004, in order to regulate the 
public offering, registration and admission to listing of securities in the Kingdom.  
 
In addition, to reinforce the justice principle among dealers in the Saudi securities market 
(including minority shareholders), the CMA has also established a Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) so as to redress the shareholders from misconduct 
and abuse of the management and board of directors.602 Despite the fact that the CRSD has 
jurisdiction over the disputes falling under the provisions of the CML,603 there are some 
shortcomings regarding its work, autonomy, advocacy measures and implementing decisions. 
Giving the importance of the CRSD and its vital role in providing good protection for 
minority shareholders, the thesis will fully analyse the committees’ actions later on in 
Chapter 3, including full discussion of key criticisms of the CRSD. 
4.5 Regulations  
4.5.1 Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) of 2006 
Since 2000, the Saudi government has had a genuine desire to restore the reputation of the 
Saudi economy and attract foreign investments. Indeed, there was serious work aimed at 
improving the national economic performance. These efforts have culminated into 
establishing several institutions and enacting sophisticated laws and regulations. Without 
going into details, perhaps the most significance of these institutions is the establishment of 
the Supreme Economic Council in 1999, the creation of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority in 2000, and lately the launching of the Capital Market Authority in 
2003.  
                                                 




Furthermore, the Saudi regulator released a bundle of laws and regulations in order to 
enhance the level of the confidence in the Saudi economy. The Foreign Investment Act in 
2000, the Capital Market Law of 2003 and the Listing Rules of 2004 were some of the 
substantial regulations introduced to increase investors’ trust and improve the investment 
climate in the Saudi stock market. However, it should be noted that the interest of the Saudi 
government, in the field of corporate governance, did not come to limelight until 2006, when 
the Saudi stock market was hit by a large stocks bubble in its history. 604 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the stock market, the Saudi government (represented in the 
Capital Market Authority Board) decided to establish a good legal framework in order to 
provide sufficient protection for all participants and practitioners in the securities market. As 
a consequence, the Capital Market Authority Board (CMAB) issued the Corporate 
Governance Regulations in November 2006. The CGRs aim to ensure that the listed 
corporations comply with the best governance practices, which ensure effective protection of 
shareholders and stakeholders alike. This assurance is clearly reflected as follows:   
These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed in the exchange to ensure their 
compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure the protection 
of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.605 
 
In reality, there is a common belief that soft laws are considered more flexible in the 
formation of joint-stock corporations. It was argued that giving listed corporations the chance 
to design their internal arrangements and management has a positive effect on the good 
performance of these companies.606 The soft law method, including corporate governance 
policy, may largely contribute to addressing companies’ issues and enhancing their 
performance.607 Some went on to say that the self-regulation of corporate governance is more 
appropriate for listed corporations, since self-regulation comes out of different views and 
opinions, and thus this method will be more acceptable, instead of the binding statutes.608 
 
                                                 
604Some reports had issued by the Tadawul all Share Index (TASI) shown that the Saudi Stock Market had lost, at the end of 2006, 
approximately 2 trillion Saudi Riyals. At that period, the TASI reached a highest level, as it was arrived 20634 points. Within 10 months the 
TASI lost 12775 points.  For more insight see: http://www.tadawul.com.sa. 
605Art (1-a) Saudi CGRs 2006. 
606Du Plessis, J. J., McConvill, J. and Bagaric, M., Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) 120. 
607David Walker,  A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities- Final Recommendations (2009) 
70.   
608Jonathan Charkham, Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten Years on (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 301. 
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The above view was endorsed by one of the prominent scholars in the field of corporate 
governance, Jonathan Charkham, who asserted that:  
 
Soft law, as in the codes of corporate governance, is similar to a sword with 
two edges. At best, this way of proceeding secures flexibility and avoids the 
need for primary legislation at every turn; at worst, such sanctions as there are, 
seem inadequate to secure compliance. Therefore, it rests on the shareholders 
to enforce them and if they are unable to do so, codes will be ineffective.609 
 
Based on this perspective, the significance of corporate governance principles have come 
from being considered as non-binding principles. The OECD Principles have also affirmed 
this as a major element of the objectives of its principles, where it has stipulated that ‘.....to 
provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other 
parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance…’.610 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the CGRs have also asserted that self-regulation is a general norm. 
Consequently, the CGRs are considered as the guiding principles for all corporations listed in 
the stock exchange and they are not obligatory, except as provided for in Article 1b), where 
these regulations stated that: ‘....a company must disclose in the Board of Directors` report, 
the provisions that have been implemented and the provisions that have not been 
implemented as well as the reasons for not implementing them’.611 
 
This challenged the board of directors to effectively act in order, to reflect a good picture for 
their corporations. Despite the fact that these regulations are distinguished as non-binding, 
they reflect the position and performance of the company positively among its counterparts in 
the stock market. Hence, the company which applies the CGRs effectively will definitely be 
distinct and attractive for investments and increase investors’ trust.612 In effect, obtaining 
accurate statistics on the number of the listed corporations that apply the self-regulation of 
corporate governance in the Saudi stock exchange is extremely difficult.  
Nevertheless, there has been a study which showed that about 57.1% of the number of listed 
corporations sufficiently apply corporate governance policy since these companies have 
                                                 
609ibid. 
610OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), p 11. 
611Art (1-c) Saudi CGRs 2006.  
612Saleh Al Shaalan, Corporate Governance in Saudi Joint Stock Companies (King Saud University, 2007) 114 [Arabic edition]. 
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established independent departments to ensure the implementation of the CGRs.613 However, 
on the other hand, other studies have revealed that the number of the listed companies that 
recognised self-regulatory corporate governance do not exceed 25 corporations, out of 150 
corporations listed in the stock exchange.614 In fact, these results present a negative picture 
regarding the extent of the effective application of the corporate governance regulations, on 
the corporations operating in the Saudi stock market.  
Thus, given that only a limited number of companies (including family-listed companies) 
implement corporate governance regulations, it is fair to say that most Saudi family-listed 
corporations have still not adapted the method of self-regulation of corporate governance. 
This in turn, suggests that the position of minority shareholders is still weak in family-listed 
corporations on the Saudi stock market. In fact, the CGRs have covered all elements existing 
in the global standards of corporate governance, which are divided into four parts, as follows: 
part 1 covers preliminary provisions; part 2 covers rights of shareholders and the general 
assembly; part 3 covers disclosure and transparency; and part 4 covers the board of directors. 
4.5.2 The Listing Rules of 2004 
The Listing Rules are great initiatives issued by the Capital Market Authority Board 
(CMAB).615 The LRs were enacted as standards to disclose and monitor publicly listed 
companies’ behaviours. They have been defined as one of the best ways to assist stock 
market authorities in overseeing the performance of listed corporations.616 The main purpose 
of the LRs is to regulate the public offerings of securitises and register and incorporate these 
securities in its official list.617 These rules are distinguished as they are strictly obligatory, as 
companies must either declare their commitment to these rules or explain any deviation from 
them.618 The compliance with these rules is a condition to invest in the Saudi stock market as 
stipulated in Article 20 of these rules ‘Issuers must comply with the listing rules and must 
                                                 
613ibid. 
614Faleh AL-Kahtani, Current Practices of Saudi Corporate Governance: A Case for Reform (School of Law, Brunel University, London, 
UK, 2013) 96-97. 
615The Listing Rules were issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority upon its Resolution Number 3-11-2004 Dated 20/8/1425H 
Corresponding to 4/10/2004 G based on the Capital Market Law. Also, the Listing Rules were amended by Resolution of the Board of the 
CMA, No. 2-128-2006, dated 22/12/1426H (22/1/2006).  
616Du Plessis, J. J., McConvill, J. and Bagaric, M., Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance  (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) 117-18. 
617Art (8-9) Saudi LRs 2004. 
618Steven Tankiso Moloi, Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting in the Annual Reports of South African Listed Companies  
(University of South Africa, 2008) 32.  
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provide to the authority without delay all information, explanations, books and records that 
the authority may require’.619 
To strengthen the protection of the stock market and its stakeholders, the LRs gave the CMA 
absolute rights to intervene directly, to suspend the shares of listed corporations that are 
trying to manipulate the market or the shareholders’ interests.620 Previous literature shows 
that these rules are intended to protect existing and potential shareholders by ensuring full 
disclosure of financial material and other information, and giving investors all the rights to 
vote on certain matters.621 In protecting minority shareholders’ rights, the LRs have included 
a number of provisions, such as access to information, disclosure of financial information, 
board of directors’ reports, its duties, notification relating to substantial shareholdings and 
continuing obligations. 
 
According to the LRs, or ‘continuing obligations’, listed corporations must be committed to 
notify the CMA and shareholders, without delay, of any major developments in their field of 
activity, which are not public knowledge and which may have an effect on the issuer’s assets 
and liabilities, the financial position, the general course of its business, or any major 
developments as mentioned in Article 25a) of the LRs. The LRs have come to affirm on the 
value of protecting shareholders’ rights, including minority shareholders. Thus, these rules 
have stated clearly that the issuer must ensure equality of treatment for all shareholders who 
hold the same class, in respect of all rights attaching to such equities.622 Thus, it is suitable to 
say that the LRs have introduced, at least in theory, a number of rules that can help protect 
the rights of minority shareholders against the abuse of power by management and boards of 
directors. These rules have paved the way before the CMA to exercise power and 
competences in order to protect the stock market and investors against manipulation of 
management or directors.    
4.6 Judicial Enforcement Authority 
 
A sound judicial system is a fundamental prerequisite for financial stability and protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights. Similarly, adequate legal and judicial enforcements are 
significant corporate governance mechanisms that support the protection of minority 
                                                 
619Art (20-a) Saudi LRs 2004.  
620Ibid art (21). 
621Padraig Cronin and Frances Murphy, Slaughter and May, ‘Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies’ (2012) Paper 
Published in Association with London Stock Exchange, White Page Ltd, p 56. 
622Art (39-a-b) Saudi LRs. 
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shareholders’ rights and the growth of enterprises.623 Importantly, effective judicial 
enforcement raises investors’ confidence in the legal and financial system and thus, 
encourages them to invest their funds in the security market. Previous research suggests that 
‘Firm-level protection of minority rights is less likely to be effective if legal enforcement and 
judicial efficiency is weak’.624 In fact, violations of security market laws cause a lot of 
damage in the market, which has implications for the rights of minority shareholders. For 
instance, victims of such violations always resort to the judiciary to seek justice and redress 
wrongs done to them. There is no doubt that the existence of a sound judicial system will 
contribute largely in ensuring effective public enforcement. Moreover, it is a significant 
means of protecting minority shareholders from the abuse and misconduct of management 
and controlling shareholders.  
 
Evidence that sound legal and judicial enforcement mechanisms play a fundamental role in 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights have been demonstrated in previous literature. For 
instance, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) asserted that ‘prosecuting cases of 
misconduct either through administrative tribunal hearings or court proceedings (civil and 
quasi-criminal) and the resulting sanctions and penalties are visible signs of active 
enforcement’.625 
 
Other legal scholars have also emphasised that the protection of public investment is one of 
the significant objectives of the enforcement of the securities laws.626 A number of theories in 
law and finance have also suggested that development of the securities market, improvement 
of investment environments and reformation of company structure are to a large extent 
dependent on the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law.627 In fact, influencing 
investors’ decisions to invest in the security market and increasing their confidence in the 
stock market rely to a large extent on how strongly the securities market laws and regulations 
are enforced.628 
 
                                                 
623E. Berglöf and S. Claessens, Corporate Governance and Enforcement (Stockholm School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, 2004) 
22-37.  
624L. F. Klapper and I. Love, ‘Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 281 (2002) pp 19.   
625The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is deemed as the council of the 10 provincial and three territorial securities regulators in 
Canada. The CSA is basically responsible for developing a consistent approach to regulate securities market over the country. For more 
insight see 2008 Enforcement Report issued by The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). Available at: 
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/News/News_Releases/2008_CSA_Enforcement_Report.pdf?t=1414345172063.  
626R. Tomasic, ‘Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia: the Influence of Professional, Corporate and Bureaucratic Cultures 
(1993) Australian Journal for Corporate Law, vol 3, pp 192-229. 
627R. La Porta et al., ‘Investor protection and corporate governance’ (2000) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 58, pp 3-27.  
628T. Beck and R. Levine, ‘Legal Institutions and Financial Development’ (2003) NBER Working Paper No w10126, pp 5-7.  
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Taken together, the evidence above suggests that the protection of investors’ rights (the rights 
of minority shareholders) is one of the substantial objectives of the public enforcement 
mechanisms. Specifically, the mere existence of law in a book is not enough to guarantee 
effective protection of minority shareholders. Instead, there needs to be a sound judicial 
system with qualified judges to ensure that the security laws and regulations are enforced 
appropriately. In Saudi Arabia, several calls have been made on the importance of reforming 
the judicial system, particularly in relation to the security market. As a consequence, the 
Saudi regulator responded to this call and thus, developed effective means of improving the 
level of judicial services provided to investors in the Saudi securities market. The following 
sections highlight and analyze the judicial enforcement mechanisms in Saudi Arabia that deal 
with cases violating the provisions of the security market laws (the CML) and it’s 
implementing regulations. 
4.6.1 Competent Judicial Body to deal with Stock Market Disputes in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, the judicial system is analogous to other judicial systems in the world. The 
composition of the Saudi judiciary system is reflected in the description below: 
In most Islamic states . . . the legal system is bifurcated: one part is based on 
man-made, positive law; the other part is Islamic law. Saudi Arabia also has a 
dual legal system … the Islamic component of the legal system is fundamental 
and dominant. The positive law, on the other hand, is subordinate, 
constitutional and in scope.629 
 
The composition of the Saudi judicial system shows that alongside the shariah courts, there 
are various administrative committees enjoying full judicial powers. These committees are 
entirely independent from the shariah courts and they rely on the written legal rules rather 
than on the provisions of Islamic Law. The quasi-judicial committees have developed in 
Saudi Arabia as an alternative court in order to deal with the resolution of administrative and 
commercial disputes outside shariah court jurisdiction. This type of judicial system emerged 
as a consequence of rejection by Islamic (shariah) scholars on the establishment of the 
commercial court system in 1931, which was supposed to be the first commercial tribunal 
court that has jurisdiction over all commercial and financial activities.630 In Saudi Arabia, 
                                                 
629F. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill, Boston, 2000) 322. 
630The Commercial Court System was involved 633 Articles distributed into four sections, namely Commercial Paper, Bankruptcy, Land, 
Maritime Trade, Arbitration Rules, Bills and Exchange. However, this Court terminated in 1954 under pressure of Shariah Clerics.    
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concerns have been raised regarding the application of the principles of civil law on certain 
issues, which some have argued contravene the provisions of Islamic law. Previous research 
has shared a similar view as has argued that ‘…the expansion of civil jurisdiction would only 
come at the expense of Shari'ah courts’.631 
 
Following the rejection of shariah judges to adjudicate on both commercial and financial 
disputes, the Saudi regulator saw the necessity to create a new legal system to deal with the 
challenges/issues arising from rapid growth in the Saudi economy. As a result, quasi-judicial 
committees came into existence to fill this gap in the Saudi judiciary system.632 The quasi-
judicial committees are always established by Royal decree and members of those 
committees are also appointed by Royal decree. The decisions of these committees are final 
and cannot be appealed.633 The main difference between these committees and the judicial 
authorities is that the members of these committees are chosen by Saudi legal scholars, while 
the members of the judicial authorities are selected by shariah scholars.  
 
Over the years, the Saudi government has established several judicial committees following 
the adoption of quasi-judicial committees as an alternative judicial system to hear cases 
outside the jurisdiction of shariah courts. The main judicial committees are the Labour 
Disputes Committees, the Custom Disputes Committees, and the Banking Disputes 
Committees.634 As far as security market disputes are concerned, the Saudi government has 
established committees for resolution of security conflicts, which are divided into two major 
committees: the Committee for the Resolution of Security Disputes (CRSD), otherwise 
known as the First-degree Court, and the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Conflicts (ACRSC), otherwise known as the Second-degree Court. The CRSD and ACRSC 
are two of the prominent quasi-judicial committees in Saudi Arabia which have jurisdiction 
over commercial, administrative and criminal matters arising from violation of the Capital 
Market Law and its implementing regulations.  
 
By virtue of the provisions of the CML, the CRSD and the ACRSC are competent judicial 
bodies for adjudicating in all lawsuits and conflicts arising from such parties of the securities 
market, when the shareholders, listed corporations, brokers or any other party has dealings 
                                                 
631G.N. Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) the American Journal of Comparative Law 36, p 746. 
632A.A. Al-Ghadyan, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’ (1988) Arab Law Quarterly, pp 246-247. 
633The decision of the Appeal Committee of Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRC), “as an example” is considered final and is not 
subject to appeal before any courts in Saudi Arabia.  
634M. Al-Ghamdi et al., The Dispute Resolution Review: Saud Arabia (Law Business Research Ltd, Fourth Edition, 2012) 664.  
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with the Saudi Arabian stock exchange market. The CRSD’s establishment is laid down in 
Article 25 of the CML and it provides that the Capital Market Authority should establish a 
judicial committee known as the: 
 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes’ which shall have jurisdiction 
over the disputes falling under the provisions of this Law, its implementing 
regulations, and the regulations, rules and instructions issued by the authority and the 
exchange, with respect to the public and private actions.635 
 
The CRSD is deemed as a quasi-judicial authority; hence its decisions are judicial in nature. 
Besides, the decisions reached by these committees are not subject to any appeal before other 
judicial authorities. These committees are entirely independent from the judicial authority in 
Saudi Arabia. It has its own special judicial proceedings outside those applicable to other 
Saudi Arabian judicial bodies. In the section that follows, the composition, jurisdiction and 
powers of the CRSD and ACRSC are provided. 
4.6.2 The Committees for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) 
4.6.2.1 Composition of the CRSD 
The CRSD was created by the CML in 2004 and classified as a first-degree court. In 
accordance with the provisions of the CML, this committee should comprise of legal advisors 
who are specialists in the financial transactions and stock markets, and have sufficient 
experience in the securities markets.636 The Capital Market Authority Board should appoint 
the members of the CRSD for a renewable period of three years.637 In order to ensure its 
objective of providing justice is maintained, the members of this committee must not have 
any direct or indirect financial or commercial interest, or have any family relationship up to 
the fourth degree with the complainants or the litigations brought before the CRSD.638 In 
accordance with the CML, the committee must begin litigations or hear the complaints within 
14 days from the date of filing the lawsuits or the complaints with the CRSD.639 
                                                 
635Art (25-a) Saudi CML. 






4.6.2.2 Jurisdictions of the CRSD  
The CML established the CRSD to receive and address any conflicts relating to the 
implementation of the provisions of the CML or its implementing regulations, as well as 
those that relate to implementation or violation of the stock market regulations, rules and 
instructions (either public or private).640 The CRSD’s jurisdictions include litigations, 
decisions and actions taken by the authority or the exchange market.641 In addition, the 
committee has the absolute right to make claims against decisions and actions taken by the 
authority or the exchange and the Committee shall have the right to issue a decision awarding 
damages and request to revert to the original status, or issue another decision as appropriate 
(that would guarantee the rights of the aggrieved).642 Since the Capital Market Law picks up 
various cases and provisions, the CRSD implements its jurisdictions to review litigations in 
accordance with such rules. The CRSD’s jurisdictions can be summarized in the following 
points:643 
1) To consider the grievance of decisions and actions made by the Capital Market 
Authority or the Saudi stock exchange which is known as the administrative lawsuit; 
2) To review lawsuits arising between investors themselves relating to the CML and its 
implementing regulations, as well as CMA and the exchange market regulations, rules 
and instructions in terms of public and private actions, what is known as the civil 
lawsuit;  
3) To consider litigations filed by the CMA (as a general prosecutor) against violators of 
the CML and its implementing regulations, what is known as the (penal lawsuit) 
 
It should be noted that these jurisdictions are currently applied at the wider geographical 
level, covering all cities and provinces of Saudi Arabia. The reason behind bringing the 
judicial committee under one umbrella is to ensure justice and fairness in the judicial system 
and to prevent conflicts as to which court has the competent jurisdiction to hear the stock 
market-related cases.644 
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4.6.2.3 Powers of the CRSD 
A wide range of jurisdictions and powers have been granted to the CRSD by the CML in 
order to reinforce its power in the market and enable it to confront the issues and conflicts 
arising from the contractual relationships in the securities market, or from the violations of 
the CML and its regulations. In accordance with the CML, the CRSD is granted the following 
powers in exercise of its legal duties and functions:645 
1) To investigate and settle complaints and litigations 
2) To issue subpoenas witnesses  
3) To issue essential decisions to tackle the lawsuits 
4) To impose dissuasive sanctions and penalties 
5) To request the presentation of proof and documents 
6) To issue a decision granting compensation 
7) To retrieve parties to the original status, or issue another decision as appropriate that 
would guarantee the rights of the aggrieved. 
 
4.6.3 The Appeal Committee for the Resolution of the Securities Conflicts (ACRSC) 
4.6.3.1 Composition of the ACRSC 
For ensuring the rights of litigants and attaining the purposes of justice, the CML has given 
litigants the right to appeal the CRSD’s decision before the Appeal Committee within 30 days 
from the notification date.646 The ACRSC is constituted by the Council of Ministers Royal 
Decree.647 The membership of the ACRSC is comprised of three members representing the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Bureau of Experts at the 
Council of Ministers.648 The membership is renewable for a period of three years.649 The 
ACRSC is classified as a second-degree court in the course of prosecution in Saudi Arabia. It 
grants all the aggrieved parties the right of appeal against the perceived unfair decision of the 
CRSD. Importantly, membership of the ACRSC is different from the CRSD.   
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4.6.3.2 Jurisdictions and Powers of the ACRSC 
In accordance with the provisions of the CML, the ACRSC has jurisdiction over complaints 
and litigations arising either from investors themselves or from the decisions of the Capital 
Market Authority, or the stock exchange market (Tadawul).650 The CML has given the 
ACRSC the right to review, reconsider and issue decisions regarding the complaints or suits 
whatever the nature of the cases, which means that the ACRSC is empowered to adjudicate in 
all cases, whatever their nature, whether the case is an administrative suit, civil suit or even a 
criminal suit.651 
On the other hand, however, the difference between the CRSD and the ACRSC lie in their 
powers. By virtue of the CML, the ACRSC is granted the power to:652 
 
1) Refuse to review the decisions that are issued by the CRSD 
2) Assert such decisions issued by the CRSD  
3) Reconsider the complaint or suit, based on constant information in the litigation’s file 
before the CRSD  
4) Issue an appropriate decision for the litigation or complaint.  
 
According to the CML, the decision issued by the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of 
the Securities Conflict is considered to be final.653 
4.6.4 Shortcomings Directed to the Judicial Committees 
As it is well-known, the CMA established the so-called specialised judicial committees to 
address the issues arising from violations of the provisions of the CML and implementing 
regulations, as well as to adjudicate in the securities disputes emerging among investors. In 
fact, these two committees (the CRSD and the ACRSC) are playing fundamental roles in the 
activities of the Saudi Arabian securities market. In particular, these two committees are 
making enormous efforts to promote and boost confidence among dealers in the market, in 
particular among minority shareholders. In fact, the numbers of sanctions issued within the 
security laws are not in themselves the ultimate target. The most important target is to enforce 
and/or implement these sanctions and penalties efficiently. Indeed, the role of the judicial 
                                                 
650Appeal Committee for Resolution of Securities Conflict (ACRSC). Available at: http://crsd.org.sa/En/Conflict/Pages/Member.aspx.  
651For more insight see these jurisdictions at: http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Dispute/Pages/authority.aspx. 
652Art (25-g) Saudi CML. 
653ibid.   
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authority in imposing appropriate sanctions against those who violate the securities law 
cannot be underestimated. Previous research has shown that the quality of justice is measured 
by the quality of the judiciary system.654 In the section that follows, an overview of the 
number of committees, its members’ independence, educational qualifications and 
experiences is provided.  
4.6.4.1 Insufficient Numbers of Judicial Committees, its Members and its Independence 
As previously stated, the committees for resolution of securities conflicts are divided into two 
major committees: the CRSD (First-degree Court) and the ACRSC (Second-degree Court). 
Both the CRSD and the ACRSC are headquartered in Riyadh, which is the capital of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There are no branches of these committees in other Saudi Arabian 
cities. The lack of other judicial committees in other cities in Saudi Arabia continues to pose 
a problem to investors in general, and in particular for minority shareholders. Perhaps this 
limitation could weaken the efficiency of the judiciary system in enforcing the security laws. 
Previous research has argued that obtaining a distinct justice regime requires the necessity of 
providing easy access to justice, regardless of its geographical location.655 In fact, creating 
easy court access to litigators is one of the fundamental prerequisites for protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights.  
 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia is a large country, thus the lack of other judicial committees in other 
provinces is considered a huge barrier that may prevent investors from bringing their trade 
disputes before the committees, due to high cost and distance of getting to the capital. To 
address this problem, previous research has recommended the need to establish additional 
quasi-judicial committees in each province in Saudi Arabia, in that this will reinforce 
investors’ confidence and encourage investment in the security market.656 Therefore, it is 
necessary that the Saudi regulator adjust the provisions of Article 25 of the CML to establish 
other divisions of the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) in various 
provinces in Saudi Arabia.   
 
                                                 
654P. J. White, ‘Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations (2002) Fordham Urban Law 
Journal, vol 29, pp 1053-1064.   
655L. R. Spain, ‘The Opportunities and Challenges of Providing Equal Access to Justice in Rural Communities’ (2011) William Mitchell 
Law Review, vol 28, pp 367. 
656Aleqtisadiah, ‘Analysts: Legal abuses by the Capital Market Authority lead to investors fleeing’ (26 November 2011) No. 66203. 
Available at:  http://www.aleqt.com/2011/11/26/article_601506.html [Arabic edition]. 
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In fact, granting minority shareholders’ easy access to courts is an essential requirement in 
the enforcement of security laws. Indeed, as the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) assert, access to courts and other mechanisms of dispute resolutions 
should be available to the aggrieved parties or investors, whose rights have been violated.657 
Therefore, it is strongly recommended that Saudi regulator benefit from the UK’s system in 
this regard. In the UK, the High Court is considered as a first-instance court that hears all 
security disputes. The High Court is divided into three main divisions, namely:658 
 
1) The Queens’s Bench Division, which deals with litigations including negligence, personal 
injury, breach of contracts, non-payment of a debt and possession of land or property and 
defamation. 
2) The Chancery Division, which is presided over by the Chancellor and about 20 High Court 
Judges and involved many specialised courts, such as the Bankruptcy and Companies Court, 
the Commercial Court, the Technology Construction Court and the Patent Court. The High 
Court deals with all disputes arising from the securities market including fraud, manipulation, 
and deceit and so on.  
3) The Family Division, which deals with matters related to personal human issues, such as 
divorce, children, probate and medical treatment.  
 
The High Court Divisions are distributed over the UK. As a result, these divisions facilitate 
the process of court hearings, as the affected or aggrieved investors can file their litigation at 
the nearest court without having to travel to the headquarters.  
 
In addition to the above problem, the number of members of these committees is really 
insufficient and constitutes a major flaw in terms of protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights in the Saudi securities market. Previous research suggests that the existence of a 
sufficient number of judges is one of the most significant factors that contribute to creating an 
effective enforcement of security laws.659 Therefore, the number of judges should be large 
enough to respond to the volume of cases. This view is consistent with those of the Chief 
Justice of the US state of California who stressed that: “the lack of available courtrooms and 
judges is a reflection of legislative failure to provide a number of courtrooms and judges 
                                                 
657IOSCO, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’, p 6. 
658The UK Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Civil Justice in England and Wales’. Available at: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-
judiciary/the-justice-system/jurisdictions/civil-jurisdiction/. 
659M. Dakolias, ‘Court Performance around the World: A Comparative Perspective’ (1999) Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, 
vol 2, no 1, p 104. 
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sufficient to cope with the rapid growing population”.660 He further stressed that these 
failures have led to many problems in the administration of justice. The main problem is that 
several criminal cases were rejected under the pretense that the defendants were not able to 
exercise their constitutional rights to speed up the trial.661 
 
According to the CML, membership of both the CRSD and c should be three has to be chosen 
by Saudi legal scholars.662 The members of the CRSD and the ACRSC are in charge of 
adjudicating in all cases arising from the Saudi securities market. However, with the rapid 
growth in the Saudi security market and existence of a number of cases, the number of 
members of both committees is no longer enough to deal with the size of the market and its 
accompanying problems. Indeed, three members in each committee make the process of 
litigation very slow, and therefore the number of the committees’ members may be seen as a 
bottleneck for investors, particularly minority shareholders. Furthermore, the independence of 
the judicial system is deemed as an essential requirement in ensuring fairness and justice. 
Judges in any judicial regime must enjoy some form of independence that enables them to 
deliberate on cases and award verdicts without any external influences. Previous research has 
shown that protecting judicial processes from inappropriate interventions strengthens the rule 
of law.663 Besides, the judicial independence has been becoming one of the most significant 
aspects of democracy over the world.664 
 
In addition to the necessity of judicial independence, judges should be accountable to the 
public. Accounting judges is considered a crucial element when it comes to reinforcing 
judicial independence. Shetreet argued that, ‘judicial independence cannot be maintained 
without judicial accountability for failure, errors and misconduct’.665 In the Saudi context, the 
Saudi judges have the absolute authority to exercise their power without external influences 
or intervention, thus demonstrating judicial independence. Importantly, the rights of the Saudi 
judges have been endorsed and supported by the law of the judiciary, which states that 
‘judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be subject to no 
                                                 
660J. Chung, ‘Lack of Judges, Courtrooms, Leads to Calif. Accused Walking Free’, The Wall Street Journal, Criminal Law (25 October 
2010) Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/25/lack-of-judges-courtrooms-leads-to-calif-accused-walking-free/.   
661ibid. 
662Art (25) Saudi CML.  
663E. Handsley, ‘Issues Paper on Judicial Accountability’ (2011) Journal of Judicial Administration, vol 10, pp 180-187.  
664P. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence (Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy. eds. P. H. Russell and 
D. O’Brien, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1, 2001).  
665S. Shetreet, ‘Judicial Accountability: A Comparative Analysis of the Models and the Recent Trends’ (1996) International Legal 
Practitioner, vol 11, pp 38.  
 134 
 
authority other than the provisions of shariah and laws in force. No one may interfere with 
the judiciary’.666 
Nonetheless, the situation is entirely different when it comes to members of judicial 
committees in the Saudi securities market. Specifically, the members of the quasi-judicial 
committees in the Saudi market are not independent, neither are they accountable. In fact, the 
Capital Market Law (CML) has not made any provision with regards to issues of judicial 
independence of the committees’ members and also it has not made any provision for legal 
accountability of the members, when they make mistakes, errors, or misconduct whilst 
discharging their duties. For example, in the Saudi security market, the members of the 
CRSD are appointed by the BCMA’s decisions for a renewable term of three years.667 
Therefore, a conflict of interests may arise between the CRSD and the Board Capital Market 
Authority Board (BCMA). It is reasonable to say that the members of the CRSD cannot make 
any decision that is at variance with the directives of the BCMA. As a result, the performance 
of the CRSD will be biased, which will negatively reflect on the justice and integrity of the 
members and cases they decide.  
 
As previous mentioned, investors in the UK can file legal action before the High Court. 
However, in terms of the appeal against the decisions of the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA), the UK’s judicial system has given the aggrieved parties the right to challenge its 
decisions at multiple stages. For example, the first-tier tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with 
appeals from executive agencies decisions, including the decisions issued by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).668 However, anybody that feels he/she is unhappy with the 
decision of the first-tire tribunal can challenge this decision before the Upper Tribunal 
Administrative Chamber. The Upper Tribunal Chamber has jurisdiction to adjust or revoke 
the decision of the first-tier tribunal.669 In addition, the aggrieved party has the right to appeal 
the decision of the Upper Tribunal Chamber before the Court of Appeal, which handles 
appeal only on points of law.670 In order to reinforce the role of judicial integrity and 
satisfying litigators, the aggrieved can challenge the decisions of the Appeal of Court before 
the UK Supreme Court.671 
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On the other hand, the CML has not prevented the members of these committees from 
working in the public or private sectors. Consequently, the members of these committees are 
still holding other jobs, either in the Saudi government or in the private sector. In fact, the 
concept of judicial independence requires that judges must be protected from any external 
interference or influence which may affect their legal decisions or opinions.672 In order to 
ensure the integrity of the judicial independence, the judges should not receive any wages or 
premiums from government or from any other sector. According to Ronald Sackaville, 
‘…unlike the legal practitioner, the judge must be independent of governments, institutions 
and individuals and must be impartial in the discharge of his or her adjudicative 
responsibilities’.673 
 
In addition to these shortcomings, the members of these committees do not enjoy judicial 
immunity. Consequently, the lack of sufficient protection for the committees’ members 
would indeed, affects their work and make them susceptible to judgment bias. The 
importance of judicial immunity has been demonstrated in many studies. For instance, 
Williams has suggested that: 
 
…adequate constitutional protection and remuneration must be afforded to 
judicial office, as these protections will allow judges to deal with all cases that 
come before them without having to worry about the security of their office, or 
having their pay reduced, if decisions unfavorable to the government are 
made.674 
 
To sum up, it is true to say that the members of quasi-judicial committees in the Saudi 
securities market still have deficiencies in three areas: the absence of other branches of 
judicial committees in different provinces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; insufficient 
number of members of the CRSD and the ACRSC; and lack of judicial protection and/or 
immunity by the committees compared to their counterparts in the Saudi judiciary. As a 
consequence, adequate intervention by the Saudi regulator is required to address these 
shortcomings so as to reinforce statutory protection for its investors, particularly minority 
shareholders. 
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4.6.4.2 Weak Education, Qualifications and Experiences of the Committees’ Members 
The confidence of investors in the security market is inversely related to a sound legal 
system. Similarly, the existence of qualified and well-educated personnel with solid 
backgrounds in the field of law are fundamental prerequisites for developing sophisticated 
laws to deal with capital market issues, in particular protecting investors’ rights and interests. 
This view is consistent with the recommendation made by the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO). According to the IOSCO, securities regulators should be 
equipped with sufficient skills, experience and qualifications that are appropriate to the 
private sector.675 Moreover, the IOSCO also proposed that security market staff should 
receive constant training as required.676 This recommendation also applies to both the 
members of the CRSD and the ACRSC. Specifically, the CML provides that the CRSD 
should comprise of three legal consultants with specialist knowledge in transactions and 
dealings in the security market, as well as financial and commercial affairs.677 On the other 
hand, the CML provides that the members of the ACRSC should consist of three members 
representing the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau 
of Experts at the Council of Ministers.678 
In fact, investment in the securities markets either directly or indirectly, via mutual funds, is 
growing rapidly.679 Furthermore, lawsuits between the securities market and its participants, 
as well as between investors have also increased. With an increase in the size of the market 
and widening scope of internet trading, cases related to security dealings have continued to 
rise steadily.680 As is well-known, the cases of the securities market are complicated and not 
easy to resolve. As a result, perfect knowledge in the science of law is required. In particular, 
the appointment of a member of the judicial body should take into account the legal 
qualifications and experiences of the candidates. Unarguably, appointment in legislative 
authorities relies on certain factors. Perhaps the most important of which has to deal with 
individual competences and a specialized ability in law. Therefore, appointing an 
international attorney on any judicial committee who is a specialist in agricultural and 
forestry would be a waste of talent and effort.681 
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In addition to the above, practical training and enormous experiences are crucial elements in 
designating judicial committee members. In reality, a legally competent person with 
qualifications and experiences in law should describe the profile of any member of the 
judicial committee. Previous research suggests that a set of criteria should be taken into 
consideration when selecting members of the judiciary committee. These criteria should 
include training in law, judicial experience and legal knowledge gained from working in 
prosecution or in legal administration.682 The importance of the existence of qualified and 
experienced persons in law on judicial committees is clearly reflected in the composition of 
the United States Senate, as it is a common phenomenon to see that most congressmen are 
attorneys. Evidence shows that slightly more than 60% of the total numbers of senators 
elected to the seventy-seventh congress were qualified solicitors.683 
 
In terms of the Saudi Arabian securities judicial committees, the present study found that 
there are a number of issues surrounding the members of these committees, particularly in 
terms of their education, qualifications and experiences in the ambit of security markets 
cases. One main issue identified is that the committees’ website does not make provision of 
any demographic characteristics of the committee members, especially their educational 
status, competencies and experience in the field of security and capital market laws. This 
raises a question as to whether the committee members have the relevant qualifications and 
skills needed to serve on the committee. The information available on the website of the 
CRSD suggests that the members of the ACRSC work as legal advisors in their governmental 
bodies.684 The nature of their professional work is in the scope of administrative law and thus 
they express their legal opinions before the Board of Grievances (administrative court) 
regarding issues that arise from administrative, contractual relationships.685  
 
As a result, it can be said that the securities judicial committees in the Capital Market 
Authority are composed of individuals who lack professional qualification or experience 
needed to tackle all security-related matters in the Saudi capital market.686 Perhaps these 
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limitations would likely affect the performance of these committee members, especially in 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
4.6.4.3 Duplication of Functions between the Board Capital Market Authority (BCMA) 
And the CRSD 
 
In principle, the Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) has entire 
jurisdiction over imposing appropriate sanctions against any person who breaches the 
provisions of the CML, regulations issued by the CMA and/or the Saudi stock exchange. It 
also has the legal right to settle or adjudicate on all litigations filed before it, either regardless 
of the referral source (the Capital Market Authority) or by investors themselves.687 In the 
same vein, the Saudi regulator has also given the BCMA the right to impose financial 
penalties against those who infringe on the provisions of the CML, or the regulations issued 
by the CMA and/ or Saudi stock exchange. This right is contained in Article 59 of the CML 
and states that ‘as an alternative to the foregoing, the board may impose a financial fine upon 
any person responsible for the violation of this Law, its implementing regulations, the rules of 
the authority and the regulations of the exchange’.688 
 
However, it should be noted that the BCMA is just entitled to imposing a financial sanction 
against those who violate the provisions of the CML or the rules of the stock exchange. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the power of the BCMA is restricted in this regard. The 
settlement of securities disputes or adjudication in those disputes is outside the jurisdiction of 
the BCMA. In addition to this, the criminal sanctions and imprisonment terms fall within the 
province of the CRSD. The main problem in this context is that giving the BCMA the right to 
impose financial fines against violators of the CML, and its implementing regulations without 
returning to the CRSD, will lead to weakening of the role of the CRSD. Thus, granting this 
right to the BCMA may largely contribute to further breaches of the securities law and 
regulations. The role of the CMAB in this respect has been challenged in a financial 
committee’s report by Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Council). 
  
The Financial Committee’s report revealed that in 2002, the BCMA dealt with 166 cases of 
violations, but that approximately 90% of these violations had been resolved through direct 
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imposition of fines by the BCMA, without referring the cases to the CRSD, thus 
demonstrating duplication of functions between the two bodies.689 The Financial Committee 
believes that imposing fines by the BCMA indicates a strict violation of the provisions of the 
CML in that it gives the violators the chance to pay fines without proper investigation of the 
case by the CRSD. 
 
As a consequence, the Financial Committee recommended the need to refer all violators of 
the provisions of the CML or its implementing regulations to the CRSD. This 
recommendation is contained in the following statement: 
 
Upon the Board of the Capital Market Authority (BCMA) to refer all violators 
of the provisions of the securities law pursuant to Article 59 to the Committee 
for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) and it should not be expanded in 
imposing fines directly by the BCMA.  
 
In line with the foregoing, it is necessary that the Saudi regulator amend Article 59b) of the 
CML so that the CRSD will be seen as the only court that has the power to impose sanctions 
and penalties against those who violate the provisions of the securities law. This modification 
of the Article would contribute to enhancing investors’ confidence in the Saudi market as 
well as prevent the duplication of roles between the BCMA and the CRSD.   
4.6.4.4 Investors have no Right to Appeal against Decisions of the CRSC before the High 
Court 
 
As a general principle, the Saudi judges have the absolute authority to exercise their powers 
and jurisdictions over all criminal and civil claims, except for the claims that fall outside their 
jurisdictions by law. For example, those cases have to be heard by specialized judicial bodies, 
such as the Board of Grievances or the quasi-judicial committees.690 The specialized judicial 
committees are considered as the third degree of judicial authorities in Saudi Arabia.691 It 
should be reiterated that the key reason that led to the emergence of the quasi-judicial 
committees is the refusal of the shariah courts to hear some cases, particular those that relate 
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to commercial aspects under the assumption that their operations, in many cases, conflict 
with the shariah principles.692 
These judicial committees are always established by Royal decree and its members are 
appointed by Royal decree. The decision of the judicial committees is final and cannot be 
appealed before the Court of Appeal or the High Court. The main difference between the 
quasi-judicial committees and other judicial authorities is that the members of these 
committees are chosen by Saudi legal scholars, while the judicial authorities’ members are 
selected amongst shariah scholars. In fact, there are diverse judicial committees in Saudi 
Arabia, such as the Labour Disputes Committees, Custom Disputes Committees, the Banking 
Disputes Committees, and lately the Committees for Resolution of the Securities Disputes 
(CRSD). It should be noted that the Saudi judiciary has given each person the right to appeal 
to the High Court when there is any deviation in the application of laws or regulations. In turn 
however, the decisions of the Appeal Committee for Resolution of Securities Conflicts 
(CRSC) are final and cannot be overturned by the law.693 
 
This exception has raised many questions, especially regarding what the alternative legal 
means to obtain redress when the decision of the ACRSC works against the aggrieved 
minority shareholders is.  In reality, putting all the issues of shareholders under one judicial 
committee, without giving them the right to seek redress before either the High Court or the 
Board of Grievances, may cause injustice and lead to expropriation of their rights. In order to 
give the shareholders, in particular the minority shareholders, further judicial protection, the 
present study recommends that the Saudi regulator should amend some of the Articles of the 
CML so as to allow shareholders to appeal the decisions of the CRSD before the High Court 
or the Board of Grievances. The reason behind this recommendation is to ensure fairness and 
justice for the aggrieved shareholders (minority shareholders). This in turn, complies with the 
OECD principles of good corporate governance, which states that: 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise 
of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights694 
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The research believes that it is worthwhile to give investors the right to file their legal action 
against the decisions of the ACRSC before the High Court or before the Board of Grievances.  
4.7 Chapter Summary 
 
The relevant legal structures to corporate governance and protecting minority shareholders’ 
rights were explored in this chapter. The analysis revealed that the Saudi government has 
enacted some legislation to deal with corporate governance issues in the Kingdom. 
Specifically, corporate governance from the Islamic law perspective was explored in relation 
to protection of minority shareholders’ rights. As the analysis revealed, the Islamic law 
perspective on corporate governance has some degree of convergence with the OECD 
principles of good corporate governance. However, the two differ in some aspects. The Saudi 
statutory laws were also reviewed including the basic law of governance, company law and 
the Capital Market Law. Corporate governance regulations and listing rules were also 
reviewed. Importantly, the CGRs were seen as the guiding principles for all corporations 
listed in the stock exchange. Despite the fact that they are non-binding, they do reflect 
positively the position and performance of the company among its counterparts, in the stock 
market. The listing rules were enacted as standards to disclose and monitor publicly listed 
companies’ behaviours and are considered as one of the best ways to assist stock market 
authorities in overseeing the performance of listed corporations. Similarly, the Saudi 
government has established competent judicial bodies to deal with stock market disputes in 
Saudi Arabia. These judicial bodies, otherwise known as quasi-judicial committees, were 
established to serve as an alternative court that deals with the resolution of administrative and 
commercial disputes outside the shariah court jurisdiction. Indeed, previous research has 
shown that in an environment where the legal system cannot provide the needed minority 
shareholders’ protection, regulators can be an effective substitute for weak judicial 
systems.695 However, there are several weaknesses that characterise effective performance of 
these committees, especially in discharge of their functions.   
 
In summary, the evidence above suggests that the Saudi government has taken some decisive 
steps in reforming its security market through enactment of laws and regulations to deal with 
                                                 




corporate governance issues. In the next chapter, mechanisms for protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights will be explored in both Saudi and UK jurisdictions. The rationale is to 
highlight the similarities and differences between the two countries, whilst considering the 
possibility of transplanting some of the UK corporate governance practices to improve the 






























Chapter 5  




The definitions and theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance were provided in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Specifically, the analysis revealed some variations in perspectives 
amongst scholars and international organisations as to what corporate governance entails. 
Importantly, these variations reflect differences in scholars’ backgrounds, country 
experiences, trade policies and standards. Despite these variations, good corporate 
governance framework represents a combination of the external and internal structures. 
Importantly, each of these structures has a particular significance in improving the stability of 
stock markets and protecting shareholders. Previous chapters696 have analysed the external 
mechanisms of corporate governance in the Saudi legal system in comparison with the UK 
legal system. The existence of a robust external structure of corporate governance, in 
particular the sound legal and judicial mechanisms, is a fundamental prerequisite for 
implementing good corporate governance practice. Specifically, harmonization between the 
internal and external tools is required in order to create a solid corporate governance system. 
The internal mechanisms are not less important than the external mechanisms. Theoretically, 
most corporate governance systems are similar regarding the internal mechanisms and any 
corporate governance system should comprise of: a shares ownership structure, a board of 
directors, transparency and disclosure requirements and basic shareholders’ rights.697   
In practice however, the features of the internal structure of corporate governance differ from 
one country to another due to differences in legal structure, political status and cultural 
setting.698 These differences can be seen in terms of equities ownership structure and the 
compositions of the boards of directors. For instance, the countries that follow the common 
law model, such as the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have adopted a 
separation of ownership and management, whereas this ownership separation is not 
                                                 
696Chapter 1 provides background information to the research including definitions of key concepts: minority shareholders, control and 
ownership structures. Research questions and aims as well as methodology were also provided. Chapter 2 reviews relevant theoretical 
underpinnings to the concept of corporate governance and their relevance to Saudi Arabia. Chapter 3 explored the development of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, particularly the role of CMA in protecting minority shareholders rights. The relevant legal structures to 
corporate governance and protecting minority shareholders rights were explored in Chapter 4. 
697For more insight, see Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 and UK Corporate Governance code 2012. 
698J. Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) Company Lawyer, vol 25,  pp 76-78. 
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applicable in most civil law countries, such as Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands.699 
In Saudi Arabia, ownership and management are characterised by concentrated ownership. 
However, the board composition in Saudi Arabia is one-tier, which is analogous to UK. The 
board has full discretion to select members for the board of directors.700 
 
Given the importance of the internal structure of corporate governance, and in keeping with 
the objectives of this thesis, the present chapter seeks to analyse and compare the following 
elements in the UK and Saudi Arabia: equities ownership structure and key players, the board 
of directors (including their responsibilities and committees), transparency and disclosure 
requirements and the basic rights of minority shareholders. In order to explore this, the 
chapter will begin by examining the above elements under the UK system, followed by the 
Saudi legal system. The choice of the UK is significant to enable the analysis of similarities 
in the two jurisdictions. Furthermore, the implications of these similarities and differences on 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights are also provided.  
5.2 The UK Experience 
5.2.1 Share Ownership Structure 
Berle and Mean’s concept of ownership structure has a significant impact on the life of the 
UK’s corporations. The separation of ownership and control is an inherent notion in the UK’s 
securities market.701 Specifically, the emergence of a corporate governance system in the UK 
is traced to the failures of the agency theory, particularly in resolving the conflict of interest 
between the owners and managers. The UK system is based on the diversification of 
shareholders and enhancing the role of the board of directors. In the last decade, the level of 
equity ownership by individuals has dropped in the US and the UK.702 Available evidence 
suggests that less than 1/5 of the UK’s listed corporations have a controlling ownership with 
more than 25% of the equities.703 Interestingly, the notion of controlling family shareholders 
is no longer prevalent in widely-held corporations that operate in the UK securities market. 
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The main reason behind the disappearance of controlling ownership is because wealthy 
families no longer intend to own a large proportion of shares in listed corporations.704 
Instead, the market has witnessed a rapid growth in the level of shares ownership by 
institutional investors. The pension system and insurance companies in the UK are 
established sources of liquidity provision in the securities market.705 In the aftermath of the 
financial scandals and the corporate fraud that hit the global economy, there has been 
increasing pressure on institutional investors to act on behalf of individuals and monitor the 
performance of corporations.706 As a result, the institutional investors have recently become a 
powerful force in the UK securities market.707 Specifically, it has been shown that the 
institutional shareholders own almost more than 50% of the shares of the listed corporations 
in the UK securities market.708 In fact, the wave of investing, through institutional 
shareholdings rather than individual investment, is influenced by the notion that institutions 
have the professionalism and technical resources needed to function effectively in the stock 
market. Similarly, other factors such as the UK tax system have been identified as the reason 
why UK investors prefer investing via institutions compared to individual investors.709 
 
In the UK, the presence of publicly traded corporations is growing deeply. However, this is 
not so in other countries where a relatively small percentage of the total number of companies 
is listed.710 According to the UK regulations, the financial institutions are not allowed to own 
shares in publicly listed companies, instead they act as agents on behalf of shareholders.711 
However, in some countries, the families and financial institutions (banks or companies) can 
hold shares directly and do not require agents to manage their funds.712 
 
It should be noted that most of the equities in the UK are held by the agents of financial 
institutions and they play a robust role in the life of the UK securities market.713 As far as 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights is concerned, it is obvious from the literature that 
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the model of ownership structure under the UK system provides much better protection of 
minority shareholders, unlike the protection provided under the concentrated model.714 Thus, 
it can be said that investment in the UK securities market is more safe and attractive than in 
other countries that rely on insider-based models of corporate governance.715 
5.2.2 One-Tier Board System and the Board Duties 
In the UK, the board system consists of the executive and non-executive directors who 
operate under one single board, otherwise known as one-tier board or unitary system.716 Both 
the executive and non-executive directors are nominated by the shareholders during the 
firm’s annual meeting and their role is to monitor the company’s activities to ensure that the 
company abides by the provisions of the law.717 Shareholders in the UK elect directors to set 
business strategies and oversee management and the company board must also consist of 
insider and outsider directors.718 The insider is usually an executive, manager or employee 
who has a business relationship with the management of the company or is designated by the 
corporation.719 The outsider director on the other hand, is a person who has no direct business 
relationship with the firm or management.720 The division of the board into two categories of 
executives follows the recommendation of the Cadbury Report in 1992, which provides that 
every publicly traded UK corporations should create insider and outsider directors in one 
board. The Cadbury recommendation also suggests that the board should consist of at least 
three outsider directors.721  
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG) of 2006 stated that the boards of 
huge corporations should consist of a reasonable number of non-executive directors.722 The 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG) was produced in 2006 to set standards of 
good practice for listed companies on board composition and development, remuneration, 
shareholder relations, accountability and audit. However, an updated version of the CCCG 
was published on 17 September 2014 by the FRC with some minor revisions. A review of the 
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major changes in the new code, otherwise known as UK Corporate Governance Code is 
provided to further broaden understanding of corporate governance practices in the UK. The 
new main changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code included:  
that boards should confirm that the annual report and accounts taken as a whole are 
fair, balanced and understandable; that audit committees should report more fully on 
their activities; that FTSE 350 companies should put the external audit contract out to 
tender at least every ten years; and that companies should report on their boardroom 
diversity policies.723 
Other new recommendations made include that FTSE 350 companies should put all directors 
forward for re-election annually; the appraisal of the boards of FTSE 350 corporations should 
be facilitated at least each three years;724 the chairman should agree and regularly review a 
personalised approach to training and development with each director; that corporations 
should dedect the personality of the external facilitator and whether they had any other bind 
to the corporation, since some firms were not doing so;725 that FTSE 350 corporations should 
place the external audit contract into tender at least each ten years.726 In addition, it should 
put forward ‘proposed transitional arrangements, recognising that it was neither realistic nor 
desirable to expect all companies that had not undertaken a tendering exercise in the previous 
ten years to do so within the first year of applying the revised Code’.727 
 
In relation to diversity, the 2012 edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
recommended that listed firms should show in their annual reports their policy on boardroom 
multiplicity and also that they should introduce a report reveals any own personal 
objectives.728 In terms of the role of the chairman of the board of directors, a new principle 
was added to the code and states that: ‘the chairman is responsible for leadership of the board 
and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role’.729 Furthermore, a new principle 
clarifies that ‘non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop 
proposals on strategy’;730 Moreover, the new developments of 2013 recommended that the 
directors’ annual reports should explores the business model and the strategy for achieving 
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the objectives of the company;731 and that ‘the board should satisfy itself that appropriate 
systems are in place to identify, evaluate and manage the significant risks faced by the 
company’.732 
 
In accordance with the UK regulator’s orientation, maintaining a balance between executive 
and non-executive directors, particularly with independent non-executive directors, is 
becoming a necessity. Thus, no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the 
decision-making process on the board.733 The main controversy in this regard revolves 
around the question: How to dissociate the role of a non-executive director from the role of 
the executive director? Therefore, the CCCG of 2006 went on to state that non-executive 
directors should be out of the company. In addition, they ‘should constructively challenge 
and help develop proposals on strategy’.734 Previous research has shown that there exists a 
mutual relationship between the effectiveness of the board and the existence of non-executive 
directors. Accordingly, supporting non-executive directors is positively reflected on the 
strength of the board.735 In fact, the duty of non-executive directors under the UK legal 
system is reflected in the affirmation: ‘…non-executive directors should scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the 
reporting of performance’.736 
 
In terms of board election, Provisions B.7.1 and B.7.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
stated that the papers accompanying resolutions for the election of directors should be 
understandable and detailed. This should be contained: biography of the board of directors, 
affirmation from the chairman that the individual’s act continues to be helpful and the reason 
why the individual should be nominated.737 The new code also requires the board to prove 
that the company’s annual report and accounts taken as a whole are reasnoable, impartial and 
understandable.738  
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As can be seen from above, the UK corporate governance has undergone some significant 
changes in certain areas. Reports published by the Financial Reporting Council indicate that 
majority of companies have begun to comply with the provisions of the new code and some 
have offered explanations as to why they fail to comply with some provisions of the code.  
 
Importantly, dividing the board into executive and non-executive directors has helped to 
reinforce the effectiveness of the board within the company as well as protect the company 
and its shareholders from the misconduct of the management. In addition, some 
commentators have said that the one-tier board is characterized by a closer relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors, and this could easily facilitate exchange of 
information between the executive directors and non-executive directors.739 Nonetheless, 
others argue that the composition of the single board could perhaps create a negative effect 
on the efficiency of the information provided.740 They believe that putting the insider and 
outsider directors together in a single room will weaken the independence and efficiency of 
the board.741 Furthermore, corporate governance analysts suggest that non-executive directors 
in this type of board usually suffer from lack of information from executive (insider) 
directors;742 thus, their capability to provide effective monitoring is reduced. However, it 
should be noted that despite this problem, there is a trend towards increasing the proportion 
of non-executive directors in the UK and US firms.743 
 
5.2.2.1 The Chairman and the CEO 
Traditionally, the chairman is a person who leads the board of directors of a company. The 
chairman is responsible for conducting the business of the board, ensuring that board 
meetings are conducted efficiently744 and that the directors have easy access to the needed 
information during board meetings. Moreover, the chairman should monitor the process of 
appraising, hiring and compensating the chief executive officer (CEO).745 The code states that 
the roles of the chairman and the CEO should be separated and not held by the same person. 
The main reason behind this provision is to prevent the individual acting based on selfish 
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interest, rather than the interest of the corporation. Specifically, previous research has shown 
that combining the roles of the chairperson and the CEO may undermine the board’s 
monitoring power.746 Besides, self-serving managers may take advantage of this weak 
monitoring by expropriating the firm’s resources, such as paying themselves huge bonuses 
regardless of their performance.747 Similarly, studies by Mashayekhi and Bazaz suggest that 
combining the role of the CEO and the chairman can offer opportunities for self-serving 
CEOs to dominate board meetings, which has negative implications for the financial 
performance of the corporation.748 These findings are consistent with the agency theory 
assumptions, which suggest a negative relationship between CEO duality and firms’ financial 
performance.749 Nevertheless, the findings contrast the assumptions of the stewardship theory 
of corporate governance.750 
Another reason is that if power is concentrated in the hands of one person, he or she may 
disregard the interests of outside shareholders, thus weakening their protection against 
mismanagement. As a result, there is a growing belief that the chairman should be 
independent and separate from the CEO.751 The separation between the roles of the chairman 
and the CEO has become a necessity for a company’s success and growth. Other advantages 
include preventing the control of management over the board, increasing the company’s 
efficiency and protecting shareholders’ rights. This reflects the assumptions of the agency 
theory, which suggest that, owing to the conflict of interest between agents and principals, 
management control over the board can be minimised through the presence of independent 
directors, which in turn reduces the agency problem.752 
In fact, calls to separate the duties of the chairman and the CEO has been received by 
international bodies and national laws, since they are seen as essential ingredients for sound 
corporate governance practice. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) provided that ‘separation 
of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate 
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balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board’s capacity for decision-
making, independent of management’.753 
 
In the same context, the UK Combined Code (2006) also advocated the importance of the 
separation of the role of the chairman and the CEO as it stated that:  
 
A chief executive should not go on to be chairman of the same company. If 
exceptionally a board decides that a chief executive should become chairman, 
the board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its 
reason to shareholders at the time of the appointment and in the next annual 
report.754 
 
As a result, the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 has endorsed this orientation by 
asserting that the responsibilities of the person who is running the board (chairman) and the 
one running the enterprises’ business (CEO) should be separated. The decision-making 
should not be subjected to one individual without unfettered powers.755 Despite the large 
encouragement for the idea of a split between the roles of chairman and the chief executive 
officer, nonetheless, this notion is still a subject of controversy across many studies.756 In the 
US for example, the executives strongly endorse the notion of duplication of functions 
between the chairman and the CEO. However, Bagley and Koppes suggested that placing the 
two roles in the hands of a single individual is often seen as a vote of trust by the board and a 
reward for an excellent service.757 This latter view is affirmed in the Business Roundtable 
Report, which stated that758 ‘most members of The Business Roundtable believe their 
corporations are generally well served by a structure in which the CEO also serves as 
chairman of the board’. 
 
One famous case study that illustrates the above controversy between the separation of duties 
of the chairman and the CEO is seen in the case of U.K. big firm, Marks and Spencer where 
the roles of the chairman and the CEO have been combined. For example, Sir Stuart Rose, 
the then CEO of the company, was on 10 March 2008 handed the job of the chairman, which 
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contravenes the principle A.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code.759 There was an outcry 
from the shareholders who argued that his appointment contravened the provisions of the 
Code. Importantly, this appointment coincided with the profits warning, which saw the 
company’s shares plummet by 30% plus.760 Although the company maintained the role would 
be split again following Sir Stuart’s retirement in 2011. A resolution was tabled at the 2009 
AGM, which saw 38% of voting shareholders calling for an early appointment of an 
independent chairman. Sadly, 62% backed the board which saw Sir Stuart retaining his dual 
position as the chairman and the CEO. Despite this controversy, a new CEO was appointed in 
early 2010 and the roles were once again separated.761 However, the new study on the 
Development of Corporate Governance and Stewardship in the UK showed that only ten 
firms in the FTSE 360 had combined between the function of chairman and CEO during 
2014.762 
5.2.2.2 The Board Duties 
The UK legal system relies mainly on a common law model in interpreting the duties of a 
director as it believes that the director should act as a fiduciary.763 The fiduciary duty is 
defined as ‘a duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's personal 
interests to that of the other person’.764 
In fact, it is a relationship of trust which places a duty on company directors to act within the 
best interests of the company and to meet the highest standards of good faith and honesty 
when doing so.765 The faith and trust are key elements that should define the personality of 
board members as well as their decisions. In the UK, the management of shareholders’ 
interests has emerged from the theory of Adam Smith 1776. As a result, the UK model has 
applied the philosophy of defining the directors’ duties to prevent agency conflict of interests. 
The principle of good faith requires a director to manage the company’s affairs with honesty 
and to be held responsible for achieving the company's objectives equitably. 
 
The negative implications arising from the agency theory problem have forced the UK’s 
legislator to change the approach of fiduciary duty and replace it with the introduction of 
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statutory duties of the board of directors.766 Importantly, unless the director can demonstrate 
that he/she has acted under due diligence, then he/she should be subjected to appropriate 
sanctions and penalties if they fail to implement their statutory duties and engage in any act 
that will damage the interests of the company, or that of its shareholders. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code asserted that the main principle that defines the role of the board is that 
each corporation must be run by an effective board, which should be responsible for the long-
term success and growth of the corporation.767 Specifically, the UK Company Act of 2006 
stipulated that directors of the company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. A 
director should possess general knowledge, experience and skills required of a person 
performing vital functions associated with the interests of the company.768 Moreover, to 
support the stability of the securities market and the protection of shareholders’ interests, the 
UK Company Act 2006769 has set out seven duties of directors as follows:  
 
1) Acting within powers granted by the company’s constitution770 
2) Reinforcing the success of the firm and achieving all its objectives771  
3) Exercising their powers independently772 
4) Exercising appropriate care, skill and diligence to fulfil the company’s interests773  
5) Avoiding conflicts of interest774 
6) Not to accept benefits or interests from third parties775 
7) Notifying about any proposed or arrangement transaction.776 
 
In fact, the concept of trust is highly emphasized in the UK’s legal system, since it provides 
that ‘directors have, both collectively and individually, a continuing duty to acquire and 
maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the company’s business to enable 
discharge of their duties as directors properly.777 
 
Furthermore, the concept of duty of loyalty simply means that the decision of the company’s 
directors should be made in such a way that it promotes the interests of the corporation rather 
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than their own interests. The board of directors should act or deal fairly in their service to the 
company even if they have a conflict of interests with the corporation.778 The term duty of 
loyalty means that the board of directors should prevent a potential conflict of interests and 
insider trading within the company.779 The best way of ensuring that duty of loyalty is carried 
out efficiently is for the directors of the company to avoid entering into any transaction that 
may likely create a conflict of interests.780 In other words, they should not enter into any form 
of dealings or transactions that satisfy their own, selfish interest, although they are allowed to 
conduct transactions or deals that satisfy their interests, as long as such deals or transactions 
are not connected with the interest of the company. As a result of this conflict of interest, the 
self-dealing transactions must be approved by non-interested directors.781 
 
In the UK, the basic rule regarding conflict of interests between directors and the company 
has been applied many times over the years, particularly in those cases involving directors 
who benefitted from their company's opportunities. For example, in the case of Aberdeen 
Railway Co v Blaikie Bros of 1854, the court ruled that it is not permissible for anyone to 
enter into any transaction that promotes self-interest and damage the interest of those whom 
he is obliged to protect.782 Similarly, in the case of Bray v. Ford of 1896, the court affirmed 
the principle that discouraged the conflict of interests of the corporation by saying:  
 
It is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position 
… is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is 
not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict.783 
 
Section 175 of the UK Company Act of 2006 has also strongly endorsed the concept of 
avoiding a conflict of interests within the company.784 This Act requires a company’s 
directors to exercise a duty of loyalty in all situations and circumstances. In accordance with 
the Act, the company's directors must try to avoid any situation (including direct or indirect 
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interest) that conflict, or may conflict with the interests of the corporation.785 In addition to 
that, Section 175 affirmed that a director must not only avoid situations where there is clearly 
a conflict with the company but also avoid those that ‘possibly may conflict’ with the duty of 
loyalty to the company.786 As a result, the director is not only obliged to consider whether his 
insider interests conflict with those of the company but to also make sure that his outsider 
interests are not in conflict with the company either.787 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that a self-dealing transaction has never been outlawed 
under the UK law. The verdict issued in the case of Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie of 1854 has 
never been more than a default rule. Thus, directors’ transactions can be accepted whether 
through charter provision or via approval and attestation of stakeholders.788 As a general rule, 
the self-dealing transaction does not necessarily cause damage to the corporation and it is not 
prohibited unless it is unfair. As a result, shareholders are the only ones who decide whether 
to challenge a self-interested transaction.789 More importantly, the UK Company Act of 2006 
has asserted that the duty to avoid conflicts of interests is not a breach if the situation does not 
give the impression that there is a conflict of interest or if the matter has been approved by 
the directors.790 
 
The third substantial duty of the company's directors is the duty of disclosure. This crucial 
duty is required for publicly listed corporations in the long-term, particularly in common law 
countries. The importance of duty of disclosure has been aptly emphasized in the work of 
Berle and Means who saw it as a legal tool of addressing the problem of managerial 
opportunism via self-interested transactions. Indeed, the duty of disclosure plays a 
fundamental role in protecting minority shareholders’ rights. Therefore, it has been argued 
that without adequate disclosure, the shareholders will not vote sufficiently and their rights 
may not be protected adequately. Another justification is that full disclosure of conflict of 
interest transactions before shareholders will permit shareholders to sue directors who violate 
the duty of loyalty. Also, sufficient disclosure will contribute largely to limiting the conflict 
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Review, vol 80, 1 p 50;  H. G. Henn and J. R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations (3rd edn, 1983)  1035–1044. 
790Chapter 2 (175-4) UK Company Act 2006.  
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of interest emanating from transactions. In reality, there have been certain justifications for 
requiring the duty of disclosure per se, which are that:  
1) It contributes to the effectiveness and development of securities markets791 
2) It assists to increase the integrity of the company’s management considerably792  
3) It provides shareholders with the useful information they need and it enables them to 
challenge unfair transactions.793 
Under the UK legal system, a company's directors must disclose, in the annual report, the 
transactions entered into by the corporation or its subsidiaries and it should also include any 
material interest, whether direct or indirect.794 The disclosure should also refer the nature of 
self-dealing to other directors of the board.795 In accordance with Section 237(4) of the UK 
Company Act 1985, if disclosure is not included in the annual report, ‘the auditors shall 
include in their report, so far as they are reasonably able to do so, a statement giving the 
required particulars’.796 Importantly, the UK is different from the rest of the world when it 
comes to punishing directors who violate the disclosure provision. For instance, the board 
director, who fails to disclose to the board their interest in a transaction, is punished with a 
fine, even if the transaction is authorized or ratified at any time, as long as it is unfair to the 
corporation.797 Nonetheless, some scholars have raised concern regarding the effectiveness of 
this penalty and argued that if the penalty would actually serve as a deterrent for future 
violations ‘the possibility of having to pay a fine is an inadequate preventative particularly as 
it is unlikely that [the director] will be prosecuted’.798 
 
5.2.3 Shareholders’ Protection Mechanisms 
5.2.3.1 Cumulative Voting 
The election of board members through cumulative voting is a mechanism that allows 
minority-shareholders to gain representation on board of directors, because “straight voting” 
would have made that impossible. Hailed by many as a strong tool for investor’s protection, 
                                                 
791J. C. Coffee Jr, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’ (1984) Virginia Law Review, vol 70, p 717.  
792L. Loss and J. Seligman, ‘Securities Regulation’ (1989) The Business Lawyer, vol 46, no 4, pp 657–658. 
793P. G. Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems’ (1995) University of Chicago Law Review, vol 62, no 3, pp 
1047-1095. 
794Sec 232, Schedule 6, paras 15–28 UK Company Act 1985;  Sec 177(1) UK Company Act 2009. 
795ibid sec 177(1). 
796G. Laurence, Gower's principles of modern company law (Stevens & Maxwell, 1992) 520 in L. Enriques (2009) p 309.  
797Sec 317 UK Company Act 1985; The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of 
Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Consultation Paper No. 153, 1998) 89. Available at: http://www.gtnet.gov.uk/lawcomm.  
798L.Enriques, ‘The Law on Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis’ (2009) International and Comparative Corporate 
Law Journal, Kluwer Law International, vol 2, no 3, p 309. 
 157 
 
cumulative voting was introduced in the United States during the late nineteenth century as a 
result of political reforms. Although popular at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
application of the system in corporations has steadily declined since 1950s.799 Cumulative 
voting allocates one vote for each share of stocks held multiplied by the number of directors 
to be elected. A shareholder may cumulate his votes and cast all of them in favour of a single 
candidate, or split them among any combination of candidates. By making it possible to use 
their cumulated votes to elect at least one board member, cumulative voting is typically seen 
as a mechanism through which minority shareholders use to secure board representation.   
According to the US Securities Exchange Commission:  
 
Cumulative voting is a type of voting process that helps strengthen the ability 
of minority shareholders to elect a director. This method allows shareholders to 
cast all of their votes for a single nominee for the board of directors when the 
company has multiple openings on its board. In contrast, in "regular" or 
"statutory" voting, shareholders may not give more than one vote per share to 
any single nominee.800 
 
To further understand cumulative voting, the following example explains the process as 
follows: if shareholder (A) owns 90 shares while shareholder (B) owns 40 shares in an 
election for three directors, then shareholder (A) will have 270 votes (90x3) and shareholder 
(B) will be have 120 votes (40x3). Shareholder (A) wishes to elect A, B and C as directors, 
whereas shareholder (B) wishes to elect X, Y and Z as directors. Ordinarily, shareholder (A) 
would be able to elect his nominees A, B and C and no nominee voted for by shareholder (B) 
would be into board. However, by using the cumulative voting procedure, the above situation 
would be different. It will distribute shareholder (A) votes equally for A, B and C with each 
director receiving 90 votes. On the other hand, shareholder (B) will get 120 votes and he will 
have right to cast all of his shares to one of the directors either X, Y or Z. Therefore, at least 
one nominee will be elected to the board on behalf of shareholder (B).801 
 
                                                 
799G. Maassen and R. Dragneva, Cumulative Voting and the Protection of Minority Shareholders in the CIS: Legal Reform and Voluntary 
Harmonization (Law in Eastern Europe, no 57, 2007) pp 85-103. 
800U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Definition. It id available at: http://www.sec.gov; Chapter (1-216) of Delaware General 
Corporation Law. 
801L. Nilubol, Legal Framework for Promoting Minority Shareholders’ Protection in Thailand (School of Law, University of Melbourne, 
Australia, 2012) p 135.  
 158 
 
It should be noted that as at 1993, cumulative voting is not broadly prevalent across the 
world. For instance, it is adopted in certain US States, particularly in California where it is 
mandatory, but it is optional and rarely used in companies in Japan, and yet unknown in 
Central and Eastern European countries.802 Several arguments have been put for and against 
the use of cumulative voting. Proponents of cumulative voting see it as a fair procedure. They 
argued that it is only when a shareholder has a substantial interest in the company that he or 
she will be able to elect a director. Therefore, it is only equitable that stockholders with a 
large stake in the company have the opportunity to gain representation on the principal 
governing body, the board of directors and proportion to their holdings.803 Indeed, without 
representation on the board, minority shareholders may not be able to get an adequate voice 
on policy affecting the company. This view is consistent with research findings by Zhao and 
Brehm, which suggest that cumulative voting is an efficient approach to ease the tension 
between the board of directors and minority shareholders and can help reduce investors 
monitoring costs on a corporation.804 Minority representation on the board can be helpful in 
protecting or advancing the interests of minority shareholders.805 
 
Despite these advantages, critiques, however, argued that cumulative voting may create 
directors who are partisans to a particular interest group. As a result, the role of a partisan on 
the board of directors may be inherently inconsistent with the proper function of a director, 
which is to represent all interest groups in the corporation.806 A good director should not be 
captured by any special interest group.807 There is also issue with regards to confidentiality of 
information about the company. A director who is not trustworthy may leak such information 
to harm the company. Other disadvantages include: disharmony could harm the energy of 
management; and shareholders with narrow, selfish interests could abuse cumulative 
voting.808 
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In the UK, cumulative voting process is rarely in existence. Firms may adopt it but rarely do 
so.809 Legal device that dilute the appointment powers of majority shareholders to benefit 
minority shareholders are rare compared to devices that enhance the power of minority 
shareholders. The dilution device that is mostly used is ‘vote capping’ or imposing 
restrictions on the control rights of majority shareholders whilst inflating the voting power of 
minority shareholders. In the UK, the charter provision allows publicly traded corporations to 
opt into voting caps. However, voting caps are rarely used today in the UK; instead it has 
been eliminated by listing rules and government cultures. Different classes of shares are 
permitted in the UK to carry any combination of cash flows and voting rights and UK 
institutional investors have discouraged the use of dual class shares.810  
 
5.2.3.2 Derivative Action Lawsuits 
Facilitating the process of litigation before shareholders to file legal action against violators 
of securities law is an essential requirement for enforcing good corporate governance and 
ensuring the stability of securities markets.811 As a result, when shareholders’ rights are 
violated due to mismanagement or misconduct of the executives, they can seek redress by 
bringing derivative action against the offenders usually a director or corporate officer. 
Derivative lawsuit means that shareholders can bring legal action against company 
management and directors on behalf of all aggrieved shareholders, but in the name of and for 
the benefit of the firm.812 
The derivative shareholders lawsuit was established to protect the interests of all the 
shareholders within the company. In many cases, directors breach their commitments 
concerning protection of shareholders’ interests by wasting the resources and capital of the 
company, cover-up their misdeeds or by awarding failed contracts or projects.813 
Consequently, these dangerous deeds may cause serious damages to the shareholders’ 
interests, thus the derivative action mechanism aims to give aggrieved shareholders the legal 
right to bring derivative suit against their company itself. Derivative suit is one of the best 
means of settling conflicts between shareholders and company management. It should be 
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noted that this kind of lawsuits has been termed “derivative” to describe the corporate right 
enjoyed by the shareholders to express their grievances.814 Specifically, previous research 
emphasized the importance of derivative action in the following statement:  
 
The purpose of derivative action is to place in the hands of the individual shareholder 
a means to protect the interest of the corporation from the misfeasance and 
malfeasance of faithless directors and managers.815 
 
In the U.K, it has been argued that the derivative lawsuit is one of the significant ways to 
reinforce the position of shareholders, especially minority shareholders in the company. As a 
chief principle in the common law countries, judicial interference is considered an essential 
element in the UK’s approach to corporate governance.816 There are restrictions in the 
application of derivative shareholders suit as can be seen in the famous case of Foss v 
Harbottle.817 According to this rule, individuals’ shareholders were not authorized to bring a 
legal action on behalf of the company against directors who breached their duties.818 
The applicable rule in the U.K states that minority shareholders were not capable of filing a 
legal action against the offending directors unless their claim was ratified by a majority of 
shareholders at the general meeting.819 Thus, the derivative suit by minority shareholders will 
not take place if the majority shareholders at the general meeting decided not to sue the 
offending directors. In fact, the main reason for not empowering minority shareholders to file 
suit against directors was based on the ruling in Foss v Harbottle (1843)case, which provides 
that individual shareholders have no cause of action in law for any wrongs done to the 
corporate and that if an action is to be brought in respect of such losses, it must be brought 
either by the corporate itself (through management) or by way of a derivative action.820 
However, the general rule was criticized as being complex and vague.821 As a result, the 
former position of minority shareholders under the U.K statute has entirely changed with the 
enactment of the new procedure in Part (11) of the U.K Company Act 2006. The Law 
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Commission, which submitted the proposal for the new rule of derivative actions, commented 
on this new procedure by saying: 
In an age of increasing globalization of investment and growing international interest 
in corporate governance, greater transparency in the requirements for a derivative 
action is in our view highly desirable.822 
In the final report referred to as “Shareholders Remedies No, 246 in 1997”, the Law 
Commission made fundamental suggestions for the adjustment of the law regarding the 
derivative action. This Commission advised that the old derivative suit should be replaced by: 
a new derivative procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible criteria for 
determining whether a shareholder can pursue an action.823 
According to the Company Act of 2006, the derivative action can be brought if the cause of 
action was arising from a proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust by a director of the company.824 In addition, the claim can be brought 
before the court whether the cause of action was against a director or against another 
person.825 
The process of the application of this new principle requires that plaintiffs who wish to file 
legal action against directors have to seek first the approval of the court to continue the suit as 
a derivative action.826 However, there are certain circumstances in which the court might 
refuse the continuation of the claim, that is, ‘where the actual breach of duty has been 
authorised or ratified by the company, or where the proposed breach of duty has been ratified 
by it (Companies Act 2006, sections 263 (2) (b) and (c) and 268 (1) (b) and (c) (applicable to 
Scotland)’.827 In addition, the decision of the court to refuse the claim is also applicable 
where a person acting in accordance with his duty to encourage the interests of the 
corporation would not seek to continue it.828 In fact, the court has to be satisfied of the latter 
state, and does not show bound by the views of the shareholder who initiates measures.829 If 
these requirements are met, the court would then take further considerations into account 
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before deciding whether to authorize the derivative action to continue.830 The importance that 
a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote success of the company) 
would attach to continuing the action must also be considered by the court including whether 
the shareholder seeking to continue the action is acting in good faith. The issue of shareholder 
acting in good faith is not new as earlier jurisprudence on derivative actions has usually not 
allowed such an action to continue where there is proof that the claim was brought for a 
hidden reason.831 Also, the court has earlier failed to authorize an action where there is 
satisfactory remedy such as placing the company in liquidation.832 For instance, the presence 
of an alternative reform under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 was a significant 
element in the court’s decision to refuse permission to continue a derivative action in the case 
of Franbar Holdings v Patel833 and this has been mentioned in a set of following decisions 
including the view of Lord Glennie in the petition of A M Wishart834 given in the Outer 
House of the Scottish Court of Session, as well as in certain English cases. Other 
considerations that the court has to take into account involve: 
1)  Whether the act or omission which forms the break of duty could be or in the 
circumstances would be likely to be ratified by the company;835 
2) Whether the violation of duty is possible to be attested by the firm, and not merely 
whether it is ratifiable;836  
3) Whether the attestation has hindered a complainant from bringing a claim on behalf of 
the firm;837 
4) Whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim through the medium of a 
board resolution or a resolution of the shareholders;838  
5) Whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is filed gives rise to a cause 
of action that the member could pursue in his own right rather than on behalf of the 
company.839 
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Furthermore, there are situations whereby special types of derivative actions may apply. For 
instance, when those who are empowered to initiate litigation on behalf of the company fear 
that a derivative claim may be brought against it, they may endeavour to prevent this by 
initiating a claim on behalf of the company which they have no intention of seriously 
pursuing. In such situation, sections 262 (2) of the Companies Act 2006, allows a shareholder 
in the company to apply to the court for permission to continue the proceedings as a 
derivative claim. This is done when the following factors are present:840 
 
(a) The manner in which the company commenced or continued the proceedings 
amounts to an abuse of the process of the court; 
(b) The company has failed to prosecute the claim diligently; 
(c) It is appropriate for the member to continue the claim as a derivative claim. 
 
When an application is made to continue an initial derivative claim841 and the court is 
persuaded that the application and evidence filed by the applicant in support of it does not 
disclose a prima facie case for giving permission or leave, the court is then required by 
section 262 (3) to dismiss the application and make any consequential order it thinks 
appropriate. Sections 264 and 269 of the Companies Act 2006 provide for a shareholder to 
apply to take over an existing derivative claim. These provisions are intended ‘to prevent 
directors from frustrating litigation by inducing a sympathetic shareholder to commence a 
derivative claim, which he will not pursue effectively’.842 
 
Despite the fact that the court no longer follows the provisions of the rule in Foss v Harbottle 
in reaching its decision, however, it is interesting to note that some provisions of this rule still 
applies if it is in the interests of the company.843 The rationale behind the introduction of 
statutory derivative action is that it would help to turn things around and perhaps give 
shareholders a fair chance of bringing the culprits to book. However, concerns have been 
raised as to whether these reforms would lead to a dramatic increase in the incidence of 
shareholder litigation844 For instance, following the introduction of the statutory derivative 
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action in the Company Act, only 16 cases has sought for authorization,845 thus representing 
an average of 3.2 cases per annum.846   
 
In addition to the right of minority shareholders to bring a derivative suit against the 
defaulting directors, the U.K Company Act of 2006 has given the minority shareholders 
further statutory protection against the abuse of majority shareholders. This action is known 
as “Unfair Prejudice”. As a result, a minority shareholder has the right to apply to the court 
by petition on the basis that the corporation's affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
way which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its shareholders generally or some of 
them (including at least the applicant himself), or that any actual or proposed act or omission 
of the corporation would be so prejudicial to the applicant.847 This has been beneficial to the 
shareholders on occasions when it has been established that the directors have breached their 
duties to the company. Critiques have argued, however, that the action is being brought by 
the shareholder to benefit himself of herself, and not the company (as with a derivative 
action).848 
 
There are certain conditions that have to be met before an individual can bring an action 
based on unfair prejudice. First, an action can be brought by a shareholder of the company 
one complains against849, or a number of members as long as they do not together hold a 
majority of votes.850 However, if they did hold a majority of votes, then they would be able to 
control the company and should not be relying on court to sort out their problems. Second, an 
action may be brought by shareholder nominees, those "transmitted" shares by operation of 
law (s.994 (2)), those transferred shares without yet having been registered as members and 
the Secretary of State (s.995). Third, shareholders may assert perform was unfairly 
prejudicial even if it was before they joined the corporation851 and they can bring a legal 
action against a violator who has already sold their shares.852 Nonetheless, when a 
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shareholder has already sold his personal shares and is no longer a member of the company, 
no claim may be brought.853 
In the UK, the unfair prejudice has generated an enormous body of cases. The examples of 
the unfair prejudice litigation under the UK Company Act 2006 are diverse, but the most 
significant of them can be seen in cases of infringement of shareholders convention or articles 
of association, failure to provide accurate accounting information, breach of quasi-partnership 
principles, management misbehaviours, breach of fiduciary duty, the appointment of 
incompetent member of a controlling family to take charge of the company despite 
opposition from the minority shareholders or breach of an equitable agreement or 
understanding.854 In terms of breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties, the case of O'Donnell v 
Shanahan855 provides a good example. During the ruling, the trial judge observes (at para. 
[212]):  
Whilst the authorities make clear that, if a breach of the no conflict rule (and also the 
no-profit rule) is made out, it does not matter if the company (or trust or partnership) 
could not of itself have proceeded with the transaction, it does appear to me 
permissible to take into account when determining the scope of the directors' duties 
and in deciding whether 'there is a real sensible possibility of conflict' the inherent 
likelihood in fact of the company extending its existing scope of business into areas of 
business which might give rise to a conflict.856 
 
If the minority shareholders petition is convincing, the court has broad powers to compensate 
the damages incurred by the minority shareholders as a result of the unfair prejudice. The 
court can exercise any of the following actions:857 
1) Regulating the company's affairs and its behaviours in the future; 
2) Requiring the company to do or refrain from doing any act;  
3) Approving for filing civil proceedings on behalf of the company; 
                                                 
853Re A Company [1986] 1 WLR 281. 
854J. Sykes, "Minority shareholders and their rights", Charles Russell, 2009, pp.1-3. Also, see the IoD Directors’ Advisory Service, 
"Protection for Minority Shareholders", Institute of Directors, 2014, pp 1-3. 
855O'Donnell v Shanahan [2008] EWHC 1973 (Ch). 
856Corporate Law and Governance (August 2008) UK: England and Wales: unfair prejudice and directors' fiduciary duties. It is available at: 
http://corporatelawandgovernance.blogspot.co.uk/2008/08/uk-england-and-wales-unfair-prejudice.html.  
857Sec (996-1-2) UK Company Act 2006. 
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4) Authorizing for buying the shares of any shareholder by other shareholders or by the 
company itself; 
5) Requiring the company not to do any amendments in its articles without the approval 
of the court.  
In this regard, it should be noted that the U.K Company Act of 2006 also give individual 
shareholders the right to bring legal action against the company or majority shareholders, and 
this legal action can only be filed to the court when the shareholder is dissatisfied with the 
new amendment to the Articles of Association or Memorandum or when there is harmful 
transactions that may lead to variation of class rights.858 Furthermore, minority shareholders 
can require the court to wind up the company on the on the ground of “Just and Equitable” 
in the situation of insolvency of the company.859 However, in some instances the shareholders 
may experience difficulties in seeking to establish the existence of equitable considerations 
affecting the manner in which legal rights are exercised. For instance, in the case of McKillen 
v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd & Ors860, a shareholder's petition for unfair prejudice, 
under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, was unsuccessful and other claims were also 
dismissed. 
In terms of awarding remedies, section 996 of the Companies Act gives the court the powers 
to award remedies based on the following:861  
1- If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make 
such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of.862 
2- Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court’s order may:863 (a) 
Regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future; (b) Require the company: 
(i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or  
(ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do;  
(c) Authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by 
such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct;  
(d) Require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without 
the leave of the court;  
                                                 
858A.R. Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors' Duties (January 16, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201598 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2201598 . 
859Sec (122-1-g) UK Insolvency Act 1986. 
860McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) 
861Sec (996) UK Company Act 2006. 
862ibid Sec (996-1). 
863ibid Sec (996-2-a-b-c-e). 
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(e) Provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members 
or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of 
the company’s capital accordingly. 
 
The current section has discussed the derivative action and unfair prejudice in the UK. In 
terms of Saudi Arabia, the derivative action lawsuit is recognised under the Saudi Company 
Law of 1965. Both articles 77 and 78 are relevant at this point. For instance, Article 77 of the 
Saudi Company Law (SCL) states that:  
‘1) The Company may institute an action against (its) directors for wrongful acts that 
prejudice to the body of shareholders, 2) The resolution to institute this action shall be 
made by regular general meeting, which shall appoint a person (or persons) to pursue 
the case on behalf of the company’.864 
Similarly, Articles 78 of the SCL states that:  
‘every stockholder shall have the right to file a liability claim against the members of 
the board of directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by 
them is of a nature to cause him personal prejudice. However, the stockholder may 
file such claim only if the company’s right to file such claim is still valid and after 
notifying the company of his intention to do so. If a stockholder files such claim, he 
shall be adjudged compensation only to the extent of the prejudice caused to him’.865 
Despite the above provisions, the SCL is not explicit about what the procedure is if the 
general meeting (GM) fails to issue a decision to sue the wrongdoers or whether the 
shareholders have the right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company or not. As a 
result, it is unclear whether minority shareholders have the power to commence any action on 
behalf of the company. According to Al-Ibrahim, there are no liability claims that have been 
brought by minority shareholders under the name of company; instead they can request the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) to launch an investigation on the affairs of the 
company.866 A closer examination of Article 78 indicates that certain conditions have to be 
met before the minority shareholders are able to exercise their right to file a suit against the 
board of directors:  
                                                 
864Art (77) of Saudi CL of 1965. 
865ibid Art (78). 
866Mansour S. T. Al Anazi, ‘Minority shareholders: improving their protection to attract foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi 




1. The shareholder is entitled to raise his claim if the directors caused harm to his 
personal interests. 
2. The shareholder cannot initiate the lawsuit unless the company has the right to 
litigation. 
3. The shareholder must inform the company of its intention to raise the lawsuit. 
 
Further discussion on this topic of litigation under the Saudi legal system would be provided 
in section 5.3.7 of this thesis.  
5.2.4 The Role of Shareholders’ Institutions 
The significant growth in institutional shareholders in UK corporations has broad 
implications for corporate governance. Since the early 1960s, ownership of the UK equity 
market has become steadily institutionalised and been dominated largely by occupational 
pension funds and insurance companies.867 This significant trend has seen individual share 
ownership plummet from over 50% of the market to fewer than 20%, suggesting that 
institutions have acquired a large share of the UK capital market.868 Specifically, this shift in 
equity ownership is characterized by a rapid expansion of foreign ownership interests in UK-
listed companies, to the extent that overseas investors today, own a considerably greater 
proportion of UK equities than domestic investors.869 Indeed, institutional shareholders are 
seen as guardians of public investment as well as a means of dealing with corporate 
governance related issues. Their main aim is to diversify risks and gain steady returns.870 In 
fact, ‘institutional saving offers some risk pooling as individual investment is collectively 
invested with that of others under the direction of specialist managers’.871 The importance of 
their role in emphasized by the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), which 
states that: 
Millions of households worldwide depend on growth in long-term  value of 
investments made by institutional shareholders, be it for the saving schemes, 
life insurance, retirement provisions or otherwise. As trustees of these 
                                                 
867M.T. Moore, ‘United Kingdom: The scope and dynamics of corporate governance regulation’, in A.M. Fleckner and K.J. Hopt (Eds.) 
Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 913-956. 
868A. Zhao and A. Brehm, ‘Cumulative voting and the tension between board and minority shareholders’ (2009) Managerial Finance, vol 37 
no 5, pp 465-473. 
869M.T. Moore, ‘United Kingdom: The scope and dynamics of corporate governance regulation’, in A.M. Fleckner and K.J. Hopt (Eds.) 
Comparative Corporate Governance: a Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 913-956. 
870A. Zhao and A. Brehm, ‘Cumulative voting and the tension between board and minority shareholders’ (2009) Managerial Finance, vol 37 
no 5, pp 465-473. 




investments, which may include shares in listed companies, institutional 
shareholders have a general responsibility to use best efforts to preserve and 
increase this value. Improving the corporate governance of companies is 
increasingly understood as an important means of enhancing the long-term 
value of equity investments. As a result, many institutional shareholders, along 
with the ICGN itself, have taken steps to outline best practices for the 
governance of such companies. However, institutional shareholders as a class 
have an equal responsibility to address their own role as fiduciaries and owners 
of equity on behalf of savers.872 
 
In the UK, the strength of institutional investment cannot be underestimated. According to 
the 2001 Myners Report on institutional investment in the UK,  
 
The strong presence of large and sophisticated institutions has been one of the 
factors ensuring that UK capital markets are among the deepest and most liquid 
in the world, enabling firms to raise capital efficiently through share and debt 
offerings. Secondly, millions of savers and pension scheme members have 
benefited from UK institutions’ willingness to make substantial equity 
investments over the past thirty years. Between 1963 and 1998, pension funds 
achieved average annual returns of 12.1 per cent compared with inflation of 7.2 
per cent over the same period.873  
 
Institutional shareholders in the UK are seen as important corporate governance mechanisms 
to improve managerial accountability. Indeed, given that minority shareholders have less 
power over top managers and executives due to ‘free rider’ problems, it is expected that UK 
corporate share ownership (institutional investment) will mitigate such problems when they 
work collectively and show active involvement in the company’s affairs.874 However, 
institutional shareholders (such as pension funds) have been driven mainly by short-term 
strategies.875 According to Hutton, the consequence of tax arrangements has been a flood of 
institutional savings, acute demands for dividends and a foreshortening of the investment 
                                                 
872ICGN Statement on Institutional Shareholders Responsibilities, International Corporate Governance Network  (2003). 
873Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (Myners Report, 2001), Global Governance Codes & Regulation. Available at 
https://www.governance.co.uk/resources/itemlist/category/63-global-governance-codes-and-best-practice, p. 28 
874H. Short and K. Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance’, in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, (eds., John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd, West Sussex, 2005) 71-80. 
875W. Hutton, The State We're In. Vintage (London, 1996) pp 305-306. 
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time horizons.876 For instance, pension fund investments are free of capital gains tax, 
contributions to pensions are made out of pre-tax income and life insurance has in the past 
benefited from tax privileges.877 
 
In keeping with the UK Company Law provision and regulation (the FSA), institutional 
investors owe a duty of care to individuals who invest in retail funds. The 2001 Review 
Committee by Paul Myners recommends that the UK should adopt an ERISA-style approach 
to formalizing shareholders’ responsibilities. Following this recommendation, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) published the UK stewardship code setting out good practice 
guidelines for institutional investors when engaging with the UK listed companies, in which 
they invest. The stewardship code covers the responsibilities of institutional investors and 
was published in 2009 by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC).  There are 
currently four prominent groups in the UK, which constitute the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee (ISC). These include: the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the Association 
of Investment Trust Companies (AITC), the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 
and the Investment Management Association (IMA).878 The ISC outlines seven principles, 
which require institutional investors to: 
 
1. Publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship 
responsibilities 
2. Have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interests in relation to stewardship (and 
this policy should be publicly disclosed) 
3. Monitor their investee companies 
4. Establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities, as a 
method of enhancing and protecting shareholder value 
5. Be willing to act collectively with other investors, where appropriate 
6. Have a clear policy on voting and a disclosure of voting activity  
7. Report periodically on the stewardship and voting and activities.879 
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877Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (Myners Report, 2001), Global Governance Codes & Regulation. Available at: 
https://www.governance.co.uk/resources/itemlist/category/63-global-governance-codes-and-best-practice. 
878ICGN Statement on Institutional Shareholders Responsibilities, International Corporate Governance Network (2003). 





In 2003, the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance urged shareholders to follow the 
ISC principles. As a result, they made the following recommendations: 
 
1. Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with the companies based on a 
mutual understanding of objectives; 
2. When evaluating companies governance arrangements, particularly those relating to 
board structure and composition, institutional shareholders should give due weight to 
all relevant factors drawn to their attention; 
3. Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their 
votes.880 
 
To ensure compliance with the ISC principles, the UK National Association of Pension Funds 
conducted a survey in 2004 of its members. The results showed that 97% of its members 
were fully aware of the ISC principles, with 60% incorporating these principles in their 
investment manager’s contract. The survey also revealed that less than 80% of pension funds 
had corporate governance policies in place. The number of pension funds, which received 
regular reports from managers on voting and their engagement with companies, was 88%.881 
 
Despite the benefits associated with institutional investment in the UK, especially their 
willingness to intervene in companies’ affairs and hold management to account, they face 
many obstacles. One main problem is known as ‘the motivation factor’, which Proctor and 
Miles have described as follows:   
 
There is a disincentive for single institutional shareholders to expend time, 
effort and resources correcting what they perceive as bad management if other 
fellow institutional shareholders do not also support this action. Institutional 
shareholders have different priorities and agendas at any one time. It may be 
difficult to pool resources to tackle together what to some institutional 
shareholders may not be a problem at all.882 
 
                                                 
880Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Shareholders responsibilities and the investing public: Exercising ownership 
rights through engagement (2006).  
881Pension Funds: Engagement with Companies (Research Report No. 2, National Association of Pension Funds, 2004).   
882G. Proctor and L. Miles, Corporate governance (Cavendish, London, 2002) 45. 
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However, compared to their peers in other countries such as the US, the UK, institutional 
shareholders’ contributions to the improvement of corporate governance practice in listed 
companies have received some encomium. Importantly, they are seen to be very effective 
when it comes to monitoring the executives and involving themselves in company affairs for 
social and regulatory reasons.883 Furthermore, their engagement with the companies has been 
characterised as positive, they work behind closed doors rather than going public and their 
actions are characterised by gentle persuasion rather than being dictated under public 
scrutiny.884 
5.2.5 The Principle of Comply or Explain 
In principle, the principle of comply or explain has been used widely as an international 
benchmark for good corporate governance practice. This approach means that listed 
corporations must declare to their shareholders how they have applied corporate governance 
rules or why they have not applied corporate governance rules and they have to explain the 
reasons, in case they have not done so already.885 In fact, the principle of comply or explain 
helps shareholders and foreign investors to make their investment decisions wisely. It also 
assists them to decide which company they wish to invest in. It is important to note that over 
the last two decades, several countries have developed corporate governance codes.886 
Specifically, as previous research has shown, there are cultural, regional and organisational 
differences in terms of how far the codes are implemented and complied with.887  
For instance, in some countries, including the UK888 and Saudi Arabia (to be described later), 
compliance with the CGCs is voluntary ‘comply or explain’, whereas in a few countries such 
as the US, compliance is mandatory (‘comply or else’).889  Over the years, research has been 
conducted to measure the level of compliance among firms in different countries. In the UK, 
Pass found that 35% of UK firms complied fully with the 2003 UK Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance.890 The study also found that 45% made efforts to comply or gave an 
                                                 
883B. Black and J. Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour under Limited Regulation' (1994) Michigan Law Review 92, pp 
2078-2080. 
884M. Georgen and L. Renneboog, 'Prediction of Control Concentration in German and UK Initial Offerings', in J. McCahery, P. Moerland, 
T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboog (Eds.) Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2002) 252-277. 
885A. Sridhar et al., Corporate Governance in the UK: is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working? (Corporate Governance at LSE 
Discussion Paper Series. No 001, 2005) 1-13. 
886ECGI (2013). European Corporate Governance Institute. Available at: http://www.ecgi.org/, accessed on 21 May 2010. 
887
 L. Bebchuk and M. Weisbach, ‘The State of Corporate Governance Research’ (2010) The Review of Financial Studies, vol 23, no 3, pp 
939-961. 
888Cadbury Committee, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: the Code of Best Practice (Gee 
Professional Publishing, London, UK, 1992). 
889Sarbanes-Oxley, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Washington DC, United States (2002). 
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Law, vol 48, no 5, pp 467-478. 
 173 
 
acceptable explanation for non-compliance. In a recent study of 130 UK listed non-financial 
firms, Hussainey and Al-Najir found a high level of compliance with the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) index among the firms. The findings suggest that there is high 
level of compliance among UK firms with the UK Combined Code, which has positive 
implications for voluntary disclosure and governance practices.891 Results from other 
countries, particularly Turkey, revealed a weak level of compliance with corporate 
governance codes.892 Specifically, the authors highlighted the reasons for poor compliance to 
include weak supervision and enforcement by the regulatory authorities.893  
The flexibility of the principle of comply or explain means that corporate governance codes 
will create a kind of competitive situation among corporations and thus will put corporations 
under pressure to improve their standards more quickly. Previous studies show that this rule 
is considered more effectively for companies than the strict codes which corporations must 
comply with promptly.894  The advantage of comply or explain is that this approach is a 
complementary rule. It does not displace or replace the basic laws or codes. However, the aim 
of this principle is to ensure that corporations maintain higher and more typical standards that 
will make them more transparent and protect the long-term interests of their shareholders or 
stakeholders. This principle has become the trademark of corporate governance in many 
countries and has been broadly admired and imitated globally.  
In Saudi Arabia, some studies have investigated the level of compliance with the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC).895 Results from these studies suggest that there is 
relative improvement in the level of compliance with the code, following the corporate 
governance reforms. In terms of voluntary disclosure, Alaseed found a 30% level of 
compliance with voluntary disclosure.896 Other studies have also looked at the extent to 
which information about good corporate governance is reported on the firms’ websites. 
Specifically, Hussainey and Al-Nodel found variations between sectors in terms of the level 
of online reporting of corporate governance. Among the sectors studied, banks were found to 
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893ibid. 
894Padraig Cronin and Frances Murphy, Slaughter and May, Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies (White Page Ltd, 
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provide the highest level of disclosure regarding their corporate governance practices.897 In 
fact, results from these studies suggest that Saudi listed firms have demonstrated some level 
of compliance with the SCGC, although the level of compliance may not reflect good 
corporate governance practices among all listed corporations.   
The UK’s corporate governance principles are based on reinforcing the principle of comply 
or explain among listed companies. It is considered a notable landmark in the UK market, 
and thus all corporations should comply with this rule and ensure that this principle remains 
an active alternative to a rule-based system. Accordingly, all listed corporations must show in 
their annual report their ability or inability to comply with corporate governance standards, or 
inability to comply with, and explain to the shareholders the major reasons that hindered the 
application of corporate governance effectively.898 Importantly, a good disclosure system 
assists minority shareholders to access reliable information in sufficient detail and appraise 
the performance of management and the board of directors.899 Therefore, it can be said that 
without credible transparency and disclosure, shareholders will not be able to exercise their 
rights efficiently.900According to the Winter Report, ‘disclosure can be a powerful regulatory 
tool; it creates an incentive to comply with best practice and allows members and third parties 
to take necessary actions. Disclosure requirements can be more efficient, more flexible and 
easier to enforce’. 
In the international context, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance assert that a 
corporate governance system should ensure that timely and accurate financial information is 
made on all material matters concerning the company.901 Given the importance of disclosure 
requirements in the stability of a financial system in any state, the UK regulator has given this 
subject great attention so that corporate governance disclosure requirements are reflected in 
their capital market regulations (the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTR), the FSA Listing Rules, the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).902 For instance, the FCA is responsible for 
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reviewing and approving prospectuses and declarations, identifying eligibility for listing, 
maintaining the official list and monitoring the UK stock exchange and market abuse.903 
 
In addition, the FCA also monitors the compliance of issuers and major shareholders via 
periodic disclosures required under disclosure and transparency and listing rules.904 Sections 
84 and 87 of the FSMA contain the main provisions related to prospectus requirements. 
These provisions state that issuers must obtain an approval from the FCA before offering 
prospectuses to the public. Disclosure and transparency rules regulate all disclosure 
requirements, including those that must be incorporated in the prospectus.  
 
According to the prospectus rules, the prospectus must include the following information: 
issuer information; managers’, suppliers’ and advisers’ information; financial information; 
investment information; policy and strategy information; hazard factors; institutional 
structure and management information.905 The UK Prospectus Rules were implemented in 
2005 and the FSA’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) were issued in February 
2010. In fact, the UK disclosure system is characterized by great recognition of the rule of 
reasonable investor, which helps the stock market to act efficiently and fairly and to serve as 
a point of reference to guide investment decisions. To reinforce the disclosure requirements, 
the UK FSMA stipulated that quarterly and annual financial reports must be submitted to the 
FCA. It is important to note that Article 12 of the Saudi Listing Rules contains similar 
conditions specified in the UK Prospectus Rules. For example, the Prospectus Rules in Saudi 
Arabia must contain all information which enable an investor to make an assessment of the 
activities, assets and liabilities, financial position, management and prospects of the issuer, its 
profits and losses and must also include information in relation to the obligations, rights, 
powers and privileges attached to the relevant securities.906  
 
According to the new developments in UK corporate governance, it is important that 
companies that do not follow the rule of “Comply or Explain”, should provid their 
shareholders with explaination so that thay can evalute whether they are satisfied with the 
governance arrangements that the corpoarion has put in place.907 Importantly, the 2014 
edition of the Code involves a set of characteristics of what the FRC considers to be 
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904ibid. 
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significant explanations, to grant a standard for corporations when providing explanations 
and shareholders when evaluting them.908 These include: ‘that the explanation should set out 
the background, provide a clear rationale for the action it is taking, and describe any 
mitigating actions taken; and that where movement away from a particular provision is 
intended to be limited in time, the explanation should indicate when the company expects to 
conform to the provision’.909 By implication, a company may choose not to comply with a 
specific provision; nonetheless, it needs to provide a reasonable explanation in its corporate 
governance report.910  
 
5.3 The Saudi Arabian Experience 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The internal mechanisms of corporate governance: equities ownership structure and key 
players, the board of directors, transparency and disclosure requirements and the basic rights 
of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, are provided in the sections below. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the main rationales for comparative study between UK law 
and Saudi law is that if the research intends to explain Saudi law to English speakers, so 
much would be lost in translation and many concepts that English speakers would take for 
granted would not be translatable from the Arabic language to the English language. Thus, to 
avoid the risk of mistranslation and misunderstanding, the sections above have provided an 
overview and analysis of corporate governance mechanisms, including capital market laws 
and regulations under the UK legal system. This approach is necessary so that it will provide 
a solid basis for a comparative understanding of laws and certain technical terms that are 
common to both jurisdictions. Specifically, one of the reasons for choosing a comparative 
law method911 is to find out if there is a possibility of transplanting some of the UK best 
practices of corporate governance to improve the situation in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, by 
analysing the internal mechanisms of Saudi corporate governance, a comparison has been 
made between the UK and Saudi Arabian corporate governance mechanisms. This has 
implications for transplantation of some UK practices to Saudi Arabia.   
                                                 
908Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship, 2014, p 12. 
909Developments in Corporate Governance. The impact and implementation of the UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes. The 
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910Corporate governance Developments in the UK, 2012, p 5.  
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5.3.2 Ownership Structure 
In Saudi Arabia, the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) have partially been 
influenced by the US Law principles, particularly in terms of the formation and duties of the 
board of directors, the rights of shareholders and transparency proceedings. Nonetheless, the 
German model of corporate governance is strongly present in the Saudi legal system. The 
proof of this orientation is that the CGRs have adopted a wider view as a method of 
interpreting the concept of corporate governance.912 Specifically, German and Saudi 
corporate governance systems are built on the stakeholders’ theory. As a result, the 
corporation ownership in the Saudi securities market is characterised by concentrated 
ownership.913 In fact, the dominance of ownership concentration in the Saudi market is 
attributed to many factors, with political and legal factors as the dominant ones. Saudi Arabia 
is characterized by absolute monarchy and the nature of the political system has a large 
impact on the life of its trade and economy.914 
 
The Saudi legal system is also considerably influenced by the civil law model, in particular 
the French legal system. Since the outset, most Saudi laws have been influenced by the 
principles of the civil law model, more than the common law model, particularly in relation 
to commercial and administrative laws.915 In Saudi Arabia, banks still play a vital role in the 
Saudi securities market. They work as stockbrokers and prefer to deal with large investors 
instead of smaller ones.916 It is important to note that Saudi banks contributed to the crisis 
that hit the Saudi securities market at the end of 2006, which led to huge losses (such as 
investment portfolios) by the shareholders, particularly the minority shareholders. 
 
Unlike the UK securities market, the Saudi market works under the control and dominance of 
two types of investors, namely family-owned corporations and government-owned 
corporations. Family ownership has been defined in the literature as: 
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914P. Gourevitch and J. Shinn, ‘Political Power and Corporate Control: the New Global Politics of Corporate Governance’ (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2007) pp 80-81, in F. Almajid, A Conceptual Framework of Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi 
Publicly Held Companies: Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (School of Law, University of Manchester, 2008) 
208. 
915
 M. Hanson, ‘The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’ (1987) Arab Law Quarterly, vol 2, pp 283-291. 
916A. Awwad, Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation and Prospect for Reforms (University of Warwick, 2000) 200, in 
supra 30. (F. Almajid, 2008). 
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Those controlled by a family having at least one of the following 
characteristics: three or more family members involved in the business; or two 
or more generations of the family having control in the business; or the current 
owning family intends to pass on ownership to its future generations.917 
 
Other scholars have also offered their definition as: ‘a family enterprise is a proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation or any form of business association where the voting control is in the 
hands of a given family’.918 
In Saudi Arabia, as in other civil law countries, the majority shareholders, who own a greater 
number of equities, usually exercise their power and influence upon the company's 
management and its board of directors. This situation often weakens the rights of minority 
shareholders, especially their right of involvement in the company's decisions-making and the 
election of the board of directors. Previous research has shown that concentrated ownership 
structure empowers the controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders’ 
rights.919 In fact, concentrated ownership and control in the hands of single families in Saudi 
Arabia has resulted, in many cases, in the failure of some family corporations. A recent 
example is the Saudi Arabian construction company Mohammed Al-Mojil Groups (MMG), 
which was hit by heavy losses and accumulated debts amounting to $107 million in 
November 2012. Importantly, the collapse of the Al-Mojil Group was attributed to the 
mismanagement and misuse of power by the board of directors.920 Some Saudi scholars 
commented that the failure of MMG suggests that most family-owned businesses that have 
recently moved to a joint-stock company in the Saudi securities market do not exercise a 
positive role, either to the Saudi economy in general or to the Saudi community in 
particular.921 
 
La Porta et al have earlier stated that wealthy families in the insider system (civil law model) 
usually desire to hold fundamental shareholdings in their corporations, even if these 
                                                 
917
 D. Kenyon-Rouvinez, and J.L. Ward (Eds.) Family business key issues (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 1-16. 
918F. Neubauer and A.G. Lank, The Family Business: Its Governance for Sustainability (Hampshire: MacMillian Press LTD, 1998). 
919R. La Porta et al., ‘Investor protection and corporate Governance’ (2000) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 58, pp 3-27. 
920The Saudi Arabian Construction Company Mohammed Al-Mojil Group is participated in building part of Aramco's Wasit gas program, as 
well as the Aramco-Sinopec refinery in Yanbu, among others. Also, this family company has branch in the United Arab Emirates. MMG has 
been put up 30% of its shares for the public offering and gained the approval of the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) on 03/05/2008 
but it also has been hinged its traded shares by the decision of the Saudi Capital Authority on 22/07/2012 because its financial troubled and 
faltering projects revenues. This information has taken from some local Saudi newspapers, such as aleqtisadiah newspaper, issued on 
01/10/2012, by no, 6930. 
921This information has taken form the Journalistic investigation made by the Saudi newspaper (aleqtisadiah) on 01/10/2012 with some 
Saudi legal scholars. 
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companies are registered in the securities market.922 Subsequently, evidence shows that some 
of the Saudi family listed corporations transferred to joint-stock companies so as to enhance 
and build up their wealth, at the expense of the minority shareholders. They also added that 
the transfer of the Saudi family enterprises to joint-stock companies is just an illusion and 
deceptive strategy, as evident in the cases of the Al-Mojil Group and the Bisha Agricultural 
Development Company.923 
 
The power of the Saudi wealthy families in Saudi Arabia is reflected through their presence 
in all sectors of the economy, in particular agriculture, finance, banks, cement, 
petrochemicals, energy and transportation. In reality, there are multiple examples that 
indicate the dominance of Saudi, rich families on most of the listed corporations. For 
instance, Kingdom Holding is owned by one owner with only 5% of its equities available for 
trading.924 Another example is the Al-Rajhi family, which owns more than 20% of equities in 
at least three listed companies.925 The Al-Zamil family owns more than 10% of stocks in 4 
public firms.926 In addition, Al-Abdullatif, Al-Drees, Al-Othaim, Al-Babtain, Al-Hokair and 
others among the companies listed on the Saudi securities market, are still mostly owned by a 
single family and afford its name. The ownership of shares in these companies exceeds 
almost 40% of total shareholdings.927 Furthermore, in the Saudi securities market, there are 
more than 22 corporations in which 20% of their total shares are still owned by a single 
family or by majority shareholders.928 
The above statistics show that a concentration of ownership in the hands of wealthy families 
is high in the Saudi securities market, which also empowers these families to boost both their 
wealth and their control in the company's decision-making. In addition, the highly-
concentrated ownership enables the Saudi founders or families to interfere in the decision-
making of the company’s board and to exercise their power to select the board members. The 
                                                 
922R. La Porta et al., ‘Investor protection and corporate Governance’, (2000) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 58, pp 3-27. 
923Bisha Agricultural Development Company has been suspended from trading since 2007. The realized losses amounted to 3.7 million 
riyals by the end of 2011, increasing about 95% percent compared with the losses recorded during 2010, which amounting to about 1.9 
million riyals. 
924The owner of the Kingdom Holding is prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Al-Saud, who is one of a famous global businessman. 
925Al Rajhi family members own a large number of shares in Yanbu Cement Company. Therefore, they own about 29.10% of the shares. For 
more insight see Tadawul website. 
926The proportion of shares that are owned by Al-Zamil family, 1- Al-Zamil Industrial Investment company “owns 19.9% of shares”, 2-
Sipchem company “10.20 % of the shares”, 3- Chemanol company “11.20% of the shares” and in Sahara company they own “7% of the 
shares”. This information is existed at Tadawul website.  




literature shows that 1/3 of Saudi listed corporations have at least two directors from the same 
family and 20% per cent of the board members also belong to the same family.929 
 
It should be noted that the government-owned corporations represent a crucial element in 
ownership structure in the Saudi securities market. The Saudi government owns extensive 
equities in most corporations listed in the securities market. Through its large investment 
funds, the Saudi government plays a substantial influence on the ownership of shares and it 
owns approximately 44% of equities traded in the Saudi securities market.930 The influence of 
the Saudi government on the securities market is visible in that most chairmen and CEOs of 
government-listed corporations are appointed based on the decisions of the government. 
Also, the election and dismissal of board members are only subjected to the government.931 
According to Al-Moataz and Hussainey, State ownership in those emerging countries where 
there is high-concentrated ownership has a significant impact on influencing corporate 
governance disclosure.932 Importantly, with such large State ownership, agency problems 
might likely manifest.933 Besides, Konijn et al have earlier argued that State or government 
ownership often results in government intervention in the running of corporations, which has 
a negative impact on corporate governance practices.934 For instance, the State influence or 
power can reflect in the appointment of the CEO and board directors, who may lack the 
requisite skills and experience.935 Therefore, the effective application of corporate 
governance in the Saudi stock market requires a free market that will mitigate the government 
ownership in the Saudi stock market because, as previously mentioned in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis, one of the problems that affects the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights is a high 
concentration of ownership in the hands of the government and rich families.  
The Saudi government invests in the securities market through spreading its investments 
amongst three large national funds managed by its agencies, namely the General Organisation 
for Social Insurance (GOSI), the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and the Public Pension Fund 
(PPF). Official statistics showed that altogether these investment funds hold about £8.8 
                                                 
929G. James, ‘Learning from Family Failures’ (2010) MEED: Commercial Banking, vol 54, 25, pp 34-37.  
930Tadawul, ‘Statistical Report – First Nine Months 2008’, in Saudi Stock Exchange (Riyadh, 2008) 25.  
931F. Almajid, A Conceptual Framework of Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: Comparative and 
Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (School of Law, University of Manchester, 2008) 213. 
932E. Al-Moataz and K. Hussainey, ‘Determinants of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabia’ (2012) Journal of Economics and 
Management, King Abdulaziz University. 
933L. Eng and Y. Mak, ‘Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure’ (2003) Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol 22, no 4, pp 
325-345. 
934S. Konijn et al., ‘Blockholder Dispersion and Firm Value’ (2011) Journal of Corporate Finance, vol 17, no 5, pp 1330-1339. 
935M. Cornett et al., ‘The Impact of State Ownership on Performance Differences in Privately-Owned Versus State-Owned Banks: An 
International Comparison’ (2010) Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol 19, no 1, pp 74-94. 
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billion shares with a market capitalisation of 584.7 billion riyals, which is equivalent to 
$155.92 billion.936 
5.3.3 Board of Directors 
As with the Anglo-Saxon model (the UK as an example), the composition of the board within 
the Saudi listed corporations is characterized by a single-tier. It is right to say that the major 
objective of the Saudi listed corporations is to increase profits for its founders and 
shareholders.937 In fact, the idea about concentration of ownership and control in the hands of 
owners and controlling shareholders still dominates the Saudi regulator mentality and its 
desires. Consequently, electing members of the board by controlling shareholders is still a 
common practice in the Saudi securities market.938 The Company Law stated that each 
company must be managed by a board of directors and it must not have less than three 
members.939 The CL gives the company’s bylaw to specify the size of the board.940 Indeed, 
board size plays a role in effective corporate governance941, especially in relation to 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights. For instance, previous research has shown that the 
effectiveness of cumulative voting as a mechanism that allows minority shareholders to elect 
their representative onto the board, will depend on the board size, that is, the number of 
members being elected and the number of voting shares that the minority holds.942 
Furthermore, previous research also suggests that the effect of board size can be traced to 
three main sources: (a) increased communication and coordination problems, (b) the board’s 
decreased ability to control management, and (c) the cost of poor decision-making spread 
among a larger group of firms.943  
The CL requires a director who wants to nominate himself to the board to own a number of 
shares to the value of at least 10,000 SR.944 In reality, most of these provisions have been 
reinforced by applying the new securities regulations under the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CGRs) of 2006, which state that the Articles of association should determine the 
number of board members, provided that the board size is not less than three and not 
                                                 
936This information took from a Journalist Report issued by alriyadh newspaper entitled: Insurance, Pension and Public Investments Funds 
reveal their Ownership of Shares in Joint Stock Companies in the Greater Disclosure Process in Saudi Securities Market. For further details 
see that at: http://www.alriyadh.com/330988. 
937M. H. Al-Jeber, ‘The Saudi Commercial Law’, King Fahad National Library, Riyadh (1996)  235 [Arabic Edition]. 
938ibid. 
939Art (66) Saudi CL. 
940ibid. 
941M. Santiago and C. J. Brown, ‘An empirical analysis of Latin American board of directors and minority shareholders’ rights’ (2009) 
FORUM Empresarial, vol 14, no 2, pp 1-18 
942International Finance Corporation, Korporativno upravljanje Priručnik za firme u Bosni i Hercegovini, IFC Sarajevo, Sarajevo (2009). 
943T. Eisenberg et al., ‘Large board size and decreasing firm value in small firms’ (1998) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 48, no 1, pp 
35-54. 
944ibid no 68.  
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exceeding eleven members.945 Importantly, the Saudi government and the Saudi wealthy 
families are basic shareholders in many listed corporations. Most of the Saudi listed corporate 
boards are dominated by members, who are selected by the State or rich families. The 
influence of the State and rich families is visibly present and prevalent in Saudi Arabia. 
Consequently, many chairmen of listed corporations are appointed by the decisions of the 
State or rich families, without following the legal procedures as set out in related legislations. 
 
Evidence suggests that the number of the government’s representatives accounts for about 
two out of six in boards of listed corporations. For instance, a high percentage of members of 
the boards of the State-controlled corporations in the Saudi securities market, such as SABIC, 
STC, the Alinma Bank, the Riyadh Bank, SAFCO, the Electricity Company, MAADEN 
Company, the Petro Rabigh Company and others, are selected by the Saudi government.946 
Similarly, the boards of most large Saudi family-owned corporations wield considerable 






Figure 2: Criteria for appointment in the boardroom948 
 
 
Figure 3: Performance of board members949 
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(University of Nottingham, 2005) pp.363-366. 
948Saudi Riyadh newspaper (2007). For more insight see K. I. Falgi, Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A stakeholder Perspective 




It is important to note that the appointment of board members in Saudi Arabia is based on 
favouritism and nepotism. Likewise, the performance of the board of directors in some of the 
listed corporations is characterized by weakness. In fact, the presence and influence of 
wealthy families is not only experienced in their firms’ boardrooms but also in other 
corporations, due to strong social ties. The recent empirical evidence shows that ‘the power 
of selecting the boards’ members in these (quoted) firms is almost entirely in the hands of a 
few large shareholders’.950 The Council of Minister’s Resolution (no.80, dated 1985) 
affirmed that it is unlawful for board members to sit as board members in more than three 
listed corporations. However, in many listed corporations, individuals still sit in more than 
three boards as members. Lately, the CGRs have allowed an individual to serve ‘as a member 
of board of directors of more than five joint-stock companies at the same time’.951 Indeed, 
this contravenes the provisions of the Council of Ministers Resolution. Hence, potential 
conflict between the decision of the Council of Ministers and the CGRs is inevitable.  
5.3.3.1 Board Duties 
The main role of the board is to direct the business or operations of the corporation 
collectively, in a manner that will ensure the success of the company, whilst also 
safeguarding the interests of its shareholders and/or stakeholders. The board of directors 
perform multiple roles inside the company, such as defining the corporate objectives, 
developing plans and strategies, monitoring the company’s management and reviewing 
financial statements of the company that contribute to improving and consolidating on the 
company’s performance. After the scandals that led to the collapse of the Enron Company, 
the WorldCom Company, the Parmalat enterprise and others, the board of directors have 
dominated the topic for debate on the reform of listed corporations over the world.952 Given 
the different roots and approaches of the board of directors, the next section focuses on 
examining and analysing the duties of the board (duty of care and good faith, duty of loyalty, 
and duty of disclosure) under the Saudi legal system and then compares these duties with the 
UK experience.  
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951Art (12-h) Saudi CGRs. 
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5.3.3.1.1 Duty of Care and Good Faith 
The duty of the board is to ensure harmony and consistency between the top company’s 
management utilities and the shareholders’ interests. The managers usually make the plans 
and decisions and the board duties are to ensure that these decisions are implemented in 
accordance with the shareholders’ interests.953 Similar to the UK system, the duty of care in 
listed corporations’ boards is defined by Saudi law. The Corporate Governance Regulations 
(CGRs) of 2003 state that the board of directors must, in the conduct of their business, carry 
out their duties in a responsible manner, in good faith and with due diligence.954 To protect 
the company’s interests and its shareholders’ rights, these regulations stipulate that the board 
of directors shall be given all the essential powers to manage the company. In fact, the 
ultimate responsibility for the company should situate on the board, even if it establishes 
committees or delegates some of its powers to a third party.955 
Each member of the board of directors shall represent all shareholders and do their best, in 
the interests of the company and its shareholders, rather than the interests of the group that he 
represents or that he voted for, in favour of his appointment to the board of directors.956 
Furthermore, the powers of the executive management should be defined by the board of 
directors and the executive management should submit a periodic financial report to the 
board of directors.957 The board of directors is responsible for ensuring that accurate 
information about the firm is available to all board members in general, and to the non-
executive members in particular.958 
 
It is important to note that the scope of the duty of care under the Saudi statutes is 
considerably restricted. Importantly, section one of the Saudi Company Law of 1965 
identified the general provisions that relate to the board of directors’ actions, obligations, 
appointments and their liability for damages sustained by the shareholders.959 However, the 
Company Law of 1965 did not define the duties of the board of directors clearly as it is with 
the UK laws, which define their duties clearly, as seen above.   
 
                                                 
953S. Lane et al., ‘Guidelines for Family Business Boards of Directors’ (2006) Family Business Review, vol 19, no 2, pp 147-167, in M.M. 
Angel and S. Kamil, Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Firms (Master’s Thesis in Business Administration, Jonkoping 
International Business School, 2008) 28. 
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In accordance with the duties of the company’s boards which appeared in the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs), it can be said that these regulations have some 
ambiguities and restraints that may impede the effectiveness of the board of directors to 
implement the duty of care efficiently. One of the major defects under these regulations is 
that the company’s board decision, to carry out its duties in good faith and with due diligence, 
must be based on information provided to them from the executive management or from 
other sources.960 In addition to this, the provisions of the duty of care have not been 
interpreted by the Saudi courts. No case related to the duties of the board of directors has 
been brought before the Saudi judicial authority.  
 
For instance, the Saudi Arabian Construction Company Mohammed Al-Mojil Group, the 
Bisha Agricultural Company and other corporations were sued by the Saudi aggrieved 
shareholders. The plaintiffs alleged that the directors of those corporations were responsible 
for the damages inflicted on them and that they should bear such damages jointly. 
Nonetheless, their cases are still pending in the Saudi courts.  
5.3.3.1.2 Duty of Loyalty 
In Saudi Arabia, prior to 2003, the concept of the duty of loyalty was recognized by the 
Company Law of 1965, since the conflict of interests was regulated by certain clauses of the 
Company Law. As a general principle, the Law clearly prohibits company directors from 
competing with the company’s businesses or engaging in any form of commercial activities 
run by the company,961 unless they seek approval at the general meeting.962 The director is 
also required to inform the company’s board of any transaction or personal interest made on 
behalf of the corporation.963 
It should be noted that the provisions for a conflict of interests, under the new Saudi 
securities market regulations, were taken from the Company Law provision of 1965 with no 
amendment. As a result, in accordance with the CGRs, the director shall notify the board of 
any personal interest he or she may have in the transactions or contracts made on behalf of 
the company. Such notifications should be recorded in the minutes of both the company’s 
general meeting and the board meeting.964 Furthermore, the Saudi listing rules have also 
                                                 
960Saudi CGRs 2006. 
961Art (69&70) Saudi CL. 
962ibid. 
963ibid. 
964Art (18-a) Saudi CGRs. 
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emphasized prevention of conflict of interests between the director and the company as they 
state: ‘the directors of a company should exercise their powers and carry out their duties in 
such a way as to serve the interests of the company’.965 
 
In reality, the concept of the duty of loyalty is much better developed in the Saudi securities 
regulations. An example of a legal case of conflict of interest can be seen in the famous case 
of the Saudi Chemical Company, in which the board members purchased 15% of the equities 
of one of the subsidiaries of the company, without informing it at the general meeting or 
announcing this transaction either on its website or on the stock exchange website. 
Consequently, the Board of the Capital Market Authority imposed a penalty fine of 50,000 
SR, which is equivalent to $13,333, to the board chairman and each board member, for 
breaching Article 28 of the listing rules.966 
 
Nevertheless, there are some criticisms associated with the enforcement of the duty of loyalty 
principle at the judicial level. This is because the sanctions imposed on violators are seen to 
be relatively weak and soft. A good example is the case of the Saudi chemical chairman and 
board members (the plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against the CMA’s decision before the 
Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC). The ACRSC 
withdrew the decision of the CMA to impose the above penalty (fine) on the above 
company’s board members, despite the fact that their violation was clear.967 
5.3.3.1.3 Duty of Disclosure 
Specifically, the duty of disclosure under the Saudi securities regulations is similar to those 
provisions mentioned in the UK system. Perhaps the only difference might be that as a 
developed country, the UK has a strong legal and economic system that helps to establish 
good corporate governance practices. Therefore, the level of disclosure in such a country may 
likely be higher compared with the level of disclosure obtained in Saudi Arabia. Previous 
research has shown that the level of compliance with corporate governance standards is high 
in developed compared to developing countries and this is attributed to the strength of legal 
and economic systems.968 In relation to duty of disclosure in Saudi Arabia, transactions 
                                                 
965Art (28) Saudi LRs. 
966The Decision of the Board Capital Market Authority (BCMA) issued against the Saudi Chemical Company on 18 October 2009. For more 
insight see http://www.argaam.com/article/articledetail/127502/.  
967This decision has announced on the website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). For more information see 
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 E. Salterio et al., ‘Canadian Evidence of Adherence to ‘Comply or Explain’ Corporate Governance Codes: An International Comparison’ 
(2013) Accounting Perspectives, vol 12, no 1, pp 23-51.  
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should be made by way of public bidding unless the director has submitted the best offer for 
the company.969 Nonetheless, the director shall announce to the company’s board any self-
interest he or she may have in the transactions or contracts made on behalf of the firm. Such 
declarations should be entered in the minutes of the company’s general meeting.970 
Importantly, the interested board member may not be allowed to vote on the resolution 
adopted in this respect, either in the general meeting or the board meeting. In addition, the 
board chairman must inform, at the ordinary general meeting, of any self-interest transactions 
and contracts made by any member of the board. Furthermore, such communication must be 
accompanied by a special report prepared by the company’s auditor.971 
5.3.3.2 Types of Directors 
As previously mentioned, the UK’s board system is characterised by a single-board or unitary 
system composed of non-executive directors and executive directors. In Saudi Arabia, the 
board structure is quite similar to the single-board model that operates in the UK system. The 
boardrooms of the Saudi listed corporations consist of both independent non-executive 
directors and executive directors. In effect, non-executive directors have lately become one of 
the most important foundations of the sound corporate governance practice in any State.972 
The significance of this development is attributed to two reasons: (1) the outside directors are 
becoming an essential element to ensure that decision-making processes are not left under the 
control and influence of individuals, and (2) outside directors can make a positive 
contribution to the development and improvement of a company. It is important to note that 
non-executive directors play a vital role in preventing abuse of executive directors, as well as 
contributing effectively to the protection of shareholders’ interests. Therefore, outside 
directors can be described as a chain-linking management, the executive directors and 
shareholders.  
The importance of separating the duties of non-executive directors and executive directors is 
increasingly being recognised as a crucial factor in reforming listed corporations in many 
jurisdictions. Importantly, the need to restore public confidence and trust in the global 
financial system, following the global financial crisis, led many States and international 
bodies to propose the inclusion of independent non-executive directors to sit in the board of 
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972J. Cotter and M. Silvester, Board and Monitoring Committee Independence (University of Southern Queensland, 2000) 1-31. 
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companies. The importance of this proposal is reflected in the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004), which state that:  
 
Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-
making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the 
performance of the board and management. In addition, they can play an 
important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and its 
shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession 
planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisition 
and the audit function.973 
 
The UK regulator has realized the importance of non-executive directors, especially 
independent non-executive directors, in stabilizing their listed corporations and restoring 
investors’ confidence in the financial system. As a result, the UK Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (2006) provides that:  
 
Non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop 
proposals on strategy. Non-executive directors should scrutinize the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and 
monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the 
integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible.974 
 
Similarly, the Cadbury Report acknowledged that the existence of non-executive members is 
particularly relevant in applying and implementing the standards of corporate governance.975 
The Hampel Committee in 1998 recommended the creation of two types of boards of 
directors: the executive and non-executive directors. It also recommended that the non-
executive directors should form at least 1/3 of the board otherwise the board is considered to 
be weak.976 Indeed, the importance of the non-executive directors in protecting shareholders’ 
rights, and the company’s interests in general, has been stated clearly in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code of 2012. 
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This Code provides that the board should consist of executive and non-executive directors, 
particularly independent non-executive directors. The main objective is to deter individuals or 
small groups of individuals from dominating the board’s decision-making.977 Furthermore, 
the Code provides that the board appointment should be made through a nomination 
committee, the majority of which are independent non-executive directors.978 In accordance 
with the UK Corporate Governance Code, non-executive directors should examine the 
company’s management and monitor their performance reports. Also, they should oversee the 
transparency and integrity of financial information.979 Non-executive directors are 
responsible for identifying the appropriate compensation of executive directors and they also 
have an absolute power to appoint and fire executive directors.980 
 
In the UK corporations, the board should appoint one of the non-executive directors to work 
as a senior independent director in order: 1) to provide a sounding board for the chairman; 2) 
to serve as an intermediary for other directors; and 3) to serve shareholders if they have 
concerns regarding their interests.981 Furthermore, in order to increase the performance of 
non-executive directors, the chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors 
without the executives present. On the other hand, the non-executive directors should hold 
meetings with executives without the chairman present, at least once a year to assess the 
chairman’s performance.982 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the Company Law of 1965 did not give room for division of board members.  
Indeed, this represents a problem in good corporate governance because according to the 
agency theory, the presence of independent directors can reduce information asymmetry,983 
mitigate the conflict of interest between agents and principals984 and improve board 
decisions.985 Therefore, by not giving room for a division of board members, many Saudi 
firms will be saddled with agency problems, which may adversely affect the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights. However, following the enactment of the CGRs in 2006, the 
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need to divide the board into three categories was emphasized. Consequently, the CGRs 
defined three types of the board members as follows: executive members, independent 
members and non-executive members. The executive director is a person who works in a full- 
time capacity with the company and obtains a monthly wage.986 The non-executive member 
is a director who does not hold a full-time management position in the firm, or receive a 
monthly or yearly salary. To increase the effectiveness of the non-executive directors, the 
CGRs require all listed corporations to ensure that the majority of board members are 
appointed as non-executive directors.987 
Furthermore, the CGRs emphasized the need to appoint independent non-executive members 
of the board who should enjoy complete independence. The independent director is not 
allowed to:988 
 
1) Hold 5% or more of the company's stock or any of its group 
2) Act as a representative for a controlling shareholder who owns 5% or more of the 
company's equity or any of its group;  
3) Act during the previous two years as a senior executive of the corporation or of any other 
its subsidiaries  
4) Be a first-degree relative of either any board member of the corporate or its group, or any 
of the senior executives of that company or its group  
5) Be a nominee in the company board or in any subsidiaries branches of that company  
6) Act during the previous two years in the company, or its group as external auditors or main 
suppliers or have a controlling interest in any such party. 
 
Despite the huge similarity between the Saudi law and the UK legal system, especially in 
terms of the types of directors and their duties however, there is an ambiguity regarding the 
function of the independent director and the non-executive director in Saudi law. For 
instance, it is very uncertain that non-executive members and executive members would not 
challenge the strategies and decisions made by the chief executive officer (CEO).989 Perhaps 
this is not an exception in Saudi Arabia. To comply with sound corporate governance 
standards, the contract of the executive director should run for three years, which can only be 
                                                 
986Art (2) Saudi CGRs. 
987Ibid art (12-c). 
988Ibid art (2). 
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renewed following endorsement of shareholders. Furthermore, the executive members’ 
income should be subjected to full transparency and disclosure.990 However, the CGRs in 
Saudi Arabia have not provided this in the legislation, thus there is a need for amendment in 
the legislation to accommodate this requirement. 
 
In fact, the number of non-executive directors in the Saudi listed firms is based on the type 
and nature of the company. Therefore, in most of the Saudi banks, the non-executive 
directors are composed of a large percentage of the board members.991 For instance, the board 
members of the Aljazeera Bank are consisting largely of non-executive directors. In the Saudi 
SAMBA Bank board, 8/10 members are non-executive directors. All the 9 board members of 
the Saudi Investment Bank are non-executive directors and for Saudi Hollandi Bank, 9/12 
members are non-executive directors.992 
 
However, it should be noted that the percentage of non-executive directors in the Saudi 
family-owned corporations is still small. Previous research suggests this is due to an 
increased concentration of ownership in listed companies.993 In fact, there is no specific 
formula for identifying the number of the company directors, though in certain companies, 
laws have placed a minimum or maximum number of directors. 
 
For example, the management board of Tesco Plc in the UK, which is considered as one of 
the largest multinational supermarket enterprises, involves 13 directors.994 The UK Corporate 
Governance Code has a good procedure in place, which requires that the appointment of 
board members and the selection of independent non-executive directors be made following a 
recommendation by the nomination committee.995 
 
Under the Saudi system, the CGRs stipulate that the board of directors, including non-
executive directors, must be appointed by the general assembly.996 In addition, the CGRs also 
provide that the nomination committee should recommend all appointments for the 
membership of the board, to the board of directors in accordance with the approved policies 
                                                 
990A. Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 58. 
991F. Al Majed, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a Comparative and 
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993ibid. 
994For more insight about the board of Tesco Plc visit: https://www.google.co.uk/#q=Tesco+plc. 
995Sec (b-2-1) UK Corporate Governance Code 2012. 
996Art (12-b) Saudi CGRs 2006. 
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and standards.997 The non-executive directors are appointed and dismissed by the nomination 
committee under the UK law but in Saudi Arabia, the appointments and dismissals are done 
at the discretion of the general assembly.998 As a result, non-executive members may act 
under the influence of controlling shareholders or majority shareholders and this may weaken 
their status of independence. 
5.3.3.3 The Chairman and the CEO 
As mentioned, the duties of the chairman and the CEO are sometimes combined as one, 
suggesting that one person can serve as the chairman of the board as well as the chief 
executive officer of the company.999 It has been argued that the function of the chairman and 
the CEO should be separated and should not be filled by only one person. Unlike the UK 
system, the Company Law of 1965 in Saudi Arabia did not encourage separation of the two 
functions.1000 Importantly, it advocated that the role of the chairman and that of the CEO 
should be inseparable. Nevertheless, this view has since changed following the enactment of 
the CGRs in 2006. This new regulation has recognized the importance of separation between 
the functions of the chairman and the CEO. Consequently, the CGRs not only recommended 
that the functions of the chairman and the CEO in listed corporations should be separated but 
that it should also be considered a serious offence if any corporation violates this 
provision.1001 
Despite the fact that the Saudi regulator recommends the separation of the two functions, 
most listed corporations, particularly the State and the family-owned corporations, do not 
apply this rule (such as the Samba Bank). In fact, it is not a surprise that some corporations 
fail to implement the Saudi security laws when it comes to separation of the office of the 
chairman and the CEO. This is because the Company Law of 1965 granted the board 
members the right to elect the chairman and the CEO.1002As a result, the State and rich 
families exert considerable influence in the selection of the chairman and the CEO of their 
companies. For instance, the chairman of the SABAC Company is appointed by the Saudi 
                                                 
997Ibid art (15-c). 
998Ibid art (12-f). 
999Art (79) Saudi CL. 
1000Ibid art (79). 
1001Art (12-d) Saudi CGRs 2006. 
1002Art (79) Saudi CL. 
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State and the post of the chairman and the CEO of the Al Rajhi Bank are held by a single 
individual, who in this case is the son of Suleiman Al Rajhi.1003 
 
In fact, most obstacles facing the effectiveness of corporate governance in the Saudi 
securities market are that there is clear duplication between the rules of the Company Law 
and the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs), as well as the appointment of the 
chairman and the CEO being subject to social ties and business relationships. Thus, the 
appointments of most chairmen and CEOs in the Saudi listed corporations are largely based 
on friendship ties rather than on skills, qualifications and experiences.   
5.3.3.4 Board Sub-Committees 
The boards’ committees are becoming a fundamental prerequisite for the effective application 
of corporate governance practice worldwide. They are seen as crucial tools that help the 
company’s boards to achieve their goals and objectives efficiently. Specifically, the 
importance of the boards’ committees has gained wide recognition across the globe. 
Consequently, boards may establish various sub-committees and delegate their authority to 
some of those committees. At the same time, the boards of directors remain responsible for 
sub-committees’ activities.1004 
The board committees differ in terms of the nature and size of the corporation. However, 
establishing a good corporate governance system requires at least three major sub-
committees. In the UK experience, the Higgs Review suggested that most public companies 
should have two types of sub-committees, namely the audit committee and the remuneration 
committee.1005 Similarly, the Cadbury Report recommended that the board of directors should 
have two official committees: the audit committee and the remuneration committee.1006 The 
Cadbury Report also stated that the nomination committee is a very important device to 
ensure the board of directors’ designation process is made more explicit.1007 Therefore, it can 
be said that a formal governance structure is made up of three main committees, namely the 
audit committee, the remuneration committee and the nomination committee. Moreover, the 
board of directors may create further committees, such as a risk committee and an executive 
                                                 
1003Mr. Abdullah bin Suleiman Al Rajhi Chairman, Board of Directors - Non-executive member. He assumed a number of leading positions 
most noted are his tenures as Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Al Rajhi Bank. For more information visit: 
http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/about-us/pages/board-of-directors.aspx.   
1004C.A. Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2007) 121-136 
1005R. Hampel, Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance Gee (London, 1998) 27. Available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/ukla. 
1006Cadbury Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee Publications, December 1992). Available at: 
http://www.ecgn.org/ecgn/docs/codes/cadbury.pdf. 
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committee, as per the company’s condition. The following sections examine these 
committees and their implications for protecting minority shareholders’ rights in two 
jurisdictions. 
 
5.3.3.4.1 Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the most significant board committee that oversees the internal and 
external audit process of the company. Basically, the objective of an audit committee is to 
review the company’s financial data and ensure that the corporation has efficient internal 
controls, suitable accounting standards and external auditors who can prevent scams, 
manipulation and enhance the company’s quality. The audit committee plays a crucial role in 
providing the board of directors with all relevant issues associated with its actions. Therefore, 
it connects the internal and external auditors and the board of directors. The importance of 
audit committees in protecting minority shareholders’ rights is captioned explicitly in the 
Smith Review Report as follows:  
While all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company, the audit 
committee has a particular role, acting independently form the executive, to 
ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly protected in relation to 
financial reporting and internal control.1008 
 
Previous research suggests that the key role of the audit committee is to help the board in 
monitoring and ensuring the efficient implementation of the internal control mechanisms, 
overseeing and concentrating on all aspects of risk management, especially financial risk.1009 
Some analysts suggest that the main objective of the audit committee is to protect the 
shareholders’ interests and ensure that managers implement their duties in accordance with 
their contracts. They summarized the significance of the audit committee in three points as 
follows:1010 (1) to help the board of directors in performing their duties in terms of internal 
control and financial reporting, (2) to make sure that management acts in the right way and 
enforces the best practices and procedures, and (3) to address the issues of management and 
corporation objectively. As a result of the importance of this committee, the UK Combined 
Code (2006) states that:  
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The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case 
of smaller companies, two, members, who should all be independent non 
executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience.1011 
 
The audit committee should include independent outside directors in order to monitor and 
assist and to give assurance that the audit committee is working correctly.1012 In fact, the UK 
and Saudi systems have adopted these recommendations that establish audit committees as 
fundamental elements of their corporate governance systems. Consequently, both of these 
systems emphasized the importance of the audit committee, remuneration committee and 
nomination committee in their listed corporations.  
 
Many of the features of good corporate governance in the UK developed through the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, which recommended the separation of the functions of the chairman and the 
CEO and the establishment of independent audit committees.1013 The company’s board 
should establish the audit committee with at least three members including two independent 
non-executive directors.1014 Under the Saudi legislation, the audit committee has constituted a 
paradigm shift in the field of transparency and disclosure in the Saudi stock market, 
particularly in the wake of enacting the CGRs in 2006. The new regulations strongly 
recommend that each board of directors in listed corporations set up an audit committee.1015 
Its members should not be less than three, involving professional persons in the domains of 
financial and accounting matters.1016 Furthermore, the CGRs recommended that the members 
of the audit committee should be selected from non-executive directors.1017 Importantly, the 
general assembly of shareholders should make specific rules regarding the appointment of the 
members of the audit committee.1018 
 
                                                 
1011Para, C.3.1 U.K Combined Code 2006. 
1012L.F. Spira, The Audit Committee: Performing Corporate Governance (Kluwer, 2002); W. Willekens and P. Sercu, Corporate 
Governance at the Crossroads (Intersentia, Oxford, 2005) 35. 
1013London Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies (White Page Ltd, 2012) 9. 
1014Sec (c-3) U.K CGC 2012. 
1015Art (14) Saudi CGRs 2006. 
1016ibid art (14-a). 
1017ibid.  
1018ibid art (14-b). 
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In accordance with the CGRs, it is not acceptable to appoint the executive directors to sit on 
the audit committee.1019 To ensure integrity and neutrality, the audit committee should not 
have any direct or indirect engagement in any interest linked to the company’s dealings or 
transactions. The supervision on the company's internal control systems, particularly the 
activities of internal auditing and the actions of the external auditors, is a major duty of this 
committee.1020 Another duty is reviewing the interim and annual financial reports and 
conducting suitable recommendations prior to presentation to the board of directors.1021 
Moreover, this committee is charged with reviewing the accounting policies and making 
recommendations to the board of directors.1022 It should also make recommendations to the 
board of directors concerning the appointment, dismissal and the remuneration of external 
auditors.1023 
 
In spite of the Saudi regulator’s efforts in this regard, evidence suggests that most Saudi listed 
corporations have a cynical disregard of the activities of this committee and thus some of 
them have failed to comply with the provisions of the CGRs. The main problem emerges 
when the board of the listed corporations nominate the audit committee members without 
seeking approval from the general meeting of shareholders. For instance, the Basic Chemicals 
Industries Company recently paid a fine of $13,333 due to the failure of the company’s board 
to seek approval of the general assembly when selecting the members of the audit 
committee.1024 In addition, Tabuk Cement Company also received the same penalty because 
it breached the provisions of Article 14b) of the CGRs.1025 
5.3.3.4.2 Remuneration Committee 
The compensation committee (remuneration) remains a contentious topic in the field of 
corporate governance. It plays a vital role in preventing potential conflicts of interests 
between managers and shareholders, as executive directors may set up private remunerations 
for their personality interests. According to the Greenbury Report (2005):  
To avoid potential conflicts of interests, board of directors should set up 
remuneration committees of non-executive directors to determine on their 
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 Decision of the Capital Market Authority Board, No. 7-1-2012 (1 January 2012).  
1025Decision of the Capital Market Authority Board, No. 8-1-2012 (1 January 2012). 
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behalf, and on the behalf of the shareholders, within agreed terms of reference 
the company’s policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration 
packages for each of the executive directors, including pension rights and any 
compensation payments.1026 
 
It should be noted that the Greenbury Report has tried to strike a balance between executive 
directors and shareholders through the creation of the remuneration committee, which should 
consist of non-executive directors who act on behalf of the board of directors and 
shareholders. Hence, the main purpose of this report is to create a balance between the 
salaries and the performance of directors.1027 The members of the compensation committee 
should be identified by the chairman and the executive directors and these should also be 
outlined in the annual report.  
 
This committee has taken an advanced position under UK legislation as it was one of the 
issues that led to the agency theory problem. Therefore, it has received special attention in 
UK legislative reform. The UK CGC of 2012 states that the level of directors' remuneration 
should be sufficient in order to attract, keep and encourage the professional directors to run 
the firm efficiently but that a corporation should avoid paying more than is necessary for this 
objective.1028 The levels of remuneration of executive directors should be determined by non-
executive directors.1029 
 
The UK Combined Code (2006) provided that: ‘the remuneration committee should consult 
the chairman and/or chief executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of 
other executive directors. The remuneration committee should also be responsible for 
appointing any consultants in respect of executive director remuneration’.1030 In fact, the 
provisions governing the remuneration committee are similar to those provisions regulating 
the audit committee under the UK legal system, and thus the company’s board should appoint 
at least three members of independent non-executive directors in this committee.1031 
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1027J.Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Chichester, West Sussex, UK, 2010).    
1028Sec (d) U.K CGC 2012. 
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1030UK Combined Code 2006, para B.2.1. 
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In Saudi Arabia, the board of directors is a single authority that holds the right to manage the 
business of the company including the audit committee, remuneration and nomination 
committees. Hence, the company’s board should form a committee, known as the 
‘nomination and remuneration committee’.1032 Based on the board’s recommendations, the 
general assembly should issue rules concerning the appointment of the members of the 
nomination and remuneration committees.1033 
 
The main duties and responsibilities of these committees include:1034 1) recommending 
members to the board of directors; 2) making an annual review of the requirements of 
appropriate skills for membership of the board; 3) reviewing the board's structure and 
recommending required modifications; 4) identifying the levels of strength and weakness in 
the board and issuing recommended remedies that are consistent with the company’s 
interests; and 5) ensuring that the independence of the independent members is respected by 
the board. 
 
Despite the similarity between the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulation (CGRs) and the 
UK regulations concerning the work of the remuneration committee, the truth remains that 
this committee and other board committees cannot replace the board of directors’ 
responsibilities, which has the absolute power to manage the company with the appropriate 
method. Therefore, the CGRs are very obvious when they state that: ‘… the ultimate 
responsibility for the company rests with the board, even if it sets up committees or delegates, 
some of its powers to a third party’.1035 
 
Furthermore, previous research has argued that controlling shareholders can abuse the 
company and the rest of shareholders by approving high remuneration for themselves.1036 
This has a negative impact on minority shareholders, especially if we take into account that 
the controlling shareholders hold an executive position in most listed corporations in the 
Saudi securities market. 
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1033ibid art (15-b). 
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5.3.3.4.3 Nomination Committee 
The nomination committee focuses on the appraisal of the board of directors of its respective 
company and ensures that the skills and attributes of directors match the specifications 
required to serve on the company’s board. Indeed, directors have been commonly designated 
according to personal relationships, without due consideration of requisite competencies. 
However, this typically provides firms with inefficient directors. Previous research had 
earlier shown that companies that have nomination committees provide good protection for 
stakeholders’ interests, as opposed to those without such committees. Thus, the presence of a 
nomination committee should limit or prevent the appointment of ineffective directors.1037 
Some reports and codes support the necessity of strict, formal and transparent designation of 
new directors. For instance, the UK Combined Code (2006) states: ‘there should be a 
nomination committee which should lead the process for board appointments and make 
recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee should 
be independent non-executive directors’.1038 
 
The nomination committee should make sure that there is the right balance of qualifications, 
knowledge, skills and experience between the members of a company’s board. Under the 
Saudi regulations, the nomination committee has recently been recognised as one of the most 
significant of the board committees. The regulations also encouraged all Saudi listed 
corporations to establish this committee as part of their board. However, it should be noted 
that the nomination committee was established alongside the remuneration committees and 
carried the same provisions. Thus, it would indeed be beneficial if the Saudi regulator split 
this committee and set out its responsibilities clearly. 
5.3.4 The Basic Rights of Minority Shareholders 
In the introductory section, reference was made to Berle and Means’ study, which assumed 
that the basis of the agency theory problem was that individual shareholders have no control 
over the company’s decision-making.1039 Similarly, in a concentrated ownership model, 
controlling shareholders dominate the decision-making and minority shareholders have no 
power to exercise their rights.1040 Corporate governance came into existence to establish 
                                                 
1037B.D. Baysinger and H.N. Butler, ‘Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
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sufficient minority shareholders’ protection through restoring a balance between conflicting 
interests and offering appropriate remedies to shareholders’ disputes. Since the advent of 
corporate governance, shareholders' rights were represented as an essential element of the 
internal structure of corporate governance.  
In the Saudi legislations, the minority shareholders' rights have been integrated within the 
general rights of shareholders under Article 3 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
(CGRs) of 2006.1041 These regulations have provided a bundle of basic rights for the 
treatment of shareholders in general, and minority shareholders in particular. As a result, the 
recent report issued by the World Bank has ranked Saudi Arabia as 70th out of 183 countries 
with adequate protection of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders.1042 In line with 
global standards of corporate governance, the Saudi regulator has outlined several rights of 
shareholders. In the section that follows, the basic rights of shareholders under the UK and 
Saudi legal systems, such as management rights, financial rights, property rights and judicial 
rights, are provided.  
5.3.5 Management Rights 
Given the importance of management rights in the field of protecting minority shareholders 
rights, the law should provide a bundle of administrative rights for all shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders. In this regard, this research has focused on examining the 
rights of minority shareholders to attend general meetings, voting rights exercised chiefly in 
the case of absence, the rights of participation in deciding the company’s agenda and 
fundamental changes, participation in the election and rejection of board members, as well as 
the right to obtain information on a timely and regular basis.  
5.3.5.1 The Right to Attendance in Shareholders’ General Meetings 
First of all, a general assembly is a substantial element in the internal structure of corporate 
governance. It is a main headquarter where all shareholders can vote and participate in the 
fundamental decisions and significant issues affecting the company. Attendance and 
engagement at the general meetings is seen as a fundamental factor in the course of 
protecting minority shareholders' rights. Therefore, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance emphasized the importance of this meeting by saying that ‘shareholders should 
                                                 
1041Art (3) Saudi CGRs.  
1042Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (The 
World Bank, 2009) 1-15. 
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have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings and 
should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures that govern general shareholder 
meetings’.1043 
According to this principle, protecting minority shareholders’ rights should form the 
definition of a good corporate governance framework and this should involve a set of 
elements of regulations, self-regulation, and mechanisms of forced enforcement of laws, 
voluntary commitment to obligations, capital market conditions, business practices and levels 
of institutions’ development.1044 Protecting minority shareholders should be supported by 
legal system, either company law, securities law or others. The quality of laws and their 
enforcement by the regulatory bodies and courts are substantial factors, needed to ensure 
sound corporate governance and financial systems in any State. When these laws and 
regulations do not provide good protection of minority shareholders however, corporate 
governance does not act efficiently. As a result, Jensen and Meckling asserted the above 
argument by saying that: 
 
This view of the company points up the important role which the legal system 
and the law play in social organisations, especially, the organisation of 
economic activity. Statutory laws set bounds on the kind of contracts into 
which individuals and organisations may enter without risking criminal 
prosecution. The police powers of the State are available and used to enforce 
performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts between contracting parties and 
establish precedents which form the body of common law. All of these 
government activities affect both the kind of contracts executed and the extent 
to which contracting is relied upon.1045 
 
In fact, shareholders usually obtain a bundle of rights by buying shares. Thus, the main 
reasons that induce shareholders to buy stocks are dividends, control and to gain capital.1046 
The widely-held view is that minority shareholders’ control is gained by participating 
effectively at general meetings. It can be said that attendance and participation at the general 
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assembly is the legal means for shareholders and their representatives to influence the 
company's policies and decisions.  
 
On the other hand, the OECD Principles assert the significance of providing shareholders 
with sufficient and timely information regarding the location, date and agenda of general 
meetings as they frankly stipulate that ‘shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and 
timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as 
full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting’. 
 
However, in practice, evidence shows that different procedures may be used to decrease the 
effectiveness of shareholders’ participation in general meetings, such as holding the 
shareholders' general meeting in a difficult location, voting by raising hands without the right 
to demand a poll, delaying the provision of basic information, allowing a limited number for 
attendance at the general meetings, giving a period of notice that is below the legal minimum, 
and so on.1047 The main issue that minority shareholders may face is that the company's 
management may only display issues that they want and disregard other significant matters. 
This problem is very common in those systems characterised by concentrated ownership, 
since the controlling shareholders may likely use the general assembly to pass only decisions 
that satisfy their selfish interests. As a result, the corporate governance system emerged to 
encourage listed companies to remove all artificial barriers that will prevent shareholders 
from exercising their rights in general meetings.  
 
Accordingly, the Saudi legislations have paid considerable attention to shareholders’ right to 
attend and exercise their rights via general meetings. Specifically, the Saudi Company Law 
has recognized the shareholders' right to attend the general meeting by stating that ‘…every 
stockholder who holds 20 shares shall have the right to attend, even if the bylaws of the 
company provide otherwise’.1048 
 
Generally, the CL has contained a set of rules that regulate the shareholders' rights to attend 
and participate effectively in the general assembly. Similar to the UK system, the CL gives 
shareholders the right to attendance and participation in both the ordinary and extraordinary 
                                                 
1047Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Report, Protection of Minority Shareholders in Listed 
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1048Art (83) Saudi CL.  
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meetings.1049 Article 61 stated that the general meeting will not be valid unless the number of 
attendees represents at least half of the company's capital.1050 In fact, the CL has included a 
bundle of provisions, which to a large extent, reflect international standards of good corporate 
governance. However, it has been discovered that the right of shareholders, especially 
minority shareholders with regards to general meetings, is poor and non-existent. This is 
because the company management, especially the CEO and the controlling shareholders use 
all the proportions and the number of shares they hold to dominate all of the company's 
affairs.1051 Therefore, the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) in 2006 and listing 
rules (LRs) were enacted in 2006 to mitigate those existing shortcomings of the SCL.  
 
The CGRs clearly stipulate that shareholders should be empowered to exercise their rights, 
especially: their right to a share of the corporation's assets upon liquidation; a share in the 
distribution of net profits; the right to attend the general meeting and vote on fundamental 
issues; the right to oversee the board's activities; the right to file claims against violations of 
board members and the right to obtain sufficient information.1052 In accordance with the UK 
Company Act of 2006, a shareholder should obtain a set of rights in the firm and these rights 
may be different depending on the type of shares held.1053 
 
As per the UK Company Act of 2006, shareholders’ rights in any company should be laid 
down the provisions of the Company Act of 2006, the Articles of association and any 
shareholder’s agreement. The major rights related to shares are diverse, but the right to attend 
general meetings and vote is substantial in the UK Company Act.1054 Therefore, shareholders, 
who own at least 10% of the paid-up capital of the company, have the right to require the 
director to convene a general meeting.1055 Specifically, the Act provides that ‘every public 
company must hold a general meeting as its annual general meeting in each period of 6 
months beginning with the day following its accounting reference date (in addition to any 
                                                 
1049The ordinary general meeting should be convened to discuss all matters related to appoint and re-appoint board members, to approve the 
company’s net profits and dividends and the date of their circulation, and to agree on the board’s annual report, and to agree whether to an 
increase or a decrease in the company’s capital. On the other hand, the extraordinary general meeting hold in order to argue the urgently 
matters, chiefly if the company has lost half of its capital or faces potential liquidation and bankruptcy. It can be also held to change the 
company’s articles of association, modify the company’s main purpose, transfer its headquarters to another country or change the 
company’s nationality. 
1050Art (61) Saudi CL. 
1051M. Al Jaber, The Saudi Commercial Law" (King Fahad National Library, Riyadh, 2007) 202 [Arabic edition]. For more information see 
Articles (84&85) Saudi Company Law 1965. 
1052Art (3) Saudi CGRs. 
1053Johnathan Korchak, ‘what rights do shareholders have?’, (2014), Online Company Records Management. It is available at: 
www.informdirect.co.uk/shares-shareholders-rights-guide.  
1054Part 22-Sec 803 (2) UK Company Act 2006. 
1055Ibid Sec (803). 
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other meetings held during that period)’.1056 In addition, Article E-2 of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code of 2012 stated that ‘the board should use the AGM to communicate with 
investors and also to encourage their participation’.1057  
 
Similarly, the Saudi CGRs stipulate that a general meeting should be held once a year at least 
within the six months of the end of the company’s fiscal year.1058 The board of directors 
should be called for at a general meeting following a request of either the auditor or a number 
of shareholders, whose shares represent at least 5% percent of the company's shares 
capital.1059 Despite the considrable similarity between the UK and Saudi systems, especially 
in terms of the right of shareholders to attend and vote at the annual general meeting (AGM). 
Yet, it should be noted that the CGRs in Saudi Arabia are in compliance with global 
standards of corporate governance more than the provisions of the UK Company Act of 2006, 
as it requested shareholders to hold at least 10% percent of paid-up capital of the company 
before they can request the director to convene at ordinary or extraordinary meetings. 
 
In fact, the required percentage (which is 5% of the equity share capital) under the Saudi 
CGRs to convene at ordinary and extraordinary meetings, is considerably recognized in many 
advanced legal systems over the world. Specifically, the European Union requests all member 
countries to reduce the percentage of requesting for extraordinary meeting to 5%. Following 
this recommendation, the UK Company Act of 2006 has changed the percentage of paid-up 
capital from 10% to 5%,1060 although the CGRs are in line with international practices of 
corporate governance, particularly in terms of the percentage of the extraordinary meeting. 
Nonetheless, Article 5b) of the CGRs conflicts with the provisions of the CL, since the latter 
has given the shareholders, who own at least 20 shares, to attend and participate in the 
general assembly.1061 In this regard therefore, it should be noted that the provisions of the CL 
may provide good protection of minority shareholders against the abuse of company 
management and its board of directors. On the other hand, there is no determined clause 
under the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance concerning 5%, as a condition for the 
shareholders to exercise their rights in the general meetings. 
 
                                                 
1056Ibid Chapter 4-Sec (336-1).  
1057Section E-2 of UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012. 
1058Art (5-a) Saudi CL. 
1059Ibid Art (5-a). 
1060Section 303(2-a) UK Companies Act 2006, s. 303 (2-A) has been modified by the EU Directive in 2009. For more insight see European 
Community Directive on Shareholders’ Rights, URN 08-1362. 
1061Art (83) Saudi CL. 
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Hence, this percentage may hinder the rights of shareholders to engage in general meetings 
and raise their opinions. In addition, this percentage may oppose the effective application of 
sound corporate governance in the Saudi securities market. As a result, it is wise that the 
CMA amend this clause to enhance the opportunity of minority shareholders to efficiently 
participate at AGM. Theoretically, the Saudi regulator has exerted huge efforts in enhancing 
shareholders' rights through attendance and participation in general meetings. In practice 
however, there is a cultural dilemma related to the attendance at the general meeting as the 
Saudi company's directors believe that the general meeting is just mere formality organ and 
that the attendance is not important. In turn, the culture of political and popular participation 
in Saudi Arabia is rather modest and the Saudi people are not familiar with participation in 
public encounters.1062  
 
5.3.5.2 The Right to Participate in Proposing an Agenda 
The main difficulties encountered by shareholders in most listed corporations is that the 
company's management always propose issues that would be discussed in general meetings 
and shareholders are only allowed to vote on matters presented by the management. This 
problem emerged clearly, as previously mentioned through the study of Berle and Means, 
which argued that the influence of shareholders on the board's decisions was poor. As a 
result, some countries proposed some laws as support that would enable shareholders to 
control the management and participate in the company's decisions-making.1063 
Specifically, the US Exchange Act gives the shareholders, who own equities with the value of 
at least $2000 or at least hold 1% of the shares, the right to file proposals. This right must be 
exercised at least once a year and the equities must be held by shareholders at the date of the 
general meeting.1064 Contrarily, in the UK governance rules, there is no text that provides 
shareholders with the right to discuss the company's agenda. However, in general, 
shareholders must enjoy all rights to exercise their legal rights efficiently. In accordance with 
PIRC Shareholders Voting Guidelines, shareholders should be notified of substantial 
decisions and allowed to vote and participate in all substantive matters. Moreover, the notice 
                                                 
1062Fahad M, Almajid, (2011), “A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: a 
Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective”, PhD Thesis, School of Law, University of Manchester. 
1063D. E. Lazaroff., ‘Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform Proxy Rules on Shareholders 
Proposals’ (1998) Rutgers Law Review, vol 50, pp 33-36. 
1064Art 14 (a-8) U.S Securities Exchange Ac 1934.  
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of the general meeting must be submitted to the company at least 20 working days prior to 
the meeting.1065 
 
The Cadbury Report recommended that shareholders should be given the opportunity to 
express their views on such matters in the annual general meeting.1066 The report further 
suggested that shareholders can play a significant practical governance role by influencing 
on-board resolutions, through making the details of board resolutions subject to their vote.1067 
All new long-term incentive schemes of the company should be approved by shareholders. 
To motivate shareholders to participate effectively in the general meeting agenda, the 
Combined Code stipulated that the company board should use the general meeting to connect 
with shareholders and stimulate their participation.1068 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the right of participation in proposing the agenda in the general meeting is 
restricted only to shareholders who hold 5% of shares capital of the company. The CGRs 
have stated frankly that: 
 
In preparing the general assembly’s agenda, the board of directors shall take 
into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed in that agenda; 
shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares are entitled to 
add one or more items to the agenda upon its preparation.1069 
 
As a result, this percentage constitutes a significant factor that can have a negative effect on 
the protection of minority shareholders' rights. In fact, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance have not mentioned the 5% criteria in its document. Consequently, this 
percentage is indeed, inconsistent with the sound practice of good corporate governance and 
should be disregarded by the Capital Market Authority Board. In addition, these two 
jurisdictions (the UK and Saudi Arabia) have included similar conditions regarding proposed 
agendas in the general meetings and this point still needs to be developed and improved in 
these systems.  
                                                 
1065Pensions Investment Research Consultants Limited (PIRC), Shareholder Voting Guidelines issued in 1994 and revised in March 2001. 
1066Cadbury Report, ‘The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, United Kingdom Shareholders Association’ (1992) in H. J. Gregory, 
Comparative Matrix of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Member States" (Weil, Gotshal&Manges 
LLP, 2001) 359. 
1067ibid. 
1068The Combined Code (2000), "The Combined Code Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice", Derived by the 
Committee on Corporate Governance from the Committee’s Final Report and from the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. 
1069Art (5-f) Saudi CGRs. 
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5.3.5.3 The Right to Vote in the Case of Absence 
It should be noted that there are some legal systems around the world which allow the 
management or controlling shareholders to reduce the influence of minority shareholders on 
the company by banning proxy voting and requiring personal attendance at general meetings 
to vote, including attaching vote fees.1070 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
affirmed that ‘... shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect 
should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia’.1071 
 
In order to ensure the voting rights for all shareholders, the law should include a bundle of 
tools that can reinforce participation of shareholders in general meetings even when they are 
far away or unable to attend. In fact, most international legal systems have changed their 
financial legislations to be compatible with the global standards of corporate governance. The 
Saudi Company Law gave shareholders all the statutory rights to attend the general meetings 
or give proxy to other stockholders, except for directors to attend the general meetings on 
their behalf.1072 The CGRs endorsed this clause with a slight difference, as they stipulated 
that ‘a shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is not a board member 
and who is not an employee of the company to attend the general assembly on his behalf’.1073 
 
Although the CGRs have recognized that voting is a substantial right of a shareholder, it 
should not, in any way, be denied. As such, corporations are obliged to avoid taking any 
action which might prevent shareholders exercising their voting right.1074 However, the main 
problem is that these provisions have not explained or shown the form of a proxy, particularly 
in the case of absentee shareholders. In addition, these regulations have not mentioned the use 
of any distance communications or new technology tools in voting processes. This is in sharp 
contrast with the UK Company Act, which gives shareholders an absolute right to appoint 
another person as a proxy to attend, speak and vote at a general meeting on his behalf.1075 
Furthermore, it also allows the shareholders to send all documents relating to the general 
meeting by using electronic forms, as well as giving the shareholders the right to use 
                                                 
1070S. Nestor and F. Jesover, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholders rights and Equitable Treatment: Their Relevance 
to the Russian Federation (2000) 5. 
1071OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004, Principle No,  (II-a-4).  
1072Art (83) Saudi CL. 
1073Art (6-c) Saudi CGRs. 
1074ibid. 
1075Sec 324 (1) UK Company Act 2006. 
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electronic tools to send documents relating to the appointment of a proxy in meetings, 
without the need to attendance.1076 
 
The use of electronic communication between corporate management and shareholders has 
been endorsed by many judicial systems in the developed nations. For instance, the U.S 
Security Act and Delawar Corporate Act have promoted electronic corporate-shareholders 
communication.1077 The SEC recognized the importance of electronic tools in the relationship 
between the company and its shareholders.1078 In Germany, the Stock Corporation Act gave 
the company and shareholders the right to use e-mail for meeting declaration.1079 Under the 
UK system, the Department of Trade and Industry issued a Statutory Instrument Order to 
encourage the use of electronic communication between the company and shareholders. 
Thus, companies can provide information to their shareholders via e-mail and other modern 
technical means.1080   
 
Proxy voting remains an important issue in protecting minority shareholders' rights. The 
advantage of this idea is to vote without attending the general meeting and increasing savings 
in terms of time, effort and money.1081 Therefore, preventing minority shareholders from 
casting their votes by using proxy or technological means may weaken the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights in the Saudi securities market. Consequently, the 
recommendation here is that using proxy voting and technology tools, including electronic 
voting, will definitely lead to wider shareholder participation and strengthen their position in 
the market, as well as mitigating conflict of interests between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders. 
 




Participating in any decision concerning making amendments to the company’s structure, is 
extremely important for minority shareholders and is considered an essential aspect of good 
                                                 
1076Ibid Sec (333). 
1077Bayo Atte, ‘Enhancing shareholders participation in company meetings in Nigeria through application of information technology’, 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol 20, issue 9, p.64. 
1078SEC Guidance on Use of Electronic Media. Release Nos. 33-7856, 34-42728, IC-24426; File No. S7-11-00.  It is available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-42728.htm.  
1079OECD, ‘General Meetings in Listed Companies-New Challenges and Opportunites 2000’.  
1080The Draft of the Companies Act 1995 ‘Electronic Counication’ Order 2000. It is available at: www.ligeslation.hmso.gov.uk.  
1081U. C. Braendle, ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany - “Law and Finance” Revisited’ (2006) German Law Journal, vol 7, no 
3, p 267. 
 209 
 
corporate governance. The OECD Principles have spelt out what fundamental corporate 
changes represent, as they state that: 
 
Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) 
amendments to the statutes, or Articles of incorporation or similar governing 
documents of the company; 2) the authorisation of additional shares; and 3) 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all 
assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company.1082 
 
In effect, the rights of minority shareholders to be involved in modifying the corporate 
charter, or any essential developments in the company’s position, are weak in most markets 
as the minority shareholders are usually oppressed by the controlling shareholders, especially 
when those amendments are being deliberated upon. The problem often occurs when the new 
controlling shareholders and management release new policies and strategies that contradict 
the existing ones significantly. These changes may have a negative impact on the minority 
shareholders' rights and interests. For example, these changes may push minority 
shareholders to sell their equities in the company but at an unfavourable price because the 
new management and strategy may lead to a decline in share prices. Furthermore, a pre-
emptive right, as referred to above, is considered one of the most significant elements that 
may assist the minority shareholders in preserving their rights during amendments in 
company structure or position.  
 
However, in many countries, pre-emptive rights are not well recognised or applicable due to 
the powerful influence of controlling shareholders. One good example is the case of the 
YUKOS Oil Company in Russia, where the right of minority shareholders to participate in 
increasing the company capital was disregarded by controlling shareholders.1083 In addition, 
some corporations issue shares without the general meeting's approval and some of them fail 
to notify shareholders to exercise their pre-emptive rights, and they are not subjected to any 
sanctions of the law in case of failure to notify. The general principle is that shareholders' 
authorisation is required in any fundamental corporate changes. According to the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, the corporate governance framework in any country 
                                                 
1082OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. Principle No, (II-b).    
1083S. Nestor and F. Jesover, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholders rights and Equitable Treatment: Their Relevance 
to the Russian Federation” (2000) 4.  
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should give either exclusive power to the shareholders’ meetings or require the board to 
obtain shareholders’ authorisation in the case of extraordinary changes on the status of the 
company.1084 
 
In fact, there are various ways used by management or controlling shareholders to mitigate 
the power of minority shareholders into the company. Therefore, the issuance of additional 
shares may be considered the best way in the hands of controlling shareholders and 
management, to reduce the power of minority shareholders. Simplistically, the majority 
shareholders may find themselves unable to make a decision to amend the company system 
or merge the company into another company because of the power of minority shareholders 
and their influence on decision-making. As a result, management or controlling shareholders 
think that the best way to force the minority shareholders to accept their decisions is to 
increase the capital of the company. In fact, this action entitles them to execute their 
decisions, concerning changing the status of the company, without consulting the minority 
shareholders. The increase of the capital of the company usually results in a decrease in the 
real value of the original shares, which makes the value of the new shares unlawful. The case 
of Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd in 1976 was one of the most significant, famous legal cases 
in this regard.  
 
The plaintiff (A) held 45% of the shares capital of the company. The remaining shares (about 
55%) were held by the defendant (B) who was director in the company board. She suggested 
that increasing the capital of the firm, by establishing additional equities, should be allocated 
to the directors. The impact of this new arrangement was not proportional on existing 
shareholding, and this saw minority shareholding plummeted from 45% to 25%, thus 
enabling the majority shareholder (B) to pass a special resolution at an extraordinary meeting 
to approve it. (A) Brought legal action against the corporation and against (B), she claimed 
that this decision was oppressive and aimed to put her aside. This scheme was aimed to put 
the defendant and her fellow directors in complete control of the company. The court held 
that the issuance of new shares was unnecessary and thus, revered the resolution. During the 
ruling, the presiding judge, Judge Foster J said that: 
 
                                                 
1084OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. Principle No, (II-b-3). 
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...this was so but, regretfully, he refused himself to produce a principle because 
“the circumstances of each case are in-finitely varied”. He also said that legal 
rights are “subject.... to equitable considerations which may make it unjust.... 
to exercise them in a particular way... such considerations were present in this 
case and were sufficient to enable “a court of equity” to prevent the defendant 
from using her right in the way that she had.1085 
 
As a result of this ruling, the defendant (B) was unable to use majority votes to participate in 
decision-making. It should be noted that the increase of the company’s capital is considered 
as a legal right for a general assembly as it has jurisdiction through its extraordinary meeting 
to enhance the company’s capital. In effect, the CL stipulated that ‘the extraordinary general 
assembly may decide to increase the company's capital once or several times, provided that 
the original capital is paid in full’.1086 
 
Although the CL has made the above provision in relation to increase in company’s capital, it 
has failed to stipulate sanctions or penalties against anyone who violates this provision. The 
Saudi listing rules have asserted that the issuer must not issue new shares of the same class as 
the shares that are listed for a period of not less than six months, following the date of 
admission of the shares to the official list. Also, the rule asserts that the issuer must notify the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) about further securities and must not issue further securities 
unless an approval is obtained from the CMA.1087 
 
In fact, the UK Company Act of 2006 has addressed this issue better than the Saudi legal 
system. The UK Act prevents directors from issuing new shares to anyone unless they are 
given the approval to do so either by the company's Articles of association or by the 
shareholders.1088 Also, a company is obliged to offer new stocks first to its existing 
shareholders in the same proportions they previously held.1089 As a result, this clause protects 
shareholders' rights from dilution. 
                                                 
1085N. Hawke, ‘Recent Developments’ (1977) The Law Teacher, vol 10, no 3, p 158.  
1086Art (134) Saudi CL. 
1087Art (37-a-b) Saudi LRs. 
1088Sec 549 UK Company Act 2006. 
1089ibid sec 561. 
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5.3.5.5 The Right to Elect and Dismiss Board of Directors 
The board of directors is charged with running the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and 
making decisions about the efficient running of the company’s business, as permitted by the 
law. As it is well known, shareholders have no power to reject the board’s decisions. 
Therefore, appointing and rejecting board members are genuine rights given to minority 
shareholders in order to protect their interests against the abuse of controlling shareholders 
and directors. Given the importance of minority shareholders participating in electing and 
rejecting the board’s members, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance have stated  
this right explicitly by saying ‘… that effective shareholder participation in key corporate 
governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, should be 
facilitated’.1090 
The participation of shareholders in nominating and dismissing the board of directors 
contributes largely in making the board of directors more accountable to the shareholders.1091 
In order to make the election process more effective, shareholders should be encouraged to 
participate in the nomination of board members and vote on individual nominees or on 
various lists of candidates.  
 
As a result, laws and regulations should create several mechanisms that ensure full 
participation of minority shareholders in electing and dismissing board members. As is 
known, the power of controlling shareholders allows them to elect and dismiss the board of 
directors. Minority shareholders should also be given the chance to participate in the election 
process. Consequently, cumulative voting (as previously mentioned) is the best way that 
facilitates minority shareholders to cast all their votes in the election process smoothly. They 
can cast all their vots for an individual nominee or distribute their vots among various 
nominees in the election process.1092 The justification of using cumulative voting is to ensure 
that minority shareholders would participate through certain representatives on the board of 
directors. Previous studies suggested that under non-cumulative voting, controlling 
shareholders could control and domainate the process of electing the board members.1093   
                                                 
1090OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. Principle No (II-c-3). 
1091Davies, P., The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers, Company Law Reform in OECD Countries: A 
Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (Stockholm, Sweden 2000) 7.   
1092Theodor, Baums and Johann, Wolfgang, ‘General Meeting in Listed Companies-New Challenges and Opporetunities’ (2000) Stockholm-




However, it should be noted that cumulative voting is not common practice across the world. 
It is present in some countries and absent in others. The use of cumulative voting is still 
optional in most countries instead of mandatory.1094  
 
In certain countries, the mechanism of cumulative voting is biding for all listed corporations, 
for instance, in some U.S States, such as California, Arizona and Nebraska listed companies 
must adher by cumulative voting, but in other States cumulative voting is still permissible 
and defulte rule.1095  On the other hand, shareholders in some countries cannot use cumulative 
voting to elect the boards of management. For instance, some evidence in the German system 
indicates that cumulative voting is unknown in the German Company Code.1096 In addition to 
that cumulative voting in UK legal system may be still allowable, yet it seems not to be in 
use.1097 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the CGRs asserted the right of shareholders to participate in the election of 
the board of directors as it provides that ‘...voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a 
shareholder, which shall not, in any way, be denied’.1098 With respect to cumulative voting, 
the CGRs have recognized the principle of cumulative voting as an original principle, which 
can support and give the minority shareholders the opportunities to elect their representatives 
on the companies’ boards. It provides that ‘in voting in the general assembly for the 
nomination to the board members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied".1099 
 
However, it should be noted that despite this, the Saudi laws and regulations have affirmed 
the rights of shareholders, especially in relation to their involvement in the electoral process 
and there are certain obstacles that may hinder shareholders from exercising their rights 
lawfully. Firstly, the application of cumulative voting under the Saudi regulations is still 
optional rather than obligatory. Thus, as previous research suggests, this mechanism is not a 
compulsory tool, particularly in publicly-listed companies.1100 Secondly, concentrated 
ownership in the hands of controlling shareholders, especially in family-listed corporations, 
                                                 
1094J. Gordon, What is Relational Investing and How Cumulative Voting Can Play a Role (Working Paper No.97, Centre for Law and 
Economic Studies, School of Law, University of Columbia, 1993).  
1095Sec (301,708-a-b) of Colifornia Corporations Code of 2004. Sec (10-728) of Arizona State Legislature of 2004. Art (12), Sec (1 and 12) 
of Nebraska State Constitiution of 2006. 
1096R. Kraakman et al., Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2004) 55. 
1097Theodor, Baums and Johann, Wolfgang, ‘General Meeting in Listed Companies-New Challenges and Opporetunities’ (2000) Stockholm-
Sweden, p 12.   
1098Art (6/a) Saudi CGRs. 
1099Ibid Art (6-b). 
1100A. R. Pinto and D. M. Branson, Understanding corporate law (LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2004) 165. 
 214 
 
may be one of the key reasons that prevent minority shareholders from participating 
effectively in the election of the boards of directors. As previously mentioned, in Saudi 
Arabia, most boards of family-listed companies are controlled and dominated by the same 
family members. Hence, the right to appoint and dismiss directors is subject to their decisions 
and discretions. A good example is the Al Khodari Company, which is a family-owned 
company (with about 60% share ownership) with its chairman and other board members (2/6) 
belonging to the same family.1101 
 
To further improve the directors’ election process and participation of shareholders in this 
election, the OECD Principle has also recommended full disclosure of experiences and 
qualifications of the candidates for the board during the election process in order to give the 
shareholders the opportunity to assess the abilities and suitability of each nominee.1102 
Moreover, many countries have established nomination committees to ensure proper 
compliance with nomination procedures and to facilitate the search for qualified candidates. 
In addition, the removal of the board members represents a fundamental element in the 
course of sound corporate governance. Therefore, both the Saudi CGRs and the UK 
Company Act have asserted the right of the general assembly to remove all or any of the 
members of the board, even though the Articles of association provide otherwise.1103 
Therefore, shareholders participation in the directors’ dismissal process is a genuine right, 
which the CL explicitly stipulates ‘…but the regular general meeting may, at any time, 
remove all or some of the directors even if the company’s bylaws provide otherwise’.1104 
5.3.5.6 The Right to Access Information on a Timely and Regular Basis 
Financial crises that have hit the global economy and the collapses of many giant 
corporations around the world have been attributed to weaknesses and ambiguities of 
transparency and disclosure. Indeed, the significance of access to company information 
related to its transactions and financial situation have been acknowledged in the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which state ‘the corporate governance framework 
should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding 
                                                 
1101Abdullah Al Khodari Company. Available at: http://www.alkhodari.com/organizational.html, accessed 8 October 2013.   
1102OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, pp 34. 
1103Art (12-f) Saudi CGRs 2006; Sec (168-1) UK Company Act 2006. 
1104Art (66) Saudi CL. 
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the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of 
the company’.1105 
It observes that a disclosure system that encourages transparency is becoming an integral 
element of shareholders’ rights to enable them to exercise their legal rights on an informed 
basis.1106 Evidence reveals that disclosure can be a powerful instrument for assessing the 
performance of companies and protecting minority shareholders.1107 Disclosure assists 
investors to judge the company which they intend to invest their funds in and empowers them 
to measure the extent of the company’s integrity and eligibility. This principle is considered 
as the spirit of the stock market and a basic hallmark of its continuation and thrives.1108  
 
In order to guarantee easy access to company information and to reinforce the principles of 
disclosure in listed corporations, adequate regulations are needed to ensure that companies 
make the financial information accessible and publicly disclose all the material transactions 
or dealings affecting the shareholders (including the value of their outstanding shares), on a 
timely basis. Consequently, the issuer is required to present a financial statement disclosing 
the: annual financial statement, interim financial statement, audited statement and electronic 
distribution and related party transactions, on a timely basis.1109 
 
It should be noted that the Saudi Arabian regulations have indeed, affirmed transparency and 
disclosure as fundamental principles in its stock market. Therefore, the CGRs and the CML 
confirm that all the joint-stock companies must comply with the policies, procedures and 
supervisory rules related to disclosure.1110 The LRs have explained the procedures required to 
attain sufficient information before traders in the Saudi stock market. In this regard, the 
CGRs affirm that shareholders should be clearly informed about the location, date and agenda 
of the general meeting. Shareholders should be invited to the meeting by publishing the 
invitation on the company’s website, two local newspapers and with using the new technical 
tools to communicate with shareholders.1111 Furthermore, shareholders should be notified by 
the rules governing the meeting and the voting procedures, they must be empowered to raise 
                                                 
1105OECD Principles of Corprate Governance of 2004, Principle No (v).  
1106Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders in Listed 
Issuers’, (2009), p 15. 
1107ibid. 
1108OECD Principle of Corporate Governance of 2004, Principle No (v). 
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Issuers (2009) 16. 
1110Art (40-48) Saudi CML;  Art (8-9) Saudi CGRs. 
1111Art (5-c) Saudi CGRs. 
 216 
 
any questions to the board or to the external editor and their questions should be 
answered.1112 Although this article gave shareholders the right to rise any question in general 
meeting. However, it dose not give them the right to place an agenda as previously mentioned 
in section of 5.3.5.2. 
5.3.6 Property Rights of Minority Shareholders 
It is logical to say that shareholders invest their funds in companies because they need to 
increase their returns and profits. Property rights are not less important than the management 
rights in the course of protecting minority shareholders. This section focuses on discussing 
dividend rights and preserving shareholders’ ownership as essential elements of corporate 
governance mechanisms in both the UK and the Saudi Arabian system. 
5.3.6.1 Dividend Rights 
The main objective of investing in securities markets is to maximize the value of the shares 
and increase revenue in the form of dividends. Dividend policy was a crucial factor that led to 
the agency theory problem or the so-called conflict of interests between owners and 
managers. Thus, placing a good policy to distribute revenues and dividends fairly is deemed a 
fundamental element in effective application of corporate governance. Generally, corporate 
dividend policy always depends on the discretion of the company’s board of directors, unless 
the Articles of association state otherwise.1113 According to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, the right of shareholders to share in the profits of the company is a 
basic shareholder’s right.1114 Some countries, such as the UK, believe that shareholders 
should not decide on profit distribution policy1115 and that this is the duty of the board of 
directors. As a result, in the UK, shareholders solely have the right to agree on the proposals 
of the board. Shareholders can participate to reduce the dividends proposed but they cannot 
increase it or insist on a distribution if the company management decides to retain profits for 
investments.1116 Under the UK system, there is no commitment on the directors to announce 
dividends even if the company is profitable.1117 
                                                 
1112Ibid art (5-d-e-g). 
1113Sec (170-a) U.S Delaware General Corporation Law.   
1114OECD Principle of Corporate Governance of 2004. 
1115O. Fremond and M. Capaul, The State of Corporate Governance: Experience from Country Assessments (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2858, 2002) 28. 
1116ibid. 
1117Johnathan Korchak, ‘what rights do shareholders have?’, (2014), Online Company Records Management. It is available at: 
www.informdirect.co.uk/shares-shareholders-rights-guide.   
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In fact, the right of dividends is an economic right and should be subjected exclusively to the 
resolution of the company’s management. By contrast, the above situation is different in 
other countries. For instance, in some European countries such as Germany and France, the 
shareholders' general meeting is to declare a dividend distribution and impose it on the board 
of directors, based on the company's annual financial report.1118 This declaration should 
include the amount of dividend distribution to shareholders, the amount of profit reserves and 
any amount of profits that would be carried forward.1119 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the CGRs have clearly stated that shareholders should be accorded all the 
rights attached to the share, including their right to a share of the distributable profits or 
dividends.1120 Under the Saudi law, both the board of directors and the general assembly are 
allowed to distribute dividends.1121 The board of directors is responsible for setting out a clear 
policy concerning the distribution of dividends, in a way that will promote the interests of the 
shareholders and the firm. The shareholders should be informed regarding the dividends 
policy at the general meeting.1122 Thereafter, the general assembly should approve the 
dividends and the specified date of distribution. The dividends are considered a genuine right 
to shareholders listed in the depositary centre and thus must be divided among the 
shareholders, whether in cash or bonus shares.1123 
The above discussion concerns protecting shareholders' rights concerning the right for 
dividends and it has shown that the law has addressed this issue in different ways. However, 
the treatment of the right of minority shareholders in this regard is still vague. As is well-
known, minority shareholders are not able to control the board of directors or the general 
meeting and the controlling shareholders or majority shareholders will pass decisions that 
serve and benefit their own interests. As a result, it has been argued that the Saudi CGRs 
would do better for minority shareholders if they regulated and placed a clear way for the 
distribution of dividends to the shareholders.1124 
                                                 
1118Sec 119(2) German Stock Corporation Act of 2009. 
1119ibid sec 175(2). 
1120Art (3) Saudi CGRs. 
1121Ibid art (7-a-b). 
1122ibid.  
1123ibid. 
1124S. Yahya, The Summary of the Saudi Arabian Commercial System (Arabic edition, The Bureau of Modern Arab, Alexandria, 2004) 255. 
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5.3.6.2 The Right to Safeguard Shareholdings’ Ownership Registration 
Among the problems facing minority shareholders, is ownership registration in joint-stock 
companies. Thus, in many cases, shareholders have found that either their shares had not 
been registered or they noticed that the numbers of shares issued by the company exceeded 
the total shares registered in shareholders’ records, due to defects in the system that may have 
led to double booking by brokers.1125 According to the OECD Principles, listed companies 
that operate in stock markets should register the records of shareholders either by themselves 
or through agents (custodies and intermediaries), and therefore all listed companies and their 
agents are responsible to register such shares in the shareholders’ records.  
Property rights protection starts with assuring all shareholders that their equities are 
registered in the company’s book. According to this principle, security laws should spell out 
the listing rules, whereas the company law should require all joint-stock corporations to 
maintain a register of their shareholders. In fact, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance have emphasized the importance of shares registration because there have been 
many cases of illegal changing of share registration, from common to preferred, so as to 
prohibit shareholders exercising their voting rights.1126 
 
Given the importance of this principle, the Saudi Capital Authority (CMA) has affirmed this 
standard within its regulations in order to reinforce confidence in the stock market, and the 
Saudi economy in general. The CML allows for the creation of the Securities Depository 
Centre to carry out the transactions of deposits, transfers, settlements and clearing and 
registering of the ownership of securities traded on the stock exchange.1127 Furthermore, the 
Saudi regulator has issued the listing rules which are responsible for setting out the rules of 
share ownership registration. 
5.3.7 Judicial Rights and Civil Litigation under the Saudi Legal System 
Enabling minority shareholders to file lawsuits against directors’ misconduct is not only 
useful to the company itself but also helps to improve the application of corporate governance 
by preventing potential violations. From the outset, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance have clearly stated that ‘minority shareholders should be protected from abusive 
                                                 
1125OECD Principles, Methodology for Assessing the Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2007) p 36. 
1126S. Nestor and F. Jesover, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholders rights and Equitable Treatment: Their Relevance 
to the Russian Federation (2000) 4. 
1127Art (26-27) Saudi CML. 
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actions by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, 
and should have effective means of redress’.1128 
Giving minority shareholders the opportunity to litigate the board of directors is seen as a 
substantial remedy and one of the most significant rights of shareholders. Nonetheless, the 
efficiency and merit of prosecuting tools have been questioned. Romano affirmed that 
shareholders’ lawsuits in listed corporations occur frequently but these litigations are always 
resolved by agreement with no monetary compensations.1129 As previously indicated, the 
derivative action lawsuit is prevalent in the UK legal system. To empower shareholders to 
claim and protect their rights, this tool gives shareholders the right to challenge the board 
members before the courts ‘expropriation in the courts’.1130 A derivative lawsuit is usually 
brought by a group of shareholders on behalf of the company, to hold the company board 
liable for their wrongdoings. Derivative action incurs high costs and may take a long time and 
effort. Besides, there is no proof that derivative action can prevent the violations of the board 
members.1131 Nevertheless, derivative action is considered a significant weapon used by the 
minority shareholders to exercise their judicial right against abuse of board members and 
controlling shareholders.  
In fact, derivative action lawsuits are not commonly recognized under the litigation system in 
Saudi Arabia in general, and in the securities market particular. However, the Company Law 
(CL) and the Capital Market Law (CML) have included certain provisions which are quite 
similar to the provisions of derivative action under the UK legal system. Under the provisions 
of civil liability, the Saudi laws grant the aggrieved shareholder the right to bring legal action 
against offending directors whose actions have damage his interests. The right of 
shareholders to litigate the board members has to pass two main stages.  
The first stage is associated with the SCL as it asserts that every shareholder shall have the 
right to bring an action in liability cases against the board members, on behalf of the 
company when their interests are harmed by directors' wrongful acts.1132 However, the main 
issue is that the right of shareholder to exercise his or her right in litigation of the board 
members, is restricted to specific circumstances, namely 1) shareholders cannot file such 
                                                 
1128OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders (2004) Principle  III-A-2.  
1129R. Romano, ‘The Shareholders Suit: Litigation without Foundation’ (1991) The Journal of Law, Economic and Organization, vol 7, no 1, 
pp 55-84. 
1130S. Djankov et al., ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (2008) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 88, p 430. 
1131R. Romano, "The Shareholders Suit: Litigation without Foundation", (1991) The Journal of Law, Economic and Organization, vol. 7, no. 
1, pp.55-84. 
1132Art (78) Saudi CL. 
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legal action unless the company’s right is still valid and after notifying the company by 
his/her intention to do so; 2) a violation of directors should damage shareholders’ interests 
precisely; 3) aggrieved shareholders are not allowed to bring claims against directors if the 
company intends to prosecute wrongs made by the directors.1133 In reality, analyzing Article 
78 of the SCL has shown that the fate of minority shareholders’ rights depends on the 
majority shareholders' decisions, who dominate the general assembly. The meaning of this 
Article suggests that the controlling shareholders legally act as judges in their own cases. The 
current Saudi Company Law, instead of providing legal assistance, directives, and guidance 
for protection of minority shareholders, has indeed, made things difficult for minority 
shareholders and supported the dominance of majority shareholders in the company’s affairs. 
It has been argued that this law has not identified appropriate remedies for minority 
shareholders when their rights have been damaged or expropriated due to mismanagement or 
abuse of majority shareholders.1134 
The second stage came into force following the enactment of the Capital Market Law in 
2003. In order to strengthen the position of shareholders and protect their rights in the Saudi 
securities market, the CML clearly established the Committees for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes as a private competent court, on the issues of the stock market.1135 
Importantly, the CML has given these committees the power to prevent the abuse of directors 
and controlling shareholders. As a result, when board members plead guilty, the CRSD has 
jurisdiction to impose a bundle of punishments against violators, including sanctions, 
imprisonment, expropriating property, issuing travel bans and suspending the board 
member(s) from dealings with the companies for a specific period of time.1136 Indeed, the 
Saudi regulator has enacted a bundle of proceedings that endeavour to ensure equitable 
remedy is provided on all shareholders’ issues. However, there are some obstacles that may 
contribute considerably to impeding minority shareholders to sue the board members. Among 
others, the SCL has given majority shareholders the right to relieve the members of boards 
from liability suits.1137 Legally, the general assembly has the right to terminate civil liability 
against the board members, with the exception of the case of fraud.1138 
                                                 
1133ibid. 
1134
 M. H. Almadani, The Reform of Minority Shareholder Protection in Saudi Arabia and Dubai in Private Companies (The University of 
Leeds, School of Law, 2011)  109. 
1135Art (25) Saudi CML. 
1136ibid art (59-a). 




Consequently, the SCL gives majority shareholders an absolute right to relieve the directors 
of their accountability. However, this rule is not justified and perhaps may contain some form 
of oppression and abuse against the protection of minority shareholders' rights. The reason is 
that the resolution of exemption of the directors may build upon the courtesy or the mutual 
interests of the controlling shareholders and the board of directors, especially in family-listed 
companies which are characterized by an overlap between ownership, management and the 
boards of directors. Furthermore, there is a disagreement between the provisions of the SCL 
and the CML concerning the period of time for hearing a complaint against the board 
members. For instance, the SCL states that any claim made against directors should not be 
heard after a lapse of three years, from the date of detection of the harmful act.1139 In contrast, 
the CML stipulates that: 
A suit under Articles 55, 56 and 57 of this Law shall not be heard if the complaint is 
filed with the authority after the lapse of one year from the date when the claimant 
should reasonably have been aware of facts causing him to believe he had been the 
victim of a violation, and in no case may such complaint be heard by the Committee 
after five years from the occurrence of the violation subject of the claim.1140 
The above clause affirmed that the CML has placed further obstacles before minority 
shareholders to litigate directors, as the period of time to hear the shareholders' complaint is 
limited to one year from the date of commission of the act. Therefore, this period is shorter 
than that provided under the SCL. 
In addition, one of the most significant differences between the CML and the SCL is that the 
latter stated that the company’s shares should be deposited in one of the banks selected by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), within 30 days following the appointment of 
the board members. They should be placed aside until all pending lawsuits against the board 
member have been heard, or judgement reached on the matter.1141 Nonetheless, the problem 
is that this requirement is no longer included in the provisions made by the CML and the 
Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs). 
 
As far as the Saudi judicial system is concerned, there are controversies regarding which 
judicial authority has jurisdiction to handle disputes between minority shareholders and the 
                                                 
1139ibid. 
1140ibid art (58). 
1141Art (68) Saudi CL. 
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company executives or management. In fact, ambiguities and unclear judicial procedures 
have been identified as major problems facing minority shareholders in the Saudi stock 
market. The SCL and the CGRs made provisions for the rights of shareholders to file a claim 
against violators but did not specify which court has the jurisdiction to hear such claims.1142 
A good example is the case of the Mohammed Al-Mojil Group (MAG) in which the Saudi 
legal scholars and lawyers were not able to determine the competent court. Some of them 
argued that the Board of Grievances (BG) was the competent body to deal with the case, 
while others argued that the Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) was 
the appropriate body to adjudicate in that case.1143 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 5 analysed and compared share ownership structures, boards of directors and their 
duties, transparency and disclosure requirements and the basic rights of shareholders in the 
UK and the Saudi Arabian capital market. The analysis revealed that even though the internal 
structures of corporate governance are fundamentally distinct in these two jurisdictions, they 
share some similarities in some aspects. These similarities and differences have important 
implications for possible legal transplants, proposed in the next chapter. Specifically, Saudi 
Arabian corporate governance has partially been influenced by the common law model (the 
UK and the US experience), particularly in terms of the formation of boards of directors, the 
rights of shareholders and disclosure requirements. In terms of ownership structure, the 
analysis revealed differences across the two jurisdictions. Specifically, the ownership 
structure in the UK is assumed to be dispersed. In other words, the market is characterised by 
a diversification of shareholders and an enhancing role of the board of directors. Similarly, 
the gradual disappearance of controlling family ownership has seen a surge in institutional 
ownership, which has characterised the UK capital market to date. In Saudi Arabia on the 
other hand, ownership structure is assumed to be concentrated. Specifically, the Saudi market 
is working under the control and dominance of two types of investors, namely family and 
government-owned corporations. Importantly, this concentrated ownership has a grave 
impact on the Saudi capital market, especially as the wealthy families continue to boost their 
investment and dominate the decision-making processes of corporations, thus creating room 
for expropriation of the rights of the minority shareholders, who are prone to threat. 
                                                 
1142For more insight review Art (77&78) Company Law of 1965 and Art (3) Corporate Governance Regulations 2006. 
1143M. Garoub, Al-Mojil’s Shareholders have the Right to Sue the Company’s Board of Directors (Aleqtisadiah. No, 6930 on 01-10-2012). 
Available at: http://www.aleqt.com/2012/10/01/article_697652.html.  
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In terms of board composition, the analysis above showed that the two jurisdictions adopt 
similar board systems (of one-tier boards), otherwise known as unitary systems. This system 
is well-developed in the UK accompanied by effective legislations describing board 
appointments. However, in Saudi Arabia the composition of the board remains a serious issue 
in the country’s capital market. As the analysis revealed, the Saudi government and the Saudi 
wealthy families are basic shareholders in most listed corporations and most of the boards of 
some of these corporations are still dominated by members selected by the State or rich 
families. The influence of the State and rich families in Saudi Arabia cannot be taken for 
granted. In fact, many chairmen of listed corporations are appointed by the decisions of the 
State or rich families without following the due process, as set out in the legislations. The 
impact that this arrangement has on the protection of the rights of minority shareholders 
however, cannot be underestimated.   
 
Other areas of convergence between the two jurisdictions include duties of the boards (duty 
of care, loyalty and disclosure), board committees and the structure and types of boards. In 
terms of the duties of the chairman and the CEO, debate regarding whether the two should be 
combined or separated remains contentious in both jurisdiction. Although available 
legislations in both jurisdictions emphasize the need for the two to be separated, evidence 
suggests that the separation principle does not always work in practice and it has been 
violated on a number of occasions. Another important area examined in this chapter is the 
rights of minority shareholders. As can be seen from the analysis, several rights of minority 
shareholders’ protection are recognised in both jurisdictions, thus complying with the 
framework of good corporate governance suggested by the OECD. With the concentrated 
ownership model still prevalent in Saudi market, minority shareholders may not have the 
power to exercise their rights despite provisions of legislation to challenge violations of those 
rights.  
 
Taken together, it appears that the UK corporate governance system may serve as a good 
reference point to improve Saudi Arabian corporate governance. Importantly, given the sound 
legal systems in place to enforce the implementation of internal corporate governance 
structures, there is a possibility that the Saudi capital market will benefit from legal 





Chapter 6  
                                                       Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the present thesis was to explore the influence of corporate governance on the 
protection of rights of minority shareholders in UK and Saudi Arabian listed firms. A 
comparative law approach was used to analyse the differences and similarities in corporate 
governance and minority shareholders’ protection in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Both internal 
and external resources were also adopted to understand the mechanisms of minority 
shareholders’ protection in both jurisdictions. The results from the analysis revealed three key 
findings: (1) corporate governance practice in the two countries reflects some elements of 
universal standards but with slight variations (2) the concentrated pattern of ownership and 
the predominant influence of the State and family shareholdings in Saudi Arabia has a 
negative effect on the protection of the rights of minority shareholders (3) the Saudi security 
market has a legal system that is characterised by weak protection of the rights of minority 
shareholders. Each of these findings is discussed below, thus furthering our understanding of 
the influence of corporate governance on the protection of the rights of minority shareholders 
in Saudi Arabia and UK listed family firms. The implications of the findings, as well as the 
practical and academic contribution of the present thesis, are provided. The chapter is 
concluded highlighting the limitations of the study as well as suggestions for future research. 
6.2 Key Findings 
6.2.1 Evidence for Global Corporate Governance Standards in the UK and Saudi Arabia 
Chapter 5 explored the mechanisms of protecting minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi 
Arabia compared with the UK. The analysis revealed that the features of the internal structure 
of corporate governance in the two jurisdictions reflected some elements of compliance with 
the global universal standards of corporate governance. As stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is recognized as the global standard of ‘good 
corporate governance’, which provides that:  
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
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governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.1144 
As revealed in the above provisions, good corporate governance requires adequate provision 
of internal structures, which determine the means of attaining the objectives of the company 
and monitoring its performance. Examples of these internal structures include ownership 
structure, the board of directors, transparency/disclosure requirements and basic 
shareholders’ rights. The evidence provided in Chapter 5 shows that the two jurisdictions 
have well-defined ownership structures but with slight variations. For instance, the UK 
corporate governance system is characterised by a dispersed ownership structure (the 
separation between ownership and control). Specifically, share ownership in the UK is 
widely-held and dominated by institutional shareholders with limited significance of family 
ownership.1145 The widely-held firms provide shareholders with little choice in terms of 
control structure. Only 4% of firms in the FTSE 100 fall below the de fact control heading 
and 3% under legal control.1146 For example, Nenova found that private control benefits in 
the UK equal to only about 10.6% of market capitalisations of the firms concerned.1147 
Similarly, a survey by Dyck and Zingales revealed a substantially lower control premium of 
2%.1148  
According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, the exercise of ownership rights 
by all shareholders, including institutional investors should be facilitated.1149 In keeping with 
this principle, the UK Cadbury Report provides that ‘given the weight of their votes, the way 
institutional investors use their power is of fundamental importance’.1150 Similarly, the 
Greenbury Report of 1995 stated that ‘investor institutions should use their power and 
influence to ensure best practice as set out in the Code’. While, according to the 1998 Hampel 
Report ‘institutional investors have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes’.1151 
The Newbold Inquiry of 1999 recommended ‘regular considered voting should be regarded 
                                                 
1144OECD Principle of Corporate Governance 2004, p 11. 
1145T. Khan, Company Dividends and Ownership Structure: Evidence from UK Panel Data (Workshop at Nuffield College, Oxford, 2005) 
pp 1-8. 
1146J. Grant and T. Kirchmaier, Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe (CEP Discussion Paper No 631, The Centre for 
Economic Performance, 2004) 16. 
1147T. Nenova, ‘the value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis’ (2003) Journal of Financial Economics, vol 68, p 
341. 
1148A. Dyck and L. Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’ (2004) Journal of Finance, pp 537-601; J. Grant 
and T. Kirchmaier, Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe (CEP Discussion Paper No 631, The Centre for Economic 
Performance, 2004) p 28. 
1149OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2007, Principle No, (II-f).  
1150Cadbury Report of Corporate Governance (1992).  
1151Hampel Report on Corporate Governance (1998); Greenbury Recommendations of Corporate Governance (1995). 
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as a fiduciary responsibility’ by trustees of pension funds.1152 The evidence above suggests 
that the UK corporate governance system reflects global standard of corporate governance.  
In terms of board systems, the findings also revealed that the UK corporate governance 
system is characterised by a one-tier board system. Specifically, the UK Company Act of 
2006 recognised the importance of boards of directors to oversee the affairs of the 
corporation and went on to outline the obligations of directors as follows: 1) to act in 
accordance with the company's constitution (s.171); 2) to exercise independent judgment 
(s.173); 3) to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (s.174); 4) to avoid conflicts of 
interest (s.175); 5) to not accept benefits from third parties (s.176); 6) to declare interests in 
proposed transactions or arrangements (s.177). This again, demonstrates evidence of global 
standards of corporate governance. According to the OECD principles of corporate 
governance, the corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders.1153 The principle also provides that board 
members should act on a fully-informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care and 
in the best interests of the company and shareholders.1154 The UK Company Act of 2006 
stipulated that directors of the company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in 
the discharge of their duties, thus demonstrating compliance with the OECD principle. 
Furthermore, the principle states that in order to guarantee good practice, the objective of the 
board and its independence from management may be strengthened by the separation of the 
role of the chief executive and the chairman, or, if these roles are combined, by designating a 
lead non-executive director to convene or chair sessions of the outside directors. The 
Combined Code of 2006, as well as the Cadbury Report of 1992, also advocated the 
importance of the separation of the role of chairman and the CEO. In terms of protection of 
the rights of minority shareholders, there is evidence to suggest that the UK complies with the 
global standard of corporate governance. According to the OECD, a corporate governance 
framework should facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights, including the protection of 
minority shareholders. This provision is supported by the Company Act 2006 and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code of 2012. Other mechanisms of protection of minority 
shareholders (cumulative voting, derivative action and comply or explain) are also recognised 
by the UK security and capital market regulations. For instance, the ‘comply or explain’ 
                                                 
1152T. Khan, Company Dividends and Ownership Structure: Evidence from UK Panel Data (Workshop at Nuffield College, Oxford, 2005) 7. 




principle is the trademark of corporate governance in the UK, as emphasized in the Corporate 
Governance Code of 2012. The principle has been in operation since the Code’s beginning 
and is widely admired, imitated and strongly supported by companies and shareholders.  
The evidence above suggests that the UK corporate governance practice reflects global 
standard of good corporate governance, using the OECD principles as a criteria. In terms of 
Saudi Arabia, the analysis of the internal structures of corporate governance (ownership 
structure, boards of directors, transparency/disclosure requirements and basic shareholders 
rights) indicate evidence of a global standard of corporate governance.  
Specifically, the Saudi Company Law of 1965 stated that each company must be managed by 
a board of directors and it must not have less than three members.1155 The CL also gives the 
company’s a bylaw to specify the size of the board.1156 Similar to the UK system, the duties 
of the board are defined by the Saudi law. The Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) of 
2006 state that the board of directors must, in the conduct of their business, carry out its 
duties in a responsible manner, in good faith and with due diligence.1157 In Saudi Arabia, the 
board structure is quite similar to the single-board model operated in the UK system. The 
boardrooms of the Saudi listed corporations consist of both independent non-executive 
directors and executive directors. Specifically, the importance of separating the duties of non-
executive directors and executive directors are increasingly being recognised as a crucial 
factor in reforming listed corporations in many jurisdictions. The importance of this proposal 
is reflected in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which state that:  
 
Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-
making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the 
performance of the board and management. In addition, they can play an 
important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and its 
shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession 
planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisition 
and the audit function.1158 
 
                                                 
1155Art (66) Saudi CL. 
1156ibid. 
1157Art (11-c) Saudi CGRs. 
1158OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) 64. 
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In fact, both UK and Saudi legislations recognise the importance of the above principle. For 
instance, the UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2006 provides that:  
 
Non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop 
proposal on strategy. Non-executive directors should scrutinize the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and 
monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the 
integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible.1159 
 
Similarly, the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Regulations of 2006 also emphasized the 
need to appoint independent, non-executive members of the board who should enjoy 
complete independence. Indeed, it appears that the internal structures of corporate 
governance in both the UK and Saudi Arabia reflect the global standard of corporate 
governance. Although as Salacuse posited, the features of the internal structure of corporate 
governance differed from one country to another due to differences in legal structure, 
political status and cultural setting.1160 Specifically, these differences are reflected not just in 
terms of legal structure, political status and cultural settings but also in terms of enforcement 
and implementations of the internal corporate governance mechanisms. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 5, both jurisdictions differ greatly in terms of the strengths and 
weaknesses of corporate governance legislations. Importantly, analysing these differences 
provided some insights as to whether the Saudi listed corporations efficiently comply with 
the corporate governance regulations and also whether the current practice of the corporate 
governance in the Saudi stock market reflects appropriate protection of minority shareholders' 
rights. 
6.2.2 Evidence for the Influence of Ownership Structure on the Protection of the Rights 
of Minority Shareholders in Saudi Arabia 
As stated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is characterised by 
concentrated ownership. Specifically, unlike the UK securities market, the Saudi market is 
working under the control and dominance of two types of investors, namely family-owned 
corporations and government-owned corporations. The findings revealed that in Saudi 
                                                 
1159Para, A.1. U.K Combined Code 2006. 
1160J. Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) Company Lawyer, vol 25, pp 76-78. 
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Arabia, as in other civil law countries, the majority shareholders, who usually own a greater 
number of equities, exercise their power and influence upon the company's management and 
its board of directors. This situation often weakens the rights of minority shareholders, 
especially their right of involvement in the company's decision-making and the election of the 
board of directors. In fact, the dominance of ownership concentration in the Saudi market is 
attributed to a number of factors, which are mainly political and legal. Saudi Arabia as a 
country is characterized by absolute monarchy, and indeed the nature of the political system 
has a large impact on the life of its trade and economy.1161 
According to the political perspective, the less democratic a State is weaken minority 
shareholder protection and is the more likely it is to have concentrated patterns of 
ownership.1162 From the perspective of the political economic theory, Gourevitch and Shinn 
argued that investors’ confidence is a function of political transparency and firm-level 
transparency.1163 Indeed, it is not a surprise to see a high concentration of shares in the hands 
of a few powerful individuals particularly in the developing countries. These individuals, 
especially from small wealthy families, own large percentages of stocks, not just in one 
company, but in several listed corporations in the stock market. Such a tendency is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon in the Saudi stock market, characterised by a high ownership of 
shares by wealthy families, who thus control the market in ways that are detrimental to 
minority shareholders. Previous research has earlier shown that a concentrated ownership 
structure empowers the controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders’ 
rights.1164 The high concentration of ownership in Saudi Arabia is also explained from a legal 
point of view. According to the law matter theory, the legal origin of a country has a strong 
influence in shaping the ownership structure of companies, as well as the design of 
shareholder protection.1165 
 
Indeed, the Saudi legal system is considerably influenced by the civil law model, in particular 
the French legal system. Since the outset, most Saudi laws have been influenced by the 
principles of the civil law model more than the common law model, particularly in relation to 
                                                 
1161P. Gourevitch and J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: the New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton 
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commercial and administrative laws.1166 Therefore, if the assumptions of the law matter 
theory are true, then this would tentatively suggest that expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the family and state-owned shareholdings in Saudi Arabia is inevitable. 
However, the legal and political explanations of the divergence of shareholding structures 
amongst different corporate governance systems have been heavily criticised in the literature. 
For example, Coffee argued that neither explanation provides sufficient reasons for the 
different ownership arrangements of corporate governance systems.1167 He attributed 
differences in ownership structure between common and civil law countries to the ways in 
which their financial markets have developed over time, rather than to their legal heritage.1168 
 
This explanation is plausible when one looks critically at the situation in the Saudi stock 
market. Since its establishment in 1984, the market has been characterised as 
underdeveloped. However, following the introduction of the Electronic Securities 
Information System (ESIS) in 1990 by the SAMA, the market gradually began to flourish.1169 
Even though the introduction of ESIS was seen by many as a significant landmark in the 
history of the Saudi market, especially to facilitate the operations of the stock market by 
making it more attractive to potential investors, the market was greeted with a low 
turnout.1170 This in turn, suggests that other factors such as high trading costs for small 
investors were perhaps responsible for the low turnout.1171 Importantly, the role of banks 
during the transformation of the Saudi stock market deserved special mention. They were 
accused of favouring the big investors to the detriment of the minority investors. Specifically, 
as the sole stockbrokers, they tended to favour large investors by lowering the executive costs 
on their trading, which in turn allowed them to own large stakes in the companies they 
invested in.1172 
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The shareholder protection criteria suggested by La Porta et al has also been criticised. 
Specifically, Baums and Scott criticised the simplicity of the judgment (zero or one).1173 
Coffee also argued that: 
 
By no means is it here implied that these rights are unimportant, but only that 
they supply partial and sometimes easily outflanked safeguards, which have 
little to do with the protection of control and the entitlement to a control 
premium.1174 
 
 Cools also raised concern on the way La Porta et al overestimated the differences in 
shareholder protection, without due consideration to important aspects of company laws and 
their differences.1175 He further attributed differences in ownership structures to fundamental 
distinctions between common and civil law, in the allocation of power in corporations.1176 
Different legal systems provide different methods of shareholder protection, which are hardly 
recognized in the evaluation of La Porta et al’s theory.1177 Braendle also questioned whether 
seven criteria are sufficient enough to evaluate shareholder protection. He also emphasized 
the need to consider different board structures, while judging shareholder protection.1178 
Importantly, common law countries, otherwise known as the Anglo-Saxon countries, apply 
one-tier or unitary board systems, whereas civil law countries are mainly characterised by 
two-tier boards, which separate management and supervisory boards. Therefore, it is likely 
that different board systems will illustrate different allocations of power within corporations.  
 
In fact, the concentration of ownership among State and family-listed corporations in the 
Saudi capital market has indeed, created an agency problem. However, this agency problem 
is not in the form of diverged interests between the management of the firms and their 
shareholders but instead it represents a conflict of interest between the majority shareholders 
(family and State-owned shareholdings) and minority shareholders (investing public). A 
demonstration of the way in which majority shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholders in Saudi listed firms is illustrated in the two interrelated issues below. The first 
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issue is the close relationship between ownership structure and board appointments. In Saudi 
Arabia, it is a ubiquitous practice to see a direct presence of controlling individuals in the 
management of the firm, though not always (but often) as members of the top management 
team, which gives them considerable power and influence over these corporations. As a 
result, the main conflict of interest manifests in terms of the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than the usual conflicts of interest 
(between managers and shareholders) that characterised the agency theory problem. 
Specifically, the highly concentrated ownership enables the Saudi founders or families to 
interfere in the decision-making of the company’s board and to exercise their power in the 
selection of board members. The literature showed that 1/3 of Saudi listed corporations have 
at least two directors from the same family, and 20% of the board members also belong to the 
same family.1179 Similarly, the analysis from Chapter 5 showed that the influence of the Saudi 
government on the securities market is visible in that most chairmen and CEOs of 
government-listed corporations are appointed based on the decisions of the government. 
Also, the election and dismissal of board members are only subjected to approval of the 
government.1180 Indeed, electing members of the board by controlling shareholders is still a 
common practice in the Saudi securities market1181 and many chairmen of listed corporations 
are appointed by the decisions of the State or rich families, without following the due legal 
procedures, as set out in the capital market laws and regulations. For instance, a high 
percentage of members of the boards of the State-controlled corporations in the Saudi 
securities market, such as SABIC, STC, the Alinma Bank, the Riyadh Bank, SAFCO, the 
Electricity Company, the MAADEN Company, the Petro Rabigh Company and others are 
selected by the Saudi government.1182 In fact, the presence/influence of wealthy families is 
not only experienced in their firms’ boardrooms but also in other corporations due to strong 
social ties.  
The evidence above suggests that ownership arrangement in the Saudi stock market, 
especially in family-listed firms is likely to create agency conflict. Previous research has 
shown that family firms suffer from agency problems that are generic to other firms, 
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especially those that arise from the peculiar nature of the relationship between owners.1183 
The nepotism and favouritism that characterise the appointments of board members in the 
majority of the Saudi listed, family firms further exacerbate the agency conflict. Schulze et al 
had earlier demonstrated that altruism, prevalent in family firms, creates a host of agency 
conflicts that have negative consequences to the family firm.1184 These agency conflicts can 
be summarised as follows: agency costs of monitoring agents who are also family members, 
agency costs of monitoring owners that are also members of the family and configurations of 
agency threats, where control mechanisms aggravate each other, exacerbating their effect on 
firm performance.1185 
The second issue derives from the first issue, being the ‘right to elect and dismiss a board of 
directors’. Appointment and rejection of board members are genuine rights given to minority 
shareholders in order to protect their interests against the abuse of controlling shareholders 
and directors. This right is affirmed in the OECD principles of corporate governance, which 
state that ‘… effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such 
as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated’.1186 This right is also 
recognised in Saudi Arabia, whereby the CGR provides that ‘...voting is deemed to be a 
fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in any way, be denied’.1187 However, it 
should be noted that despite the existence of these laws and regulations, there are several 
obstacles that hinder shareholders from exercising their right lawfully. Specifically, 
concentrated ownership in the hands of controlling shareholders, especially in family-listed 
corporations, is one of the key reasons that prevent minority shareholders from participating 
effectively in the election of boards of directors. This reason seems to fit well with the Saudi 
context. As previously mentioned, in Saudi Arabia most boards of family-listed companies 
are controlled and dominated by the same family members. Hence, the right to appoint and 
dismiss directors are subject to their decisions and discretions. A good example is the Al 
Khodari Company, which is a family-owned company (with about 60% share ownership) 
with its chairman and other board members (2/6) belonging to the same family.1188 
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Similarly, there is a problem with insider control. According to Tomasic and Andrews, the 
appointment of independent directors is viewed as a strong element of corporate governance 
and a panacea for insider control.1189 The concentration of ownership in the hands of 
controlling shareholders (State and families) implies that there is a lack of effective external 
monitoring of the management of listed firms. In Saudi Arabia, the percentage of non-
executive directors in the family-listed corporations is still small. Previous research suggests 
this is due to increased concentration of ownership in listed companies.1190 The Capital 
Market Authority in Saudi Arabia identifies the independent members as ‘members who 
enjoy a complete independence’. By implication, family members who are already acting as 
board members should not be allowed to act as non-executive directors. However, this is not 
the case in Saudi Arabia. The main problem lies in the way the Saudi Arabia Corporate 
Governance Regulations (CGRs) define non-executive directors. For instance, the Code 
defines the independent director as the director who has no first-degree relatives on the board, 
where relatives are identified as father, wife or husband and children.1191 This means that 
brothers, sisters, uncles and cousins are excluded from this relationship. In a society like 
Saudi Arabia, the relationships between families are so strong and the firms still look like 
family businesses.1192 Evidence showed that some firms in Saudi Arabia have more than two 
brothers sitting on the board of directors, or in the sub-committees, and they are described as 
independent members.1193 From the perspective of the agency theory, a large presence of 
independent directors on the board can mitigate agency conflicts and thus, enhance board 
effectiveness and firm performance.1194 
Indeed, given that members of one family dominate a board and its committees may affect 
the decision-making processes or perhaps lead to a conflict of interests. Furthermore, since 
the minority shareholders have the right to information, this could also lead to information 
asymmetry between the minority shareholders on the one hand, and majority shareholders on 
the other. Indeed, majority shareholders would have more information regarding the 
company’s situation than their minority counterparts, which could facilitate their 
expropriation of the firm.  
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Taken together, the findings from this research showed that the volume of concentrated 
ownership in Saudi Arabia represents about 70% of the shareholdings structure in the Saudi 
securities market.1195 Specifically, most listed corporations on the Saudi securities market are 
dominated by a relatively small network of prevalent Saudi families and business leaders. 
Remarkably, 1/3 of Saudi listed companies have more than two directors from the same 
family, and in other corporations 20% of the board members belong to the same family.1196 In 
reality, controlling rich families on most listed companies on the Saudi securities market is a 
major problem facing minority shareholders. This is because a high concentration of 
ownership and control allow them to increase not only their wealth but also to exercise 
control over the management, the board of directors, the chairman and the CEO of the 
company. As a result, the rights of the minority shareholders would indeed, remain under the 
control of the majority shareholders, who control all the decisions-making processes of the 
corporation. 
6.2.3 Evidence for Weak Legal Protection of the Rights of Minority Shareholders in 
Saudi Arabia 
One of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 of this thesis is ‘What is the role of the 
Saudi Arabian laws and regulations in protecting minority shareholders' rights?’. This 
question was examined in Chapter 3, which provided a review of legal and judicial 
authorities in relation to capital market operation in Saudi Arabia. The findings revealed that 
the Saudi Arabian government has enacted some laws to regulate the activities of the stock 
market and in particular, safeguard the rights of minority shareholders. La Porta et al have 
earlier asserted that one of the factors that affect the development of capital markets is the 
protection they offer to minority investors and its enforceability and the stability of these 
rules, or at least of the core of these rules.1197 This is so because these rules determine, to a 
large extent, the propensity of outside investors to become minority shareholders in a firm 
controlled by someone else (or, in Adam Smith´s terms, ‘other people´s money’), including 
families.1198 Therefore, protecting the interests of minority shareholders is a gesture of good 
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health of a shareholder democracy and is fundamental in the corporate governance 
process.1199 
According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, ‘effective corporate governance 
requires a sound legal, regulatory and institutional framework that market participants can 
rely on when they establish their private contractual relations’.1200 The principles also suggest 
that a sound legal structure should be in place to promote efficient and effective processes of 
corporate governance. Indeed, as noted in the OECD document, the confidence of minority 
investors is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders 
to bring lawsuits when they have reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been 
violated. Thus, if a violated right cannot be protected by the shareholder in front of coercive 
authorities (such as courts and security committees), the shareholder shall not enjoy effective 
and actual protection, even when he/she is protected by ‘the right on the paper’.1201 
Previous research has shown that the Saudi legal system has the most characteristics of 
systems with weak protection of shareholders.1202 This, according to Almajid, is due to a 
number of factors which include: (1) a concentrated pattern of ownership shareholdings, (2) a 
strong existence of State and family corporate ownership, (3) an illiquid equity market, (4) 
debt finance-dominating equity finance.1203 Almajid argued that the concentrated pattern of 
ownership and the predominant influence of the State and family shareholdings have resulted 
in a less liquid and less competitive stock market.1204 A critical analysis of the rights of 
minority shareholders showed that these rights exist in theory but their enforcement remains a 
critical issue. For instance, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) recognise 
the right of minority shareholders to attend shareholders’ general meetings. Specifically, the 
CGRs stipulate that a general meeting should be held once a year at least, within the six 
months of the end of the company’s fiscal year.1205 The board of directors should call for a 
general meeting following a request of either the auditor or a number of shareholders whose 
shares represent at least 5% of the company's shares capital,1206 (although the CGRs are in 
line with international practices of corporate governance, particularly in terms of the 
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percentage of shares required to call for an extraordinary meeting). Nonetheless, Article 5b) 
of the CGRs conflicts with the provisions of the CL, since the latter has given the 
shareholders, who own at least 20 shares, the right to attend and participate in the general 
assembly.1207 This means that the provisions of the CL may provide good protection of 
minority shareholders against the abuse of the company’s management and its board of 
directors.  
However, there is no determined clause under the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
concerning 5% as a condition for the shareholders to exercise their rights in the general 
meetings. Specifically, this percentage may hinder the rights of shareholders to engage in 
general meetings, raise their opinions and perhaps oppose the effective application of sound 
corporate governance in the Saudi securities market. Article 83 also provides that if a 
shareholder is unable to attend, he can send an authorised representative to cast his vote at the 
meeting. The authorised representative, as Article 84 provides, must not be a member of the 
board of directors. The main problem is that these provisions have not explained or shown the 
form of a proxy, particularly in the case of absentee shareholders. In addition, there are no 
provisions regarding means of sending correspondence (especially for those who live in 
distant locations) or use new technology tools in the voting process. Unlike the UK legal 
system, which allows a shareholder to mail his proxy vote directly to the corporations without 
being there in person, shareholders under the Saudi legal system are not permitted. In fact, 
they are binding to attend in person or authorise someone to represent and vote on their 
behalf.1208 Besides, Saudi listed companies are generally controlled by the majority 
shareholders (State and family) and it is almost impossible for minority shareholders to gain 
sufficient votes through proxies to overcome the power of the controlling shareholders. This 
in turn, suggests that the Saudi system makes it difficult for shareholders to vote, rather than 
encouraging the voting process. Therefore, preventing minority shareholders to cast their 
votes, either via a proxy or use of technology, weakens the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights in the Saudi securities market. 
Available evidence also showed that different procedures may be used to decrease the 
effectiveness of shareholders’ participation in general meetings, such as holding the 
shareholders' general meeting in a difficult location, voting by raising hands without the right 
to demand a poll, delaying the provision of basic information, allowing a limited number to 
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attend the general meetings, giving a period of notice that is below the legal minimum, and so 
on.1209 The main issue that minority shareholders may face is that the company's management 
may display only issues that they want and disregard other significant matters. 
Saudi Arabia has also adopted some principles, which derive from US law, including 
shareholders’ rights to file proposals. Specifically, the US Exchange Act gives the 
shareholders who own equities, with the value of at least $2000 or at least hold 1% of the 
shares, the right to file proposals. However, whether such adopted rules will function 
in practice in Saudi Arabia and remains to be determined. For example, the majority of Saudi 
minority shareholders participate in the share market as speculators, not investors; they have 
no interest in putting shareholder proposals to a general meeting. Specifically, in Saudi 
Arabia, the right of participation in proposing the agenda in the general meeting is restricted 
only to shareholders who hold 5% of shares capital of the company. The CGRs have frankly 
stated that: 
 
In preparing the general assembly’s agenda, the board of directors shall take 
into consideration matters, which the shareholders want to be listed in that 
agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares are 
entitled to add one or more items to the agenda upon its preparation.1210 
 
Indeed, this percentage is inconsistent with the sound practice of good corporate governance 
and can have a negative effect on the protection of minority shareholders' rights. In fact, the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance have not mentioned the 5% criteria in its 
document. Furthermore, the rights of minority shareholders to be involved in modifying the 
corporate charter, or any essential developments in the company’s position, are weak in the 
Saudi markets. The findings showed that minority shareholders are usually oppressed by the 
controlling shareholders, especially when those amendments are being deliberated upon. The 
problem often occurs when the new controlling shareholders and management release new 
policies and strategies that significantly contradict the existing ones. These changes may have 
a negative impact on minority shareholders' rights and interests. For example, these changes 
may push minority shareholders to sell their equities in the company but at an unfavourable 
price because the new management and strategy may lower the share price. 
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Apart from the provision of the rights of minority shareholders, the Saudi legal system also 
provides different mechanisms of shareholder protection (such as derivative action and 
cumulative voting). However, the enforcement of these mechanisms in the Saudi market is 
relatively weak. For instance, the CGRs have recognized the principle of cumulative voting 
as an original principle, which can support and give minority shareholders the opportunities 
to elect their representatives on the company's board. However, the findings showed that the 
cumulative voting process under the Saudi regulations is still optional instead of obligatory. 
Therefore, as previous research suggests, this mechanism is not a compulsory tool, 
particularly in publicly-listed companies.1211 Besides, high ownership concentrations 
(especially in family-listed corporations) prevent minority shareholders from participating 
effectively in the election of boards of directors. As previously noted, in Saudi Arabia most 
boards of family-listed companies are controlled and dominated by the same family 
members. As a result, the right to appoint and dismiss directors is subject to their decisions 
and discretions. Similarly, minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia are allowed by law to bring 
derivative action against directors on behalf of the company, but this does not always work in 
practice. 
The main issue is that the right of a shareholder to exercise his or her right in litigation of the 
board members is restricted to specific circumstances, namely 1) shareholders cannot file 
such legal action unless the company’s right is still valid and after notifying the company by 
his/her intention to do so; 2) violation of directors should damage shareholders’ interests 
precisely; 3) aggrieved shareholders are not allowed to bring claims against directors if the 
company intends to prosecute wrongs made by the directors.1212 In reality, analyzing Article 
78 of the SCL has shown that the fate of minority shareholders’ rights will depend on the 
majority shareholders' decisions, who dominate the general assembly. The meaning of this 
Article suggests that the controlling shareholders legally act as judges in their own cases. The 
current SCL, instead of providing legal assistances, directives, guidance and suitable 
protection of minority shareholders, has indeed, made things difficult for minority 
shareholders and on the other hand, supported the dominance of majority shareholders in the 
company’s affairs. Furthermore, it has also been argued that this law does not identify 
                                                 




appropriate remedies for minority shareholders, especially when their rights have been 
damaged or expropriated, due to mismanagement or abuse of majority shareholders.1213 
Another important finding from this research is that in Saudi Arabia there is an absence of a 
specialised, commercial court to deal with security market issues, including those affecting 
minority shareholders. Currently, the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes 
(CRSD) and the Appeal Committee for Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC) are 
responsible for adjudicating the issues of the securities market. The main challenge facing 
minority shareholders is that those committees are not subjected to the judicial courts, they 
are known as quasi-judicial committees, and hence they do not have a binding force to 
implement their decisions. Furthermore, the CRSD is subjected to the authority of the Capital 
Market Authority Board (CMAB), thus making it non-autonomous and impartial. Similarly, 
both the CRSD and the ACRSC are headquartered in Riyadh, which is the capital of Saudi 
Arabia. There are no branches of these committees in other Saudi Arabian cities. Thus, the 
lack of other judicial committees in other cities in Saudi Arabia remains a major dilemma for 
investors in general, particularly minority shareholders. 
Taken together, it seems that the Saudi legal system provides some measures aimed at 
protecting the rights of minority shareholders, thus conforming to the standard of good 
corporate governance. However, these measures seem to work in theory rather than in 
practice. Indeed, the findings above seem to be supported by a wealth of anecdotal evidence 
and some academic research, which showed that whenever a locale does not have 
comprehensive protection of minority stakeholder rights, their interests tend to not be catered 
for, as much as they would in minority-friendly locations.1214 The protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights under the Saudi legal system is poor, ineffective and in need of 
improvement. As a general norm, shareholders’ rights cannot be protected by the rule of ‘the 
right on the paper’. A violated right cannot be protected without effective, judicial protection. 
Even if it is granted by an advanced legal system, it will remain meaningless. The existence 
of laws and the quality of their enforcement by regulatory bodies and courts are significant 
factors of both corporate governance and the financial system of a country.  
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6.3 Contribution of the Research 
Specifically, the present thesis aims to provide insight into the influence of corporate 
governance on the protection of the rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, in 
comparison with the UK corporate governance system. In recent years, the study of corporate 
governance has become increasingly recognised in the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) regions. As a result, practitioners from the capital market including banks, private 
and public sectors and civil society alike, have accepted the need to address corporate 
governance issues as a means of increasing the investment climate and international 
competitiveness in the global economy. Indeed, there is a dearth of literature in the MENA 
region in general and particularly in Saudi Arabia. These developments alongside others, 
were the primary motive for embarking on this research. Therefore, the findings from this 
research have important implications for understanding the role of corporate governance in 
protecting the rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the findings will 
contribute to the literature on corporate governance and shed light to understanding the role 
of concentrated share ownership, especially family owners, in the protection of rights of 
minority investors.   
As corporate governance practice is gradually developing in the Kingdom, the findings from 
this thesis highlight those internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance, 
including the barriers facing their successful implementation. By so doing, practitioners and 
policy makers alike will be fully informed on the ways to improve corporate governance 
standards in the Kingdom, especially regarding the investment climate, market regulations 
and shareholder democracy. Furthermore, the findings from this thesis have important 
implications for legal education, especially in understanding the role of laws and regulations 
in the protection of the rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Importantly, the 
analysis of the legal structures, capital market laws and corporate governance 
codes/regulations have theoretical implications for a number of academic debates, including 
the debate as to whether law matters in economic development as La Porta et al would 
claim.1215 Therefore, the present thesis makes a useful contribution to understanding the 
development of law and policy in Saudi Arabia, especially as it relates to minority 
shareholders’ protection. Perhaps this knowledge may likely benefit future capital market law 
reforms in Saudi Arabia. Also, the research findings can sereve as a reformative tool for 
improving the market in the Arab Gulf States GCC.   
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6.4 Corporate Governance and Protection of Minority Shareholders Enhancing Saudi 
Laws 
This thesis has chiefly relied on describing and comparing the statutory protection of 
minority shareholders under the UK and Saudi Arabian legal systems. A comparative and 
analytical study is a substantial approach in legal studies; it allows countries to benefit from 
other countries, which have more advanced legal experiences. In fact, the effectiveness of a 
legal transplant is still a subject of controversy amongst legal researchers. Those in support of 
legal transplants, particularly Watson, believe that ‘transplanting is, in fact, the most fertile 
source of development. Most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing’.1216 
Friedman endorsed this orientation and assumed that the legal transplant is a beneficial 
method to reform the local laws. It helps local regulators to borrow laws that will assist them 
to reshape local laws and harmonize them with the local situation.1217 However, opponents 
argued that legal transplants may not be successful because every law is culturally 
determined.1218 
Despite these opposing views, the comparative approach is beneficial in that it enables 
researchers to appraise existing laws from the regional and global perspectives in order to 
find a means of addressing the weaknesses in their local legal systems. Corporate governance 
has been one of the significant subjects in comparative studies across the world.  The notion 
of the corporate governance system is made up of both internal and external structures. 
Politics, laws, rules, values, cultures and other constituents in any State play a crucial role in 
developing and improving corporate governance systems.  
In fact, the concept of corporate governance is no longer restricted to the advanced 
economies, it is now been embraced by developing and emerging countries alike. Nowadays, 
each country is attempting to reform its legal system and economic environment in order to 
strengthen its financial stability and attract foreign investment. Indeed, reforming local 
corporate governance practice requires an input from the advanced models of corporate 
governance. All countries pursue two famous corporate governance models, namely the 
Anglo-Saxon model (the UK system is an example) and the intercontinental European model 
(the Germany system is an example). Most studies view the US and the UK models as 
                                                 
1216A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Literature (2nd edition, University of Georgia Press, 1993). 
1217L. M. Friedman, Adapting Legal Cultures: Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants (edited by David Nelken& Johannes 
Feest, New York, Section 4, 2001) 93-98.  
1218P. Legrand, What Legal Transplants? In Adapting Legal Cultures (edited by J. Feest and D. Nelken. Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
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‘panacea par excellence’, when it comes to reforming a corporate governance system and 
providing good protection for minority shareholders.  
This research is based on the critical and comparative analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the corporate governance system in protecting minority shareholders in the Saudi securities 
market. The OECD principles of Corporate Governance and the UK corporate governance 
system have been used as a benchmark in recommending ways of addressing the weaknesses 
and shortcomings in relation to the issue of protecting minority shareholders' rights in Saudi 
Arabia. 
6.5 Recommendations  
In the discussion that follows, an examination of ways to improve the Saudi legal system in 
relation to capital market operations is provided. As far as protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights is concerned, it is obvious from the literature that the model of ownership 
structure under the UK system provides much better protection of minority shareholders, 
unlike the protection provided under the concentrated model.1219 Thus, it can be said that 
investment in the UK securities market is more safe and attractive than in other countries that 
rely on insider-based models of corporate governance.1220 Therefore, Saudi CGRs would do 
better for minority shareholders if their laws and regulations are modified to ensure adequate 
protection of the rights of minority shareholders. To this end, the following recommendations 
are proposed, which if strictly enforced would ensure adequate protection of the rights of 
minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia.  
 In line with the UK system, the Saudi Capital Market Authority Board (CMAB) 
should adopt the principle of comply or explain into its Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CGRs) and also ensure that it is a binding rule for each listed corporation 
operating in the Saudi securities market. 
 There is a need to lessen the concentration of ownership and control in the Saudi 
securities market. This could be achieved by establishing a solid organisational 
structure, which would see devolution of powers, jurisdictions, responsibilities and 
administrative lines among owners, shareholders, employees and management. In 
addition, it is necessary to limit the number of family members and unqualified 
                                                 
1219L.R. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control 
from Cash Flow Rights (Working Paper no. 6951, NBER, 1999);  R. La Porta et al., ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997), The 
Journal of Finance, vol 52, no 3,  pp 1131-1149; J.C. Coffee, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: the Roles of Law and State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control’ (2001) T he Yale Law Journal, vol  111, no 1, pp 1-82. 
1220R. La Porta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (1998)  Journal of Political Economy, vol 106, pp 1151-1152. 
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personnel in the company’s management board and then use some incentives to attract 
the highly skilled, well experienced and qualified persons to act in the management of 
these corporations.  
 The Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) stated that each listed corporation 
should comply with the provisions of these regulations and thus endeavour to separate 
the duties of the chairman and the CEO. However, this rule is still optional instead of 
binding. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of the board of directors, the CGRs 
should make it compulsory that the duties of the chairman and the CEO remain 
separated in all Saudi listed corporations. This rule must be binding and not optional.    
 In order to provide solid protection of minority shareholders, the Saudi securities 
market could benefit from the UK experience, especially in the establishment of 
shareholders’ institutions. Thus, this research recommends investing in the securities 
market via shareholders’ institutions instead of through individual shareholders.  
 Financial penalties and imprisonment terms imposed by the CRSD are not sufficient 
to deter violations of the provisions of the CML and its regulations. Similarly, they 
are not commensurate with the nature of the offence or violations inflicted on the 
securities market and shareholders. Therefore, the research recommends the need for 
the Saudi regulators to amend Articles 57c) and 59b) of the CML to increase the 
financial penalties and criminal sanctions. Also, amending the CML’s articles to issue 
more severe penalties/sanctions would indeed, contribute in protecting the rights of 
minority shareholders and thus strengthen the stability of the securities market.   
 The lack of existence of other judicial committees in other provinces in Saudi Arabia 
greatly contributes in preventing minority shareholders to bring legal actions before 
these committees. This is because they have to incur high travel costs due to long 
distance journeys. Thus, this research strongly recommends that the Saudi regulator 
could benefit from the UK’s experience in this respect. In the UK, High Courts are 
available in the country to hear all securities market-related disputes. The aggrieved 
party or parties do not have to travel to London to lodge his or her complaint.  
 With the rapid growth in the Saudi securities market and associated market disputes, it 
appears that the number of members of the ACRSC is no longer enough to deal with 
the size of the market and volume of cases it presents. Indeed, three members would 
delay the process of litigation, which may cause damages to the rights of minority 
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shareholders. Therefore, the need to increase the number of ACRSC to respond to the 
vicissitudes and exigencies in the market remains sine qua non.  
 The findings from this study showed that the CML has not made any provision as to 
the independence and accountability of the members of the CRSD and the ACRSC. In 
other words, the issue of judicial independence and accountability of these committee 
members, when they make mistakes or engage in any form of misconduct, is not 
covered by the law. For instance, the CRSD’s members are appointed by the decision 
of the CMAB for a renewable three-year term. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that 
the CRSD’s members cannot make any decisions that conflict with the directives of 
the CMAB. As a result, the performance of the CRSD would perhaps be prone to bias, 
which will negatively reflect on the justice delivered, as well as the integrity. 
Therefore, granting the two committees autonomy will reduce all forms of bias, which 
in turn would ensure fairness in the justice system.    
 As a general principle, the integrity and independence of the judiciary members 
requires that judges should not receive any wages or premiums from government or 
from any other sector. In Saudi Arabia however, the CML has not prevented the 
committees’ members from working in the public or private sectors, as the members 
of these committees are still holding other jobs in both government and private 
parastatals. In addition, the committees’ members do not enjoy full judicial immunity, 
which would guarantee fairness whilst discharging their duties. To address this 
shortcoming, the research recommends that the Saudi regulatory should prevent the 
committee members from engaging in any other duty or duties outside their 
jurisdiction and they also need to be provided with sufficient, statutory protection.   
 In accordance with the available information on the website of the Committee for 
Resolution of Securities Disputes, the members of the ACRSC work as legal advisors 
in the governmental bodies. The nature of their professional work is subjected to 
administrative law, and thus they express their legal opinions before the Board of 
Grievances (administrative court) regarding issues that arise from administrative or 
contractual relationships. Thus, it is clear that these committees lacked sufficient 
experience in securities law, commercial law and corporate law. The research 
recommends the Saudi regulatory to address this issue immediately as it negatively 
reflects on the confidence of the securities market in protecting its investors.   
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 To prevent duplication between the CMAB and the CRSD regarding the imposition of 
sanctions and penalties, the research recommends the amendment of Article 59b) of 
the CML, so that CRSD is seen as the sole court empowered to impose sanctions and 
penalties against those who violate the provisions of the CML and its regulations. 
 Articles 77 and 78 of the Company Law 1965 have reinforced the dominance and 
control of the majority shareholders, as it stated that filing the claim against the board 
of directors must be made at the regular general meeting. Accordingly, the controlling 
shareholders have the right to accept or reject the claim of the minority shareholders, 
as well as the power to relieve the members of the board from a liability suit. These 
Articles represent a significant shortcoming, which may harm the rights of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the research recommends the amendment of these Articles to 
ensure that minority shareholders have the right to sue boards of directors without any 
restrictions. Derivative action is a common mechanism under the UK system used to 
strengthen and reinforce the protection of minority shareholders against the abuse and 
expropriation of board members and controlling shareholders. Therefore, the research 
strongly recommends the Saudi regulator to benefit from the UK experience in this 
context and adopt this method in the securities laws and regulations. 
 The findings of this study also revealed that minority shareholders face some 
ambiguities when it comes to identifying the appropriate or competent court to refer 
their cases to when they have conflicts with the board of directors. Sadly, there is no 
clear provision in the law as to which court they need to channel their grievances to. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the security regulators should clarify which court of 
law has the jurisdiction to deal with disputes arising between minority shareholders 
and boards of directors.  
 Proxy voting represents an important issue in protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders. The advantage of this idea is that it enables shareholders to vote without 
attending the general meeting. It saves time, effort and money of shareholders.1221As 
discussed earlier, exercise of this right by minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia does 
not guarantee adequate protection. Therefore, preventing minority shareholders to cast 
their votes by using proxy or technological means may weaken the protection of their 
rights in the Saudi securities market. In the UK Company Act, shareholders have an 
absolute right to appoint another person as a proxy to attend, speak and vote at a 
                                                 
1221U. C. Braendle, ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany - “Law and Finance” Revisited"’ (2006) German Law Journal, vol7, 
no 3, pp 267. 
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general meeting on their behalf.1222 Furthermore, they are also allowed to send all 
documents relating to the general meeting (such as the appointment of a proxy in 
meeting without the need to attend) by using all forms of electronic media.1223 
Therefore, it is recommended that using proxy voting and technology tools, including 
electronic voting, would widen shareholders’ participation and strengthen their 
position in the market. It will also help mitigate any conflict of interest between 
minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. Similarly, a strong regulatory 
framework is needed to mitigate any undue pressure from the directors, who may 
capitalise on any weakness on the part of minority shareholders to expropriate their 
rights. 
 The findings from this research showed that Saudi Arabian regulations have indeed, 
affirmed the transparency and disclosure requirements as fundamental principles in its 
stock market. Specifically, the SCL of 1965 gives shareholders the right to obtain 
copies of the reports of the board and of the auditor and to receive an invitation to a 
GM together with its agenda. However, no mechanism was provided under the law to 
ensure that the information the shareholder receives is a genuine and accurate 
reflection of the company’s status. Indeed, without a clear picture of the company’s 
situation, shareholders cannot effectively play their part in the company’s affairs. 
Therefore, the need to revise the provisions of the SCL so that shareholders would 
have easy access to all company’s reports and other relevant information, as long as 
such information is not detrimental to the company, should be provided at no extra 
cost.  
 The Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) have not explained or shown the 
form of proxy, particularly in the case of the absence of shareholders. In addition, 
these regulations have not mentioned to use any distance communications or new 
technology tools in the voting process. Consequently, the recommendation here is that 
using proxy voting and technology tools, including electronic voting, will definitely 
lead to widened participation of minority shareholders and strengthen their position in 
listed corporations.  
 The use of cumulative voting is still an optional, instead of mandatory, mechanism of 
shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia. As a result, participation of minority 
shareholders in the election and dismissal of board members is still not enforceable. 
                                                 
1222Sec 324 (1) UK Company Act 2006. 
1223ibid Sec (333). 
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This is because most boards of family-listed companies are controlled and dominated 
by the same family members. Hence, the right to appoint and dismiss the board 
members are subjected to their own whims and caprices. Therefore, it is necessary to 
make cumulative voting a compulsory tool in all listed corporations in the Saudi 
securities market. 
6.6 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings from this research need to be considered within the context of some 
methodological limitations. Therefore, they have to be interpreted with caution. First, the 
research methodology was designed to achieve a complete understanding of similarities and 
differences in corporate governance and minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia and 
the UK. Although the choice of the UK as a benchmark for comparison was highlighted, 
particularly her recognition as one of few countries with sound and efficient corporate 
governance practices in the world. It could have been necessary to include another MENA 
country in the comparison. This would allow for a meaningful conclusion to be drawn 
concerning whether the corporate governance practice in Saudi Arabia generalises to other 
countries in the region, or whether it is specific to Saudi Arabia alone. A further examination 
of the influence of corporate governance on minority shareholders’ protection could therefore 
be to investigate whether the Saudi findings can be generalising to other MENA countries. 
Secondly, the study examined the legal framework for protecting minority shareholders in 
Saudi listed corporations in general. This is a weakness in that corporations differ in terms of 
capitalisation size, industry sectors and ownership structure. Indeed, the findings from this 
thesis may have led to a different conclusion, had these variables been taken into 
consideration. A series of studies could address this issue by controlling these variables in 
their analysis. Thirdly, the present research relied mainly on secondary sources of 
information in its analysis. Even though these techniques save time and are easily-accessible, 
it may not capture the true realities of the situation in the jurisdiction of study. Besides, the 
information may be obsolete or unreliable. Future empirical research that adopts an interview 







This thesis has explored the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the protection 
of minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia and compared these with the UK corporate 
governance system. Specifically, the findings from this thesis have revealed some differences 
and similarities between the two jurisdictions, on the influence of the internal and external 
structures of corporate governance, on the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
Importantly, both jurisdictions have enacted some laws to regulate the activities of the stock 
market and in particular, safeguard the rights of the minority shareholders, which indeed 
suggest evidence of a global standard of good corporate governance. Despite the existence of 
these regulations, the enforcement of these rights remains a bigger challenge in Saudi Arabia 
than in the UK. This is due to a weak legal system, characterised by an inadequate or weak 
enforcement of corporate governance regulations. Besides, the fines and sanctions imposed 
on those who violate the provisions of corporate governance are not commensurable with the 
offence committed. In fact, the impact of this weak legislation on the rights of minority 
shareholders cannot be underestimated. Indeed, minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia still 
suffer various forms of abuse and expropriation of their rights, from the hands of controlling 
shareholders. This is still a big concern considering the ownership structure in the Kingdom, 
which is characterised by a powerful influence of the State and wealthy families.  
Another noticeable difference between the two jurisdictions is on the use of proxy voting and 
technology tools. In fact, this technique is rarely used in Saudi Arabia compared to the UK. 
The implication is that the absence of proxy voting limits participation of minority 
shareholders in the affairs of corporations. There is also a problem with the use of cumulative 
voting, which is still an optional rather than mandatory mechanism of minority shareholder 
protection in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, CEO duality is still a norm in most Saudi listed 
firms as opposed to the UK, where every corporation is expected to comply with the 
Corporate Governance Code, which recommends that the duties of the CEO and chairperson 
should be separated.  
Although the debates concerning the success or failure of legal transplantation is outside the 
focus of this thesis, the findings from this thesis suggest that the Saudi security market would 
likely benefit from the adoption of UK capital market laws and regulations. Indeed, some of 
the issues that need to be considered when adopting foreign legal rule is for a legislator to 
consider proven efficiency of the rule in their country of origin and whether it will produce 
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the desired effects in the destination country. As previously mentioned, the UK has an 
international reputation when it comes to good corporate governance, hence the need for 
transplanting some of the UK corporate governance practices to the Saudi context. 
Specifically, encouraging the use of electronic voting, granting minority shareholders easy 
access to company’s information, the use of derivative action against the abuse and 
expropriation of board members and controlling shareholders, would improve the way that 
corporations are governed and help increase investors’ confidence in the Saudi Arabia 
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